Desire: The unfolding of the other

The Confucian classic the Liji 禮記 defines ‘desire’ as ‘the arousal of nature’. In line with this classical definition, Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777) sees desire as human nature in activation. However, while the Liji ascribes human deceits and debauchery to the susceptibility of human nature, Dai Zhen speaks highly of its responsiveness and receptivity. This article discusses Dai Zhen’s conception of desire and argues that Dai Zhen distinguishes himself from other Confucian moral thinkers by bringing to light the dimension of the Other in addressing the issue of desire. As the Confucian tradition has long been disturbed by an anxiety to keep desire in check, Dai Zhen draws our attention to how to cultivate the affective faculty inherent in human nature to develop our sensitivity to the needs and desires of others, especially those of the widow, the orphan, the solitary, the sick, and the weak.     

重复启动条件下语义启动效应减少的机制

采用重复启动范式探讨语义启动效应减少的机制。结果发现,在SOA为短的167ms条件下,重复/相同和重复/相关的启动效应无差异,且重复/相关启动并未导致语义启动效应的减少;而在SOA为长的1200ms条件下,重复/相同和重复/相关的启动效应差异显著,且重复/相关启动导致了语义启动效应的减少,而重复/相同未导致语义启动效应的减少。在抵消了期望和消退的作用后,在SOA为1200ms条件下所得到的重复/相同和重复/相关启动效应的差异,是由于扩散受到了阻碍而导致的。这一结论支持了激活扩散是有一定条件的观点。     

Rawls and Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients: A Reply to Maio

In his paper, “The Relevance of Rawls’ Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients” (Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2002):45–53), Giovanni Maio has developed athought-provoking argument for the permissibility of non-therapeutic research on cognitively impaired patients. Maio argues that his conclusion follows from the acceptance of John Rawls’s principles of justice, specifically, Rawls’s “liberty principle” Maio has misinterpreted Rawls’s “libertyprinciple” – correctly interpreted it does notsupport non-therapeutic research on cognitivelyimpaired patients. Three other ‘Rawlsian’ arguments are suggested by Maio’s discussion –two “self-respect” arguments and a “presumed consent” argument – but none of them are convincing. However, an alternative argument developed from Rawls’s discussion of “justice in health care” in his most recent book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, may justify certain kinds of non-therapeutic research on some cognitively impaired patients in special circumstances. We should not expect anything more permissive from a liberal theory of justice. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Parental refusals of medical treatment: the harm principle as threshold for state intervention

Minors are generally considered incompetent to provide legally binding decisions regarding their health care, and parents or guardians are empowered to make those decisions on their behalf. Parental authority is not absolute, however, and when a parent acts contrary to the best interests of a child, the state may intervene. The best interests standard is the threshold most frequently employed in challenging a parent's refusal to provide consent for a child's medical care. In this paper, I will argue that the best interest standard provides insufficient guidance for decision-making regarding children and does not reflect the actual standard used by medical providers and courts. Rather, I will suggest that the Harm Principle provides a more appropriate threshold for state intervention than the Best Interest standard. Finally, I will suggest a series of criteria that can be used in deciding whether the state should intervene in a parent's decision to refuse medical care on behalf of a child.     

A Critique of Frankfurt-Libertarianism

Most libertarians think that some version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is true. A number of libertarians, which I call ‘Frankfurt-libertarians,’ think that they need not embrace any version of PAP. In this paper, I examine the writings of one such Frankfurt-libertarian, Eleonore Stump, for her evaluation of the impact of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP. I show how, contrary to her own claims, Stump does need a PAP-like principle for her account of free action. I briefly argue that this discussion also goes some distance to showing that any Frankfurt-libertarian is in a similar position regarding the need for some PAP-like principle. If I am correct, then Frankfurt-libertarians must either renounce their incompatibilism or concede that FSCs fail to show all PAP-like principles to be false.

A hierarchical model of operational anticipation windows in driving an automobile

Driving an automobile is an example of a goal-directed activity with high complexity in which different behavioral elements have to be integrated and brought into a sequential order. On the basis of the reafference principle and experimental results on temporal perception and cognitive control, we propose a hierarchical model of driving behavior, which can also be adapted to other goal-directed activities. Driving is conceived of as being controlled by anticipatory neuronal programs; if these programs are disrupted by unpredictable stimuli, which require an instantaneous reaction, behavioral control returns after completion of the reactive mode to the anticipatory mode of driving. In the model different levels of anticipation windows are distinguished which, however, are interconnected, in a bi-directional way: (a) Strategic level with a representation of the driving activity from the beginning to reaching the final goal; (b) Segmented tactical level with the sequence of necessary milestones to reach the goal; (c) Maneuver level where actions like passing another car or keeping a lane are controlled; (d) Short-term integration level of a few seconds which allows immediate anticipations; and (e) Synchronization level for sensorimotor control and complexity reduction within neuronal assemblies. A flow diagram schematically describes different driving situations stressing the anticipatory mode of control. In a pilot experiment with 20 subjects using a virtual driving situation in a car simulator predictions of the model could be verified, i.e., subjects showed a significant preference for the anticipatory mode of driving.     

A component analysis of "stereotypy as reinforcement" for alternative behavior

Results from several studies have suggested that the opportunity to engage in stereotypic behavior may function as reinforcement for alternative, more socially desirable behaviors. However, the procedural components of this intervention include several distinct operations whose effects have not been analyzed separately. While measuring the occurrence of stereotypy and an alternative behavior (manipulation of leisure materials), we exposed 3 participants to three or four components of a "stereotypy as reinforcement" contingency: (a) continuous access to materials, (b) prompts to manipulate materials, (c) restricted access to stereotypy (i.e., response blocking), and (d) access to stereotypy contingent on manipulating the materials. Continuous access to materials and prompting (a and b) produced negligible results. Restriction of stereotypy (c) produced a large increase in the alternative behavior of 2 participants, suggesting that response restriction per se may occasion alternative behavior. However, contingent access to stereotypy (d) was necessary to increase the 3rd participant's object manipulation; this finding provided some support for the use of stereotypy as reinforcement for alternative behavior. Finally, when transfer of the effects of intervention was assessed during periods in which active intervention components were withdrawn, the alternative behavior was maintained for 1 participant.     

The role of collateral information about examinees in item parameter estimation

Standard procedures for estimating item parameters in item response theory (IRT) ignore collateral information that may be available about examinees, such as their standing on demographic and educational variables. This paper describes circumstances under which collateral information about examineesmay be used to make inferences about item parameters more precise, and circumstances under which itmust be used to obtain correct inferences.This work was supported by Contract No. N00014-85-K-0683, project designation NR 150-539, from the Cognitive Science Program, Cognitive and Neural Sciences Division, Office of Naval Research. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government. We are indebted to Tim Davey, Eugene Johnson, and three anonymous referees for their comments on earlier versions of the paper.     

‘Brain-Malfunction’ Cases and the Dispositionalist Reply to Frankfurt's Attack on PAP

Harry Frankfurt has famously argued against the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) by presenting a case in which, apparently, a person is morally responsible for what he has done even though he could not have done otherwise. A number of commentators have proposed dispositionalist responses to Frankfurt, arguing that he has not produced a counterexample to PAP because, contrary to appearances, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present but is a disposition that has been ‘masked’ or ‘finked’ by the presence of a counterfactual controller. This article argues that this response to Frankfurt does not undercut his attack on PAP, since there are Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the principle—‘brain-malfunction’ cases—that evade the dispositionalist analysis.     

Principle of Care and Giving to Help People in Need

Theories of moral development posit that an internalized moral value that one should help those in need—the principle of care—evokes helping behaviour in situations where empathic concern does not. Examples of such situations are helping behaviours that involve cognitive deliberation and planning, that benefit others who are known only in the abstract, and who are out‐group members. Charitable giving to help people in need is an important helping behaviour that has these characteristics. Therefore we hypothesized that the principle of care would be positively associated with charitable giving to help people in need, and that the principle of care would mediate the empathic concern–giving relationship. The two hypotheses were tested across four studies. The studies used four different samples, including three nationally representative samples from the American and Dutch populations, and included both self‐reports of giving (Studies 1–3), giving observed in a survey experiment (Study 3), and giving observed in a laboratory experiment (Study 4). The evidence from these studies indicated that a moral principle to care for others was associated with charitable giving to help people in need and mediated the empathic concern–giving relationship. © 2016 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology