A Process Model of Causal Reasoning

How do we make causal judgments? Many studies have demonstrated that people are capable causal reasoners, achieving success on tasks from reasoning to categorization to interventions. However, less is known about the mental processes used to achieve such sophisticated judgments. We propose a new process model—the mutation sampler—that models causal judgments as based on a sample of possible states of the causal system generated using the Metropolis–Hastings sampling algorithm. Across a diverse array of tasks and conditions encompassing over 1,700 participants, we found that our model provided a consistently closer fit to participant judgments than standard causal graphical models. In particular, we found that the biases introduced by mutation sampling accounted for people's consistent, predictable errors that the normative model by definition could not. Moreover, using a novel experimental methodology, we found that those biases appeared in the samples that participants explicitly judged to be representative of a causal system. We conclude by advocating sampling methods as plausible process-level accounts of the computations specified by the causal graphical model framework and highlight opportunities for future research to identify not just what reasoners compute when drawing causal inferences, but also how they compute it.     

The sociocultural movement in psychology,the role of theories in sociocultural inquiries,and the theory of sociocultural models

This special issue presents the theory of sociocultural models (TSCM) and its applications in diverse areas of psychology, including education, health care, clinical practice, gender relations, and general research. As many theories already exist in the social sciences, some readers may ask: “Why do cross‐cultural, cultural, and indigenous psychologists need another theory?” This question is comprised of two aspects: culture/cultural and theory/theoretical. Therefore, to answer it, it is important to clarify both issues. The first relates to cultural and its relation to psychological. The second, theory, considers its relation to cultural and psychological. These issues have long‐range implications for all culture and psychology disciplines as they pose many questions: What role does culture play in the mental functioning of people? How is culture constituted? Is cultural related to social? Does people’s mental functioning exert reciprocal influences on their cultural and social functioning? While working toward answering these questions, researchers quickly determine that more questions arise: What role should theories play in answering these questions? What constitutes theory in culture and psychology disciplines? How should such a theory (or such theories) address the triad of cultural, social, and mental? Consequently, in an effort to provide an overview of the TSCM and to begin to answer these questions, this introduction consists of two parts. The first part addresses the sociocultural turn in modern psychology; this part discusses its implications for research in culture and psychology disciplines. The second segment examines the topic of the theoretical backgrounds of cultural and cross‐cultural research and connects the philosophical paradigms of interpretivism and realism with the theory of sociocultural models. This introduction concludes with a brief overview of the articles included in this issue.     

The cultural in the social: A reflection on sociocultural models approaches

Culture is a critical concept for social psychology in Asia. The sociocultural models approach, as exemplified in this special issue, is a significant synthesis of the past work and a generative platform for future research. From the perspective of cultural dynamics, this commentary provides what I hope to be constructively critical reflections on this approach and attempts to point to potential directions for future investigation.     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

Molecular analyses of the principal components of response strength

Killeen and Hall (2001) showed that a common factor called strength underlies the key dependent variables of response probability, latency, and rate, and that overall response rate is a good predictor of strength. In a search for the mechanisms that underlie those correlations, this article shows that (a) the probability of responding on a trial is a two-state Markov process; (b) latency and rate of responding can be described in terms of the probability and period of stochastic machines called clocked Bernoulli modules, and (c) one such machine, the refractory Poisson process, provides a functional relation between the probability of observing a response during any epoch and the rate of responding. This relation is one of proportionality at low rates and curvilinearity at higher rates.     

On normal theory based inference for multilevel models with distributional violations

Data in social and behavioral sciences are often hierarchically organized though seldom normal, yet normal theory based inference procedures are routinely used for analyzing multilevel models. Based on this observation, simple adjustments to normal theory based results are proposed to minimize the consequences of violating normality assumptions. For characterizing the distribution of parameter estimates, sandwich-type covariance matrices are derived. Standard errors based on these covariance matrices remain consistent under distributional violations. Implications of various covariance estimators are also discussed. For evaluating the quality of a multilevel model, a rescaled statistic is given for both the hierarchical linear model and the hierarchical structural equation model. The rescaled statistic, improving the likelihood ratio statistic by estimating one extra parameter, approaches the same mean as its reference distribution. A simulation study with a 2-level factor model implies that the rescaled statistic is preferable.This research was supported by grants DA01070 and DA00017 from the National Institute on Drug Abuse and a University of North Texas faculty research grant. We would like to thank the Associate Editor and two reviewers for suggestions that helped to improve the paper.     

Interval length and time-use by children with AD/HD: a comparison of four models

Predictions made by 4 competing models of time use by children with AD/HD were tested using a computerized version of the Matching Familiar Figures Test in 2 studies. In Study 1 teacher-identified AD/HD children (N = 10) and non-AD/HD controls (N = 10) completed the task under 3 different trial duration conditions (5, 10, and 15 s). In Study 2 the same task was completed by a group of children with a diagnosis of Hyperkinetic Disorder (N = 12) and controls (N = 12). In both studies AD/HD children performed poorly on trials of both 5- and 15-s duration but as well as controls on the 10-s trials. This quadratic function provided support for the State Regulation Deficit model of time use in AD/HD. The value of tailoring the temporal features of learning contexts to the conceptual style of AD/HD children is discussed.