Carnapian explications,experimental philosophy,and fruitful concepts

It seems natural to think that Carnapian explication and experimental philosophy can go hand in hand. But what exactly explicators can gain from the data provided by experimental philosophers remains controversial. According to an influential proposal by Shepherd and Justus, explicators should use experimental data in the process of ‘explication preparation’. Against this proposal, Mark Pinder has recently suggested that experimental data can directly assist an explicator’s search for fruitful replacements of the explicandum. In developing his argument, he also proposes a novel aspect of what makes a concept fruitful, namely, that it is taken up by the relevant community. In this paper, I defend explication preparation against Pinder’s objections and argue that his uptake proposal conflates theoretical and practical success conditions of explications. Furthermore, I argue that Pinder’s suggested experimental procedure needs substantial revision. I end by distinguishing two kinds of explication projects, and showing how experimental philosophy can contribute to each of them.     

SIGNALING STATIC: ARTISTIC,RELIGIOUS, AND SCIENTIFIC TRUTHS IN A RELATIONAL ONTOLOGY

Abstract. In this essay I point toward the difficulties inherent in ontological objectivity and seek to restore our truth claims to validity through a relational ontology and the dynamic of coimplication in signals and noise. Theological examination of art and science points toward similarities between art, religion, and science. All three have often focused upon a “metaphysics of presence,” the desire for absolute presence of the object (the signified, the divine, the natural object). If we accept a relational ontology, however, we must accept that the revelation of presence is always simultaneously a concealment. This helps explain technoscientific achievement without recourse to a philosophically flawed objectivity. Twentieth‐century information theory shows the impossibility of a “pure signal.” By accepting that signal and noise are permanently interconnected, we begin to see how noise makes signal possible and even how noise becomes signal (allowing the discovery of novel facts). Information theory thus underscores important similarities and leads toward new approaches in aesthetics, Christian theology, and scientific research. By comparing art, religion, and science, I argue that rejecting a metaphysics of presence without rejecting presence itself allows human beings to know the world. Although religion, science, and art often seek the absolute presence of their objects, they function better without.     

The Free will Revolution (Continued)

I seek to reply to the thoughtful and penetrating comments by William Rowe, Alfred Mele, Carl Ginet, and Ishtiyaque Haji. In the process, I hope that my overall approach to free will and moral responsibility is thrown into clearer relief. I make some suggestions as to future directions of research in these areas. I thank Michael McKenna for his thoughtful comments, his generous introduction, and all his hard work in putting this together. Also, I wish to thank J. Angelo Corlett for his very pleasantly surprising decision to do this volume, and for his outstanding work in editing this wonderful journal from its inception.     

Sound intuitions on Moral Twin Earth

A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of papers that make use of their “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic intuitions. If they are right, the intuitions generated by Moral Twin Earth cannot be appealed to in arguments against externalist moral semantics. The most developed case against the Moral Twin Earth argument that follows this strategy is found in a paper by Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis and Angus Dawson. Here I argue that their attack on the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment fails. Laurence, Margolis and Dawson have not shown that we have reason to distrust the semantic intuitions it generates

Simultaneous odor-taste and taste-taste compounds in poison-avoidance learning

In six experiments, rats received an odor or a taste alone or in simultaneous compound with another taste prior to lithium chloride-induced illness. Aversions to the target odor and the target taste were then assessed. In Experiments 1–3, the presence of the taste in compound with the target during conditioning attenuated the strength of the aversions to both the target odor and the target taste. Although these results were consistent with the familiar principles of compound conditioning, they contradicted previous reports of potentiation, rather than attenuation, of odor conditioning by taste. In Experiment 4, taste again attenuated the conditioning of odor when a second odor was presented during the CS-US interval. In Experiment 5, we looked for odor potentiation with a within-subject design, and in Experiment 6, we examined an alternative method of presenting odor. In neither case did we find odor potentiation by taste. Over the range of conditions investigated here, a taste often attenuates, and never potentiates, the conditioning of aversions to both odors and tastes.     

Is dissonance phenomenologically aversive?

This study examined whether dissonance is, phenomenologically, an aversive state. Experimental subjects were induced to write counterattitudinal essays under a high-choice condition. One group of subjects was led to believe that a pill, which they had just taken in the context of a separate experiment, would cause them to feel pleasantly excited. A second group was led to believe that the pill would make them feel tense. A third group was given no information about the pill's potential side effects, while a fourth group expected to have no side effects at all. In this last condition, the results yielded the usual dissonance effect: subjects stated attitudes more congruent with the essay than did subjects in a survey control condition. When subjects were given an opportunity to attribute their arousal to an arousing, but nonaversive pill (i.e., the pleasant excitement condition), this effect was unchanged. In contrast, when subjects could attribute their arousal to an aversive pill (i.e., in the tensè and the no information conditions), this effect was virtually eliminated. These results are consistent with the notion that dissonance is an aversive state and that subjects will seize, when possible, an external attribution for this state.     

Actors,observers, and the attribution process: Toward a reconceptualization

Jones and Nisbett hypothesize that actors attribute their actions to situational requirements whereas observers attribute the same actions to personal dispositions. This hypothesis is critically examined and a reconceptualization is proposed. Our conceptual analysis focuses on the attributional consequences of differences between actors and observers in: (a) availability of information about the contemporary and historical determinants of the actor's behavior, and (b) susceptibility to possible motivational distortions and cognitive biases. The relationship between this formulation and Jones and Nisbett's analysis of differences between self-perception and interpersonal perception is discussed.     

The influence of a model's reinforcement contingency and affective response on children's perceptions of the model

Following their observation of a videotaped model, boys and girls were asked to rate various characteristics of that model. In each of two experiments, the subjects were 90 primary grade children. The model's reinforcement (reward, punishment, or no consequences) and affective response (positive, neutral, or negative) constituted the independent variables. In both experiments, children who observed an affectively neutral model receive punishment, perceived his affective state as more negative than children who observed this model receive reward or no consequences. The converse attribution (i.e., inferring consequences based on depicted model affect) did not obtain. Also, data from both experiments supported the conclusions that (a) the punished model was less attractive than no-consequences and rewarded models, and (b) the model was perceived as less competent when he demonstrated negative affect or received punishment.     

Contextual control of the extinction of conditioned fear

Rats received 15 pairings of a CS and shock in one context, and then a series of CS-alone trials in a second context. Even though this extinction procedure produced a complete loss of conditioned suppression, when the animals were returned to the site of original conditioning, suppression was renewed to a level comparable to that of animals that had not undergone extinction. Controls indicated that the renewed suppression was not due solely to pseudoconditioning, suggesting that the CS-US association had survived extinction. Renewed suppression was also demonstrated in a third context that was never associated with shock. Loss of suppression did not necessarily depend upon inhibitory conditioning of the extinction context. The data suggest that extinction of conditioned fear is specific to the context in which it occurs. They also suggest the possibility that animals might discriminate episodes in which a CS is reinforced and nonreinforced independently of the excitatory or inhibitory status of cues, like contextual stimuli, that are coincidentally present during those episodes.