Strict Identity with No Overlap

Is standard, Kripke-style semantics for quantified modal logic compatible with the view that no individual may belong to more than one possible world? One is naturally inclined to answer in the negative, arguing that the view requires a Lewis-style, counterpart-theoretic semantics instead. Strictly speaking, however, this natural answer is wrong-headed. This note explains why.     

Initial development and validity evidence for the processes of change in Psychological Skills Training Questionnaire

ObjectivesThe purpose of this study was to create and provide validity evidence for the Processes of Change in Psychological Skills Training Questionnaire (PCPSTQ).DesignThe current study used a cross-sectional research design.MethodsFive hundred fifty nine NCAA Division I, professional, and Olympic level athletes participated in the current study. To create the PCPSTQ, an initