On not being able to dream

In this paper, the author explores the phenomenon of not being able to dream (as opposed to not being able to remember one's dreams) from three different vantage points. First, from the point of view of psychoanalytic theory, he discusses Bion's idea that the work of dreaming creates the conscious and unconscious mind (and not the other way around). A person who cannot dream is unable to generate differentiable conscious and unconscious experience and, consequently, lives in a psychic state in which he is unable to differentiate waking from sleeping, dreaming from perceiving. The author then approaches the problem of the inability to dream from the perspective achieved by a literary work. He discusses a Borges fiction that creates, in a singularly artful way, the experience of not being able to dream. Finally, the author utilises the vantage point of a detailed account of a clinical experience to explore what it means not to be able to dream. He describes an initial state characterised by the patient's proliferation of unutilisable 'psychic noise' which, over a period of years, led to the analyst's experiencing 'reverie-deprivation' and brief periods of countertransference psychosis. Two analytic sessions are presented and discussed in which psychological work was done that contributed to an enhanced capacity on the part of both patient and analyst for genuine dreaming - both in sleep and in analytic reverie states.     

What is a Jungian analyst dreaming when myth comes to mind? Thirdness as an aspect of the anima media natura

Listening analytically is not listening just to what is said but listening to what is just below the surface waiting to be said. This paper looks at Jung's insight into a ‘third thing’ being created intra‐psychically and within the analytic encounter. Ogden's concept of an ‘analytic third’ is used to describe the clinical aspects of this thirdness. This paper explores: how the state of thirdness is created and accessed through use of reverie and associative dreaming; how the material emerging from it is used in a from or about manner; and the eventual fate of the third in a successful analysis by a reexamination of plates four and ten of the Rosarium. The focus is particularly on the awareness and possible meanings of mythological motifs appearing in the mind of the analyst while in session. Thirdness can be viewed as the interpersonal aspect of the anima media natura and functions in a way that informs us of permeability in and between individuals, while the operation of the anima mundi means that there is always an inseparability of the individual with the world.     

On psychoanalytic supervision

The author provides both a theoretical context for, and clinical illustrations of, the way in which he thinks and works as a psychoanalytic supervisor. The analytic supervisory experience is conceived of as a form of 'guided dreaming'. In the supervisory relationship, the supervisor helps the analyst to dream (to do conscious and unconscious psychological work with) aspects of the analytic relationship that the analyst is unable to dream or is only partially able to dream. It is the task of the supervisory pair to 'dream up' the patient, that is, to create a 'fi ction' that is true to the supervisee's emotional experience with the analysand. To carry out this work, the supervisor must provide a frame that ensures the supervisee's freedom to think and dream and be alive to what is occurring in the analytic and the supervisory relationship, as well as in the interplay between the two. In one of the clinical illustrations presented, the author illustrates his conception of the importance of the feeling on the part of supervisor and supervisee that (at least occasionally) they have 'time to waste'. Such a state of mind may provide an opportunity for a type of freely associative thinking that enhances the range and depth of what can be learned from the supervisory experience. In another clinical example, the author describes his own experience in supervision with Harold Searles, which contributed to his conception of the supervisory process.     

Social contents in dreams: An empirical test of the Social Simulation Theory

Social Simulation Theory (SST) considers the function of dreaming to be the simulation of social events. The Sociality Bias and the Strengthening hypotheses of SST were tested. Social Content Scale (SCS) was developed to quantify social events. Additionally, we attempted to replicate a previous finding (McNamara et al., 2005, Psychological Science) of REM dreams as predisposed to aggressive, and NREM dreams to prosocial interactions.Further, we investigated the frequency and quality of interactions in late vs early REM and NREM dreams. Data consisted of wake, REM and NREM home dream reports (N = 232, 116, 116, respectively) from 15 students. Dreams overrepresented social events compared to wake reports, supporting the Sociality Bias hypothesis. However, the Strengthening Hypothesis was not supported. We weren’t able to replicate the McNamara et al. finding, and no time of night effect was found. While SST gained partial support, further research on social contents in dreams is required.     

Phenomenal consciousness in dreams and in mind wandering

Dreaming can be explained as the product of an interaction among memory processes, elaborative processes, and phenomenal awareness. A feedback circuit is activated by this interaction according to the associative links and the requirements of the dream scene. Recently, it has been hypothesized that a partial similarity exists between dreaming and mind wandering and that these two processes may involve the same neural default network. This commentary discusses the differences and similarities between phenomenal consciousness during dreaming and phenomenal consciousness during mind wandering from the perspective of the “continuity” of engagement of cognitive systems. The greatest difference consists in the lack of reality testing during dreaming. Dream imagery is hallucinatory by nature. Consequently, the simulated world in dreams makes dream imagery more akin to perception. In contrast, the imagery of mind wandering is more similar to imagination. The level of meta-awareness is preserved more frequently and to a greater degree in mind wandering.     

