多感官线索整合的理论模型

日常生活中,人脑能联合来自不同感官通道的线索对外部世界中的物体和事件进行感知。这些感官通道采用不同的参照系来表征物体的特征和位置;而且各种线索的可靠性也不恒定,根据环境而改变。但是人脑依然能够有效地整合这些线索,对物体和事件进行正确的感知。在以往研究的基础上,总结评述了多感官线索整合的几种理论模型及其验证结果,其中重点介绍了近年来引起广泛关注的贝叶斯统计优化模型。未来的研究应结合虚拟现实技术和脑成像技术对多感官线索整合进行探讨。     

时间参照对绿色消费的影响：环保意识和产品环境怀疑的调节作用

绿色消费虽然受到越来越多的关注,但消费者的绿色承诺很难转化为实际的购买行为,出现了消费者的不作为现象。本研究试图探讨时间参照对消费者不作为的影响以及环保意识是否能够有效抑制这种不作为。研究发现,消费者在近期情境下对绿色产品的购买意愿低于远期,出现了绿色消费不作为现象,即个体更倾向于在将来而不是现在购买绿色产品。尤为重要的是,环保意识对消费者不作为的弱化作用受制于个体的产品环境怀疑：产品坏境怀疑较低时环保意识的弱化作用明显,而产品环境怀疑较高时环保意识的弱化作用则不存在。     

LP方法及其与三种常用DIF检测方法的比较

本研究基于项目反应理论,提出了一种检验力高且犯Ⅰ类错误率小的检测DIF的新方法：LP法（Likelihood Procedure）,且以2PLM下对题目进行DIF检验为例介绍此法。本文通过与MH方法、Lord卡方检验法和Raju面积测量法三种常用的检验DIF的方法比较研究LP法的有效性,同时探讨样本容量、测验长度、目标组和参照组能力分布的差异、DIF值大小等相关因素对LP法有效性可能产生的影响。通过模拟研究,得到以下结论：(1)LP法比MH法及Lord卡方法更灵敏且更稳健;(2) LP法比Raju面积测量法更合理;(3)LP法的检验力随着被试样本容量或DIF值的增大而增大;（4）当参照组与目标组的能力无差异时,LP法在各种条件下的检验力比参照组与目标组的能力有差异时的检验力高;（5）LP法对一致性DIF和非一致性DIF都有良好的检验力,且LP法对一致性DIF的检验力比对非一致性DIF的检验力高。LP法可以简便的扩展并运用到多维度、多级评分项目上。     

A new formulation of the Principle of Indifference

The idea of a probabilistic logic of inductive inference based on some form of the principle of indifference has always retained a powerful appeal. However, up to now all modifications of the principle failed. In this paper, a new formulation of such a principle is provided that avoids generating paradoxes and inconsistencies. Because of these results, the thesis that probabilities cannot be logical quantities, determined in an objective way through some form of the principle of indifference, is no longer supportable. Later, the paper investigates some implications of the new principle of indifference. To conclude, a re-examination of the foundations of the so-called objective Bayesian inference is called for.     

Automatic optimism: Biased use of base rate information for positive and negative events

People generally judge that positive events will occur in their lives and negative events will not, even when both events have the same objective likelihood to occur. In four studies, we examined the possibility that this optimistic bias is the result of people’s automatic affective reactions to future events. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate, in two different contexts, that people are consistently optimistic in their predictions, despite identical base rates for positive and negative events. In Study 2, optimistic bias was not influenced by incentives for motivated reasoning or rewards for accuracy, suggesting that bias was the result of automatic processes. Studies 3 and 4 showed that optimistic bias was more pronounced when predictions were speeded and when participants made predictions after exposure to affectively valenced words. Together, these findings suggest that people optimistically interpret base rates and that this optimism is due to an effortless affective process.     

Motivationally selective risk judgments: Do fear and curiosity boost the boons or the banes?

Recent theories of judgment and decision-making have focused increasingly on the role of motivation, affect, and other drive states. The current research examined whether specific motivational orientations associated with approach versus avoidance might be linked selectively to judgments of positive versus negative decision outcomes and future events. Findings from three studies suggest that fear—an emotion intrinsically linked to threat avoidance—was more strongly associated with judgments of negative outcomes than judgments of positive outcomes. In contrast, curiosity—a motivational orientation associated with approaching desired information and experiences—was more strongly associated with judgments of positive outcomes than judgments of negative outcomes. Findings are discussed with respect to functionalist theories of motivation and selective cognition.