A note on the "word-order problem" in agrammatism

This brief note has two parts. First, it presents an analysis of the ability of English agrammatic patients to assign the thematic roles of agent, instrument, theme, and locative to noun phrases in active and passive sentences and prepositional phrases. Data regarding this ability have been presented by Schwartz, Saffran, and Marin (Brain and Language, 10, 149-262 (1980) regarding comprehension, and by Saffran, Schwartz, and Marin (Brain and Language, 10, 263-280 (1980) regarding production. These authors claim their data show that English agrammatic aphasics do not map "word order" onto thematic information. However, a very simple set of principles accounts for all their results, including results which are discrepant in their treatment, but requires that English agrammatics assign thematic roles to NPs in part by virtue of the position of an NP in a sentence or a phrase. In the second part of this note, several issues raised by this re-analysis are briefly discussed.     

Irrelevance of mitigating circumstances in retaliatory behavior at high levels of excitation

Subjects were aggressively instigated by a provoker. They then performed either a nonstrenuous or a strenuous task in order to be placed in either a moderate or an extreme state of sympathetic arousal. Following the task, they either learned or did not learn about mitigating circumstances behind the provoker's behavior. This information was received prior to the provision of an opportunity to retaliate. Under conditions of moderate arousal, mitigating circumstances were found to reduce retaliation. In contrast, these circumstances failed to exert any appreciable effect on retaliation under conditions of extreme arousal. In addition, the induction of extreme arousal was observed to increase retaliatory behavior. The findings were considered to support a model of hostility and aggression that postulates a specific interdependency of cognitive and excitatory processes.     

An empirical evaluation of a scale to measure occupational aspiration level

Data from 34,118 American high school students are used to evaluate the Occupational Aspiration Scale (OAS). The OAS is successively reevaluated for each of 16 subsamples (cells) generated by cross-classifying respondents by grade in school (9–12), sex, and socioeconomic status (SES). In each cell the OAS is found to be essentially unifactorial, and that factor is identified as level of occupational aspiration (LOA). The reliability of the OAS is slightly lower among females ($\text{r}$_kk = .681) than among males ($\text{r}$_kk = .756); it does not vary appreciably by grade or SES. The mean scores are lower for youth from low SES families than for those from high SES families, in accord with previous research. Mean OAS differences due to sex and grade are small. No important differences by age, sex, or SES are found in the standard deviations of the test scores. This and previously published data from small, local samples indicate that the reliability and validity of the OAS are sufficient for research on high school youth of both sexes and from both higher and lower SES levels.     

Exposure effects and associative learning

The contributions of initial stimulus affect and of associative learning to the effects of repeated stimulus exposures were examined in two experiments. Stimuli that were initially positive and stimuli that were initially negative were presented for different number of times, and subjects rated these stimuli afterward on a number of affective dimensions. In all cases, except when negative affect was associatively paired with every stimulus exposure, affective responses became increasingly more positive with increasing exposures. The results were taken to indicate that the exposure effect can overcome an initially negative stimulus affect when the conditions of the mere exposure hypothesis are satisfied. Initial stimulus affect and associative learning of affect were shown to be independent factors, the first influencing the intercept of the exposure function, the second its slope.     

Inferential processes in the forced compliance situation: A Bayesian analysis

The attribution made by an observer (O) to an actor in the forced compliance situation was regarded as a probability revision process which can be described by a Bayesian inference model. Os' perceptions of the forced compliance situation were analyzed in terms of the input components into the Bayesian model: prior probabilities of the relevant attitudes and the diagnostic values of the behaviors which the actor may choose. In order to test propositions made by attribution theory about such perceptions (Kelley, 1967;Messick, 1971), Os viewed actors under conditions of Low Inducement (LI) and High Inducement (HI). Before observing the actor's decision, Os estimated the prior probabilities of the relevant attitudes and the conditional probabilities of compliance and refusal given each of the attitudes. After observing the actor's decision, Os estimated the posterior probabilities of the attitudes. As expected, in the LI condition, compared to the HI condition, compliance was seen as less probable and more diagnostic about the actor's attitudes, and the posterior probability of the corresponding attitude was higher. Contrary to expectations, within both conditions, compliance, compared to refusal, was seen as less diagnostic and more probable.     

Stimulus probability and prediction outcome as determinants of choice reaction time: Some procedural considerations

Effects of stimulus probability and prediction outcome on two-choice reaction speed (CRS) were determined when a frequency imbalance was reversed half-way through 300 samples of a 70/30 stimulus distribution and when the same 70/30 distribution was sampled for 1200 trials. Prior to each presentation Ss made a prediction; following each presentation Ss identified the stimulus by pressing a right-hand or left-hand trigger. CRS was faster to correctly predicted stimuli, and faster to the more probable stimulus. Ss who were informed of the frequency imbalance reacted significantly faster than Ss who were not. Both practice and boredom effects were demonstrated by using the extended number of trials. CRS was faster during the second session of 300 trials than during the first; after two sessions, CRS was slower during the second half of two additional sessions.     

Testing two classes of theories about group induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly cautious or overly risky. Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Two experiments were conducted, the results of which give considerable support to persuasive-argument theories and none to those based on interpersonal comparison: When a member did not know whether others were arguing for their own position or were forced to support a position contrary to the one they had originally chosen, and the former in fact was the case, typical shifts in choice were obtained. However, if a member had to argue for a position contrary to the one he had initially chosen (and thus he would not be able to muster highly persuasive arguments) typical shifts did not occur, even though another's initial choice could be accurately inferred.     

Sensitivity to binocular depth information in infants

In order to study infants' sensitivity to binocular information for depth, 11 infants, 20 to 26 weeks of age, were presented with real and stereoscopically projected virtual objects at three distances, and the infants' reaching behavior was videotaped. When the virtual object was positioned out of reach, infants tended to lean further forward and to reach less frequently than when the virtual object was positioned within reach. In addition, the proportion of reaches in which the infants patted, closed their hands, or brought their hands together was greater when the virtual object was within reach. However, no difference in the terminal location of the infants' reaches was found as a function of the virtual object's position. Examination of reaches to a near real object revealed that infants frequently did not contact the object or show appropriate hand shape or orientation. The effectiveness of the cue of retinal size and of binocular information for the depth of an object is discussed. It is concluded that 5-month-old infants are sensitive to binocular information for depth.     

The development of memory structure as reflected by semantic-priming effects

This study was designed to investigate the development of knowledge about categorical and associative relationships as reflected by the presence or absence of semantic priming effects. Kindergarteners and second-graders were shown pairs of pictures, one picture at a time, and asked to name each picture as rapidly and accurately as possible. Picture pairs were of four types which reflected the factorial combination of associative relatedness (high and low) with categorial relatedness (high and low). An analysis of naming times revealed a significant main effect of associative relatedness, i.e., second pictures or “target” pictures in high-associative pairs were named faster than those in low-associative pairs. This reduction in naming latency, or priming effect, was independent of developmental level. However, the effects of category relatedness varied with developmental level, i.e., target pictures in high-categorical pairs were named significantly faster than those in low pairs by second-graders, but not by kindergarteners. These findings are discussed in terms of previous estimates of children's semantic competence.