Integration versus conflict between schools of dream theory and dreamwork: integrating the psychological core qualities of dreams with the contemporary knowledge of the dreaming brain

The various ways schools of psychotherapy relate to dreams have been marked by isolationism and mutual conflict rather than self-examination and then integrating the discoveries and methods of other schools. Jung’s method was in opposition to Freud’s psychoanalysis. Existential psychology was dismissive of Freud’s and Jung’s discoveries, while cognitive dream interpretation and cognitive therapy sought other roads entirely. In addition, scientific and neuropsychological dream research has been only insignificantly tied to the psychotherapeutic dream theories. These conflicts and the lack of a comprehensive dream theory has made it convenient for the current rationalist collective consciousness and treatment systems to reject the often times challenging knowledge about ourselves that dreams can provide. This paper describes how contemporary theories of complex cybernetic information networks can create an overriding, constructive framework for uncovering common traits within the above-mentioned branches of dream research and dreamwork. Within this framework, ten core qualities are delineated, supported by both therapeutic knowledge as well as scientific research: 1) Dreams deal with matters important to us; 2) Dreams symbolize; 3) Dreams personify; 4) Dreams are trial runs in a safe place; 5) Dreams are online to unconscious intelligence; 6) Dreams are pattern recognition; 7) Dreams are high level communication; 8) Dreams are condensed information; 9) Dreams are experiences of wholeness; 10) Dreams are psychological energy landscapes. For each core quality I describe short dreamwork sequences from my own practice and a schematic image of how I perceive the overriding interaction between systems in the dreaming brain. For each core quality recommendations for practical dreamwork are provided. Finally, I draw attention to dreams as a huge psychological resource for humankind.     

RUPTURES IN THE ANALYTIC SETTING AND DISTURBANCES IN THE TRANSFORMATIONAL FIELD OF DREAMS

This paper explores some implications of Bleger's (1967, 2013) concept of the analytic situation, which he views as comprising the analytic setting and the analytic process. The author discusses Bleger's idea of the analytic setting as the depositary for projected painful aspects in either the analyst or patient or both—affects that are then rendered as nonprocess. In contrast, the contents of the analytic process are subject to an incessant process of transformation (Green 2005). The author goes on to enumerate various components of the analytic setting: the nonhuman, object relational, and the analyst's “person” (including mental functioning). An extended clinical vignette is offered as an illustration.     

From Freud’s dream-work to Bion’s work of dreaming: The changing conception of dreaming in psychoanalytic theory

Bion moved psychoanalytic theory from Freud's theory of dream-work to a concept of dreaming in which dreaming is the central aspect of all emotional functioning. In this paper, I first review historical, theoretical, and clinical aspects of dreaming as seen by Freud and Bion. I then propose two interconnected ideas that I believe reflect Bion’s split from Freud regarding the understanding of dreaming. Bion believed that all dreams are psychological works in progress and at one point suggested that all dreams contain elements that are akin to visual hallucinations. I explore and elaborate Bion’s ideas that all dreams contain aspects of emotional experience that are too disturbing to be dreamt, and that, in analysis, the patient brings a dream with the hope of receiving the analyst’s help in completing the unconscious work that was entirely or partially too disturbing for the patient to dream on his own. Freud views dreams as mental phenomena with which to understand how the mind functions, but believes that dreams are solely the ‘guardians of sleep,’ and not, in themselves, vehicles for unconscious psychological work and growth until they are interpreted by the analyst. Bion extends Freud's ideas, but also departs from Freud and re-conceives of dreaming as synonymous with unconscious emotional thinking – a process that continues both while we are awake and while we are asleep. From another somewhat puzzling perspective, he views dreams solely as manifestations of what the dreamer is unable to think.     

Social dreaming:competition or complementation to individual dreaming?

Social dreaming is presented as a method to explore the unconscious dimension of the social world. The theoretical position of social dreaming and its historical development is described. Two examples are given for the practical application of social dreaming, a professional meeting of psychotherapists and an experiential workshop dealing with the aftermath of trauma. It is suggested that social dreaming is complementary to individual dreaming and offers insights and explanations, as well as guidance on various levels for applications in clinical, organizational, institutional and social settings.     

On holding and containing, being and dreaming

Winnicott's concept of holding and Bion's idea of the container-contained are for each of these analysts among his most important contributions to psychoanalytic thought. In this light, it is ironic that the two sets of ideas are so frequently misunderstood and confused with one another. In this paper, the author delineates what he believes to be the critical aspects of each of these concepts and illustrates the way in which he uses these ideas in his clinical work. Winnicott's holding is seen as an ontological concept that is primarily concerned with being and its relationship to time. Initially the mother safeguards the infant's continuity of being, in part by insulating him from the 'not-me' aspect of time. Maturation entails the infant's gradually internalizing the mother's holding of the continuity of his being over time and emotional fl ux. By contrast, Bion's container-contained is centrally concerned with the processing (dreaming) of thoughts derived from lived emotional experience. The idea of the container-contained addresses the dynamic interaction of predominantly unconscious thoughts (the contained) and the capacity for dreaming and thinking those thoughts (the container).