An examination of the SEP candidate analogical inference rule within pure inductive logic

Within the framework of (Unary) Pure Inductive Logic we investigate four possible formulations of a probabilistic principle of analogy based on a template considered by Paul Bartha in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [1] and give some characterizations of the probability functions which satisfy them. In addition we investigate an alternative interpretation of analogical support, also considered by Bartha, based not on the enhancement of probability but on the creation of possibility.     

An empirical study of psychology and logic. Abduction and belief as normalizing habits of positive expectation

This research supports the value of psychology for the study of abduction, and the value of abduction for better understanding psychological meaning-making. More specifically, we argue that the logical structure of abduction is supported by psychological processes, namely, surprise, the psychological normalization of that surprise by a proposed explanatory hypothesis, and the projection of that hypothesis as a normalizing, interpretive lens onto related subsequent experiences. We examine how abduction can be better understood by taking into consideration what Peirce called belief, an understanding of belief that in effect reflects the psychological aspects of abduction. We also examine how abduction helps identify a line of reasoning that people follow with or without their explicit knowledge. The empirical study involves a series of semi-structured interviews focusing on the genesis of perceived loneliness and solitude as normalizing habits of positive expectation from the situation of being alone.