TWO FORMS OF LOVE: The Problem of Preferential Love in Kierkegaard's Works of Love

The duty to love one's neighbor as oneself is at the core of Kierkegaard's Works of Love. In this book, Kierkegaard unfolds the meaning of neighborly love and claims that it is the only valid form of true love. He contrasts between neighborly love and preferential love (which includes romantic love and friendship) and criticizes the latter for being nothing but a form of selfishness. However, in some contexts, Kierkegaard seems to acknowledge the significance of preferential love relationships, and does not disallow them. Therefore, his understanding of preferential love appears to be confused and inconsistent. My essay discusses the tension in Kierkegaard's position regarding preferential love, and by presenting recent readings of Works of Love, it asks whether this tension is resolvable and offers a suggestion for a possible solution.     

Reading disability: A problem in rule learning and word decoding

Traditional explanations of reading disability (e.g., perceptual, memory, and phonetic receding deficits) have encountered logical difficulties and substantial empirical disconfirmation. An alternative conceptualization of the nature of reading disability is proposed. Disabled readers are hypothesized to suffer a fundamental problem in acquiring word knowledge and word processing skills. Poor decoding skills prevent them from developing sophisticated reading comprehension skills. From this perspective, the cognitive deficits of disabled readers result from failure to acquire and generalize complex processing skills originally mastered through reading experience. Recent research of the author and of others relating to these issues is discussed.     

Know-how,intellectualism, and memory systems

ABSTRACT

A longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between knowthatand know-how. This traditional “anti-intellectualist” view is soentrenched in folk psychology that it is often invoked in supportof an allegedly equivalent distinction between explicit and implicitmemory, derived from the so-called “standard model of memory.”In the last two decades, the received philosophical view has beenchallenged by an “intellectualist” view of know-how. Surprisingly, defenders of the anti-intellectualist view have turned to the cognitivescience of memory, and to the standard model in particular, todefend their view. Here, I argue that this strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon closer scrutiny, the evidence from cognitivepsychology and neuroscience of memory does not support theanti-intellectualist approach, mainly because the standard modelof memory is likely wrong. However, this need not be interpretedas good news for the intellectualist, for it is not clear that theempirical evidence necessarily supports their view either. I arguethat, currently, the philosophical debate is couched in terms thatdo not correspond to categories in psychological science. As aresult, the debate has to either be re-interpreted in a vocabularythat is amenable to experimental scrutiny, or it cannot be settledempirically.     

Further observations on the nature of prosopagnosia

Two new cases of prosopagnosia are described and compared with pertinent clinical material from the English language literature. The interpretation of this disorder most compatible with the clinical data appears to us to be that there is an underspecification of visuoperceptive information preventing both the formation of significant face images and the retrieval of well-known face memoranda existing within a relatively intact visual remote memory store. Failure of formation of immediate memoranda of similarly complex visual images is also commonly observed but does not seem to be a requirement for the symptom of prosopagnosia. Conceptualizing this abnormality as simply a material specific visual agnosia of images beyond the classifier level would still appear to be acceptable if less informative.     

Verbs,time, and modality

In the first part of this paper it is argued that Vendler's classification of verbs into aspectual categories, called activities, accomplishments, achievements, and states, is better seen as classifying the meanings of sentences, and a recursive scheme for describing the aspectual character of sentences is presented. In the second part, this scheme is applied to the discussion of the epistemic and deontic meanings of the modal verbs must, will, and may. In particular, the relation between the “future” and “nonfuture” senses of epistemic will is examined.     

Self- and other regulation during the infancy period

The “other regulation” views of Lev Vygotsky and of Jerome Bruner are contrasted with Jean Piaget's self-regulatory model of infant development. Examples of adult behavior in Piaget's writings and in mother-infant interactions suggest that adults perform behaviors which are analogous to Piaget's type a and b self-regulation. Data from infant games are provided to illustrate the processes by which mothers regulate the environments for their infants and the consequences of such maternal regulation for infant development.     

Current issues in theory construction: A commentary on Waters and Sroufe

The view of competence proposed by Waters and Sroufe remains faithful to a kind of theorizing about human personality which emphasizes its unitary and universal properties. Developments in other areas of inquiry, however, are redirecting theoretical efforts toward a more pluralistic and contextualistic view of human nature and development. Implications for future theories of development are discussed.