Reasoning about update logic

Logical frameworks for analysing the dynamics of information processing abound [4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 20, 22]. Some of these frameworks focus on the dynamics of the interpretation process, some on the dynamics of the process of drawing inferences, and some do both of these. Formalisms galore, so it is felt that some conceptual streamlining would pay off.This paper is part of a larger scale enterprise to pursue the obvious parallel between information processing and imperative programming. We demonstrate that logical tools from theoretical computer science are relevant for the logic of information flow. More specifically, we show that the perspective of Hoare logic [13, 18] can fruitfully be applied to the conceptual simplification of information flow logics.     

Argument practices

The move to Postmodernism in argumentation is often predicated on the rejection of the formal basis of argument in logic. While this rejection may be justified, and is widely discussed in the literature, the loss of logic creates problems that a Postmodern theory of argument must address without recourse to logic and its attendant modernist assumptions. This essay argues that conceiving of argument in terms ofpractices will address the key problematics of Postmodernism without abandoning those features of argumentation that make it an important social, cultural and political practice. Implications for both theory and pedagogy are discussed.The author would like to acknowledge the invaluable commentary of, and discussions with, John Lyne, Charles Willard, Steven Fuller, and Ed Schiappa.     

Why Logic Doesn‘t Matter in the (Philosophical) Study of Argumentation

Philosophically, the study of argumentation is important because it holds out the prospect of an interpretation of rationality. For this we need to identify a transcendent perspective on the argumentative interaction. We need a normative theory of argumentation that provides an answer to the question: should the hearer accept the argument of the speaker. In this article I argue that formal logic implies a notion of transcendence that is not suitable for the study of argumentation, because, from a logical point of view, argumentation disappears from sight. We should therefore not expect formal logic to provide an interesting interpretation of the rationality intrinsic in argument and discussion.     

A critique of Tversky and Kahneman's distinction between fallacy and misunderstanding

Tversky and Kahneman explain cognitive errors in terms of either misunderstanding or fallacy , but have failed to define these concepts. Therefore, they are unable to derive strict diagnostic criteria for distinguishing between them. The lack of conceptual clarification also has prevented them from recognizing the circular relationship between understanding and logicality. Diagnosis of understanding presupposes logicality, and diagnosis of logicality presupposes understanding. This circularity follows when understanding is defined as grasping what is and is not logically implied by a given expression as intended, and when fallacy is defined as logical error. Alternative definitions are discussed and rejected. Tversky and Kahneman fail to realize that one cannot explain and understand what is genuinely illogical, and that, therefore, errors must always be regarded as failure to understand, that is, as logical inference from erroneous premises.     

On the uses of language in working and idealized logic

The interpretation of discourse covers a continuum with two extremes: on the one hand, a text considered as an ideal, distant object, and on the other hand, a conversation regarded as a real, present event. On the basis of a distinction between relatively context-invariant propositions and relatively context-dependent statements, it is argued that statements in conversational discourse are easier to interpret than statements in texts, whereas only propositions in symbolic logic can be interpreted with exactitude. In the same way, the interpretation of dialogical arguments proceeds more easily than the interpretation of arguments in texts. While dialogical argumentation requires a dialectical approach, textual argumentation necessitates an imaginative reconstruction of the argument. From this it can be concluded that for different sorts of argumentative discourse diverse sorts of interpretative activities have to be used.     

学校氛围对学生数学成绩影响的跨文化比较:基于多水平分析的结果

学校氛围是学校中被成员所体验并对其行为产生影响的、相对持久而稳定的学校环境特征。它以成员的共同行为感知为基础,对学校和学生的发展具有重要作用。以PISA2003测试的数据为基础,采用多水平线性模型,考察了中国香港、日本、美国和土耳其的15岁学生及其所在学校的校长知觉的学校氛围对学生数学成绩的影响。结果显示:(1)学生知觉的师生关系、数学课堂秩序,校长知觉的学生士气、学校消极行为对数学成绩的显著预测作用具有较高的跨文化一致性;(2)数学课堂上的教师支持、教师负面状态、数学教师间的共识能显著预测部分国家/地区的学生数学成绩;(3)学生知觉的对学校的看法、校长知觉的教师士气对四个国家/地区的学生数学成绩均无显著预测作用。     

Predicting stress patterns in an unpredictable stress language: The use of non-lexical sources of evidence for stress assignment in Russian

The main goal of this research was to examine how readers of Russian assign stress to disyllabic words. In particular, we tested the claim that the process of stress assignment in Russian can only be accomplished lexically. Eleven potential non-lexical sources of evidence for stress in Russian were examined in regression and factorial studies. In Study 1, onset complexity, coda complexity, the orthography of the first syllable (CVC1), of the second syllable (CVC2), and of the ending of the second syllable (VC2) were found to be probabilistically associated with stress in Russian disyllables. In Studies 2 and 3, it was shown that Russian speakers do use 3 of these cues (CVC1, CVC2, and VC2) when making stress-assignment decisions. These results provide evidence against the idea that the nature of stress in the Russian language is so unpredictable that stress assignment can only be accomplished lexically. These results also suggest that any successful model of stress assignment in Russian needs to contain mechanisms allowing these 3 orthographic cues to play a role in the stress-assignment process.     

Proto-Semantics for Positive Free Logic

This paper presents a bivalent extensional semantics for positive free logic without resorting to the philosophically questionable device of using models endowed with a separate domain of non-existing objects. The models here introduced have only one (possibly empty) domain, and a partial reference function for the singular terms (that might be undefined at some arguments). Such an approach provides a solution to an open problem put forward by Lambert, and can be viewed as supplying a version of parametrized truth non unlike the notion of truth at world found in modal logic. A model theory is developed, establishing compactness, interpolation (implying a strong form of Beth definability), and completeness (with respect to a particular axiomatization).