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171.
172.
Hybrid logics with Sahlqvist axioms 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
173.
In Coecke (2002) we proposed the intuitionistic or disjunctive representation of quantum logic, i.e., a representation of the property lattice of physical systems as a complete Heyting algebra of logical propositions on these properties, where this complete Heyting algebra goes equipped with an additional operation, the operational resolution, which identifies the properties within the logic of propositions. This representation has an important application towards dynamic quantum logic, namely in describing the temporal indeterministic propagation of actual properties of physical systems. This paper can as such by conceived as an addendum to Quantum Logic in Intuitionistic Perspective that discusses spin-off and thus provides an additional motivation. We derive a quantaloidal semantics for dynamic disjunctive quantum logic and illustrate it for the particular case of a perfect (quantum) measurement. 相似文献
174.
175.
Resnik DB 《Science and engineering ethics》2001,7(1):29-62
This paper focuses on the question of whether DNA patents help or hinder scientific discovery and innovation. While DNA patents
create a wide variety of possible benefits and harms for science and technology, the evidence we have at this point in time
supports the conclusion that they will probably promote rather than hamper scientific discovery and innovation. However, since
DNA patenting is a relatively recent phenomena and the biotechnology industry is in its infancy, we should continue to gather
evidence about the effects of DNA patenting on scientific innovation and discovery as well the economic, social, and legal
conditions relating to intellectual property in biotechnology. We should give the free market, the courts, researchers, and
patent offices a chance to settle issues related to innovation and discovery, before we seek legislative remedies, since new
laws proposed at this point would lack adequate foresight and could do more harm than good. However, we should be open to
new laws or regulations on DNA patents if they are required to in order to deal with some of the biases and limitations of
the free market. 相似文献
176.
The specific heat of liquid Fe90Si6.95Sn3.05 alloy has been investigated by electromagnetic levitation drop calorimetery in the temperature range of 1390–2140 K. The enthalpy of this liquid alloy increases linearly with the rise of temperature. Furthermore, the enthalpy obtained from molecular dynamics calculation shows a similar trend to the experimental results in a broader temperature range of 1000–2200 K. The calculated specific heat is 39.7 J mol?1 K?1, which agrees well with the experimental result of 39.9 J mol?1 K?1. The density of this liquid alloy decreases as a quadratic function of temperature. 相似文献
177.
Liam P. Dempsey 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(2):241-264
In this paper I consider a cluster of positions which depart from the immortalist and dualist anthropologies of Rene Descartes and Henry More. In particular, I argue that John Locke and Isaac Newton are attracted to a monistic mind-body metaphysics, which while resisting neat characterization, occupies a conceptual space distinct from the dualism of the immortalists, on the one hand, and thoroughgoing materialism of Thomas Hobbes, on the other. They propound a sort of property monism: mind and body are distinct, with distinct characteristics and functions, but are, nevertheless, ontologically interdependent. Consciousness – the locus of personhood, and thus, a necessary condition for personal immortality – is an embodied phenomenon; its preservation requires the life and proper functioning of the body. Dying with the dissolution of his body, then, man is a compound wholly mortal. Nevertheless, both Locke and Newton accepted the possibility of personal immortality; with Hobbes, both looked to the Biblical promise of bodily resurrection. For with the re-vitalization of the body – and a subsequent restoration of consciousness and memory – personal identity is preserved, even beyond the grave. 相似文献
178.
Charlotte Baumann 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(6):1132-1152
ABSTRACTMany interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel – even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in Hegel’s system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel’s rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel’s references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being. 相似文献
179.
Daniel J. Hicks 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2015,45(1):37-57
Susan Moller Okin's critique of libertarianism in Justice, Gender, and the Family has received only slight attention in the libertarian literature. I find this neglect of Okin's argument surprising: The argument is straightforward and, if sound, it establishes a devastating conflict between the core libertarian notions of self-ownership and the acquisition of property through labour. In this paper, I first present a reconstruction of Okin's argument. In brief, she points out that mothers make children through their labour; thus it would seem that mothers own their (adult) children; but this implies that the children are not self-owners. I then examine the two most common objections to this argument in the literature: mothers do not make children, and acquisition by labour includes an exception for persons. I give several replies to each objection, including an extension of Okin's argument that I call Okin's dilemma. This dilemma argues that the libertarian can avoid Okin's conclusion only by requiring an involuntary property transfer. And this alternative, it seems, is just as unacceptable for many libertarians. I close with some speculation about the further implications of Okin's dilemma for libertarianism. 相似文献