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21.
Of 96 male undergraduates, one-third saw a violent film which they were told represented a real event, one-third saw the same film presented as a fictional event, and the remaining subjects saw no film. One-half of the subjects in each group had been attacked previously by a confederate while the others had not. Each subject was then given an opportunity to aggress against the confederate by administering shocks to him as punishment in a learning task. Results indicate that subjects who observed real violence delivered stronger shocks to the confederate than subjects who viewed fantasy violence or saw no film. Subjects who were angered and saw the real film were the most punitive toward the confederate. 相似文献
22.
Six-year-old children were tested on several versions of the five-term transitivity problem as used by B. O. McGonigle and M. Chalmers (1977, Nature (London), 267, 694–696) with squirrel monkeys as subjects. Both binary and triadic versions of the tests were administered in both verbal and nonverbal modes to help determine whether or not any major procedural differences between the monkey version and that used conventionally in research with children might account for the monkey's apparently nonlogical solution of the problem. The main result is that children showed very similar response profiles to that of monkeys in all the conditions used. In addition, “labeling”, direct seriation, and “association” post-tests suggest that nonlogical strategies can underwrite ostensibly impeccable transitive “reasoning” in child as well as monkey. 相似文献
23.
Two experiments were designed to investigate the development of a preference for minimal convergence in pictures. Pictures varying in degree of convergence from conic to parallel were observed three at a time under two conditions: monocularly at the correct station point for the conic projection, and freely with unconstrained view. Subjects were children in nursery school (age: 4 years) and first grade (age: 6 years), and adults in college. Subjects were asked to choose the “best” picture. In the correct station point condition the younger children preferred the most conic picture, while adults chose the most parallel projection significantly more frequently than either remaining choice. First-grade children were in transition between these two modes of responding. In the free view condition, the younger children showed no strong preferences, while older children and adults preferred parallel projections significantly more frequently than more convergent pictures. Results were interpreted in context of the development of the “Zoom effect,” an assumption of appropriate viewing distance 10 times as great as the size of the pictured object. 相似文献
24.
Chris Meyns 《Philosophical explorations》2018,21(1):60-75
The category of sympathy marks a number of basic divisions in early modern approaches to action explanations, whether for human agency or for change in the wider natural world. Some authors were critical of using sympathy to explain change. They call such principles “unintelligible” or assume they involve “mysterious” action at a distance. Others, including Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, appeal to sympathy to capture natural phenomena (yawn contagion, magnetism), or to supply a backbone to their metaphysics. Here I discuss how concerns about sympathetic actions form at least a partial background for differing seventeenth-century conceptions of what it is to explain action. I argue that critics of sympathy generally insist on an “atomistic” approach to action explanation, which makes primitively relational phenomena come out as problematic. Proponents of sympathy, by contrast, allow for a more holistic approach to action explanation, which allows for such basic connections. Hence, divergent attitudes toward sympathetic action in part explain differences in approaches to explanation. I conclude by showing how some of these core concerns fade into the background when in the eighteenth-century sympathy gets psychologised and individualised. 相似文献
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26.
Anatomical and theoretical considerations, as well as experimental findings, have yielded conflicting points of view regarding the abilities of the right hemisphere in man to accomplish cross-modal transfer of information. Auditory—visual cross-modal matching (CMM) and association (CMA) abilities of the left and right hemisphere (LH and RH) were tested, using the Wada intracarotid sodium amytal technique. It was found that the RH performed slightly better on these tasks than the LH. These findings contrast with results of other techniques which indicate that the RH cannot perform CMM and CMA. 相似文献
27.
Michael E. Bratman 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):149-165
Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations.
I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what
in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest
sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency
and modest sociality. In pursuit of these theoretical aims, I propose that a central phenomenon is shared intention. I argue
that an adequate understanding of the distinctiveness of the intentions of individuals allows us to provide a construction
of attitudes of the participants, and of relevant inter-relations and contexts that constitutes shared intention. I explain
how shared intention, so understood, differs from a simple equilibrium within common knowledge. And I briefly contrast my
views with aspects of views of John Searle and Margaret Gilbert.
相似文献
Michael E. BratmanEmail: |
28.
Mikko Salmela 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):33-46
Existing scientific concepts of group or shared or collective emotion fail to appreciate several elements of collectivity in such emotions. Moreover, the idea of shared emotions is threatened by the individualism of emotions that comes in three forms: ontological, epistemological, and physical. The problem is whether or not we can provide a plausible account of “straightforwardly shared” emotions without compromising our intuitions about the individualism of emotions. I discuss two philosophical accounts of shared emotions that explain the collectivity of emotions in terms of their intentional structure: Margaret Gilbert's plural subject account, and Hans Bernhard Schmid's phenomenological account. I argue that Gilbert's view fails because it relegates affective experience into a contingent role in emotions and because a joint commitment to feel amounts to the creation of a feeling rule rather than to an emotion. The problems with Schmid's view are twofold: first, a phenomenological fusion of feelings is not necessary for shared emotions and second, Schmid is not sensitive enough to different forms of shared concerns. I then outline my own typology that distinguishes between weakly, moderately, and strongly shared emotions on the basis of the participants’ shared concerns of different degree of collectivity, on the one hand, and the synchronization of their emotional responses, on the other hand. All kind of shared emotions in my typology are consistent with the individualism of emotions, while the question about “straightforward sharing” is argued to be of secondary importance. 相似文献
29.
David Jenkins 《Ratio》2020,33(2):87-96
Recent philosophical work on the relation between reasoning and bodily action is dominated by two views. It is orthodox to have it that bodily actions can be at most causally involved in reasoning. Others have it that reasoning can constitutively involve bodily actions, where this is understood as a matter of non-mental bodily events featuring as constituents of practical reasoning. Reflection on cases of reasoning out-loud suggests a neglected alternative on which both practical and theoretical reasoning can have bodily actions as constituents, where such bodily actions themselves amount to contentful mental events. Furthermore, the natural lines of resistance to this view trade on type-token errors, or on a questionable common-factor assumption. 相似文献
30.
KAREN KOVACH 《Metaphilosophy》2010,41(4):618-638
Abstract: Many individuals experience feelings of collective guilt or shame for the blameworthy historical acts of the nations or ethnic groups to which they belong. I reject the idea that collective moral sentiment rests on inherited moral responsibility. I suggest that the possibilities for individual action inherent in membership in ethnic identity groups can be a source of special moral duties. I argue that collective guilt and shame are moral emotions that individuals experience in response to complex assessments of their groups' histories and of their own practical responses to those histories. The approach I take to analyzing the concept of an ethnic identity group makes use of tools developed by Max Weber. Weber's conceptual work on social groups and related phenomena has been strongly criticized in a widely discussed book by Margaret Gilbert. I show that Gilbert's arguments fail to discredit Weberian analyses of social groups and their properties. 相似文献