Progress with Science and Religion Issues: Critical Questions and Suggestions

Progress with the marriage of science and religion is slowed by “sterile” controversies. Ways toward overcoming them are suggested here. These concern the metaphysical foundations of science and religion (science and spirituality, science and theology) with a specific emphasis on epistemology, ontology, anthropology, aims, methodological procedures, limitations of binary logic, and the use of other types of logic (in particular relational and contextual reasoning). Dialogues between science and religion can have positive practical societal relevance, and therefore need to progress faster. An enlargement of humanity's mental horizons and development—especially of epistemic cognition—seems to be called for in order to secure the future of a global intellectual culture. Suggestions for achieving this are included.     

Knowledge and man

Collective Intelligence (CI) can be formalized as a specific1 computational process through the use of a molecular model of computations and mathematical logic, in terms of interacting information_molecules, which are chaotically or quasi-chaotically displacing and running natural-based inference processes in their own environment. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence as a property of a social structure of beings of any nature is surprisingly short and abstract (which is astonishing) from definitions of Life. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence proposed by the author in the last few years seems to be valid for the whole spectrum of beings, in human social structures to ants in colonies, and even for bacterial colonies. It has recently been found that the CI definition also has an engineering value. The theory of CI can also be used to better understand Evolution because it allows us to locate and relate Life and Intelligence in Evolution. Moreover, this approach presents Evolution as something more complex than can be concluded from Darwinism. Probably the most surprising fact is that a simple extrapolation of the definition of Collective Intelligence brings us to the conclusion that most probably the first elementary Collective Intelligence emerged on Earth in the "chemical soup of primeval molecules," much before Life emerged. Collective Intelligence can be defined with fewer and weaker conditions than Life requires. Perhaps the emergence of that early elementary Collective Intelligence provided the basic momentum to build Life as we now know it. Thus Evolution caused Intelligence to create Life. Our hypothesis is consistent with biochemistry theories that "primeval biochemical molecules" started to interact, "firing" the Collective Intelligence of their "elementary chemical social structure" for survival. This successful action boosted further growth of complexity in that "elementary social structure," which finally resulted in the emergence of "well-defined Life." Furthermore, it provided a self-propagating cycle of growth of individual and collective Intelligence and individual and collective Life. The Collective Intelligence of ants, wolves, humans, and so forth today is only a higher level of Collective Intelligence development. Thus the present Evolution is a computational process of unidentified complexity where Life, Intelligence, and perhaps other as yet undiscovered components play temporary roles. In this paper we provide formalization and a proposed partial proof for this hypothesis.     

Logical Knowledge

It seems obvious that our beliefs are logically imperfect in two ways: they are neither deductively closed nor logically consistent. But this common-sense truism has been judged erroneous by some philosophers in the light of various arguments. In defence of common sense I consider and rebut interpretative arguments for logical perfection and show that the assumption espoused by common sense is theoretically superior, and capable - unlike its rival - of accounting for the informativeness of mathematics. Finally, I suggest that common sense opens the way to genuine disputes about the correct logic.     

From a Continental Point of View: The Role of Logic in the Analytic-Continental Divide

My discussion addresses the differences between analytic and continental philosophy concerning the use of logic and exact reasoning in philosophical practice. These differences are mainly examined in the light of the controversial dominance of Hegel's concept of logic (and theory of concept) in twentieth-century continental philosophy. The inquiry is developed in two parts. In the first (Sections 1-2), I indicate some aspects of the analytic-continental divide, pointing to the role that the topic 'logic and philosophy' plays in it. In the second part (Sections 3-6), I give a short account of the views of logic which are typical of the three main trends of continental philosophy (see Table 1). I also suggest how, with the aid of some typical analytical devices, some continental 'anti-logical' attitudes may be corrected, on their own terms.     

Do intermediate- and higher-order principal components contain useful information to detect subtle changes in lower extremity biomechanics during running?

Recently, a principal component analysis (PCA) approach has been used to provide insight into running pathomechanics. However, researchers often account for nearly all of the variance from the original data using only the first few, or lower-order principal components (PCs), which are often associated with the most dominant movement patterns. In contrast, intermediate- and higher-order PCs are generally associated with subtle movement patterns and may contain valuable information about between-group variation and specific test conditions. Few investigations have evaluated the utility of intermediate- and higher-order PCs based on observational cross-sectional analyses of different cohorts, and no prior studies have evaluated longitudinal changes in an intervention study. This study was designed to test the utility of intermediate- and higher-order PCs in identifying differences in running patterns between different groups based on three-dimensional bilateral lower-limb kinematics. The results reveal that differences between sex- and age-groups of 128 runners were observed in the lower- and intermediate-order PCs scores (p < 0.05) while differences between baseline and following a 6-week muscle strengthening program for 24 runners with patellofemoral pain were observed in the higher-order PCs scores (p < 0.05), which exhibited a moderate correlation with self-reported pain scores (r = −0.43; p < 0.05).     

Towards the logic of projective identification

This paper is devoted to the ‘logic of the unconscious’ and its application to the analysis of projective intentionality in psychoanalysis.Subjective assumptions concerning the existence and identity of intentional objects are often unconscious. They result from personal experience through its assimilation and transformation in further psychological (e.g. defensive) processes. Formal aspects of these subjective assumptions and their influence on our judgment and action have been studied by a number of psychoanalytic authors, in particular by Silvano Arieti, Ignacio Matte-Blanco and their followers who tried to develop ‘logic of the unconscious’. My project consists in the reformulation, clarification and elaboration of the logic of the unconscious using contemporary modal and relevant logics, in particular Graham Priest's logic of intentionality. An important advantage of this logic is that it allows for truth indeterminacy and paraconsistency of the propositional content of intentional states. In this article I explore the logic of projective identification, which I assume plays the central role in the logic of the unconscious.Special attention is given to the logical analysis of the notion of an internal object, and to a logical reconstruction of the fantasy of projective identification.     

Application of the Within- and Between-Series Estimators to Non-normal Multiple-Baseline Data: Maximum Likelihood and Bayesian Approaches

In single-case research, multiple-baseline (MB) design provides the opportunity to estimate the treatment effect based on not only within-series comparisons of treatment phase to baseline phase observations, but also time-specific between-series comparisons of observations from those that have started treatment to those that are still in the baseline. For analyzing MB studies, two types of linear mixed modeling methods have been proposed: the within- and between-series models. In principle, those models were developed based on normality assumptions, however, normality may not always be found in practical settings. Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the robustness of the within- and between-series models when data were non-normal. A Monte Carlo study was conducted with four statistical approaches. The approaches were defined by the crossing of two analytic decisions: (a) whether to use a within- or between-series estimate of effect and (b) whether to use restricted maximum likelihood or Markov chain Monte Carlo estimations. The results showed the treatment effect estimates of the four approaches had minimal bias, that within-series estimates were more precise than between-series estimates, and that confidence interval coverage was frequently acceptable, but varied across conditions and methods of estimation. Applications and implications were discussed based on the findings.     

A Dynamic-Logical Perspective on Quantum Behavior

In this paper we show how recent concepts from Dynamic Logic, and in particular from Dynamic Epistemic logic, can be used to model and interpret quantum behavior. Our main thesis is that all the non-classical properties of quantum systems are explainable in terms of the non-classical flow of quantum information. We give a logical analysis of quantum measurements (formalized using modal operators) as triggers for quantum information flow, and we compare them with other logical operators previously used to model various forms of classical information flow: the “test” operator from Dynamic Logic, the “announcement” operator from Dynamic Epistemic Logic and the “revision” operator from Belief Revision theory. The main points stressed in our investigation are the following: (1) The perspective and the techniques of “logical dynamics” are useful for understanding quantum information flow. (2) Quantum mechanics does not require any modification of the classical laws of “static” propositional logic, but only a non-classical dynamics of information. (3) The main such non-classical feature is that, in a quantum world, all information-gathering actions have some ontic side-effects. (4) This ontic impact can affect in its turn the flow of information, leading to non-classical epistemic side-effects (e.g. a type of non-monotonicity) and to states of “objectively imperfect information”. (5) Moreover, the ontic impact is non-local: an information-gathering action on one part of a quantum system can have ontic side-effects on other, far-away parts of the system.     

Kant and the problem of existential judgment: critical comments on Wayne Martin’s Theories of Judgment

The paper assesses Martin’s recent logico-phenomenological account of judgment that is cast in the form of an eclectic history of judging, from Hume and Kant through the 19th century to Frege and Heidegger as well as current neuroscience. After a preliminary discussion of the complex unity and temporal modalities of judgment that draws on a reading of Titian’s “Allegory of Prudence” (National Gallery, London), the remainder of the paper focuses on Martin’s views on Kant’s logic in general and his theory of singular existential judgment in particular. The paper argues against Martin’s key claims of the primacy of formal logic over transcendental logic and of the synthetic nature of judgment in Kant. It also takes issue with each of the four interpretations of singular existential judgment in Kant offered by Martin: existence as logical predicate, as copula, as thesis and as logical subject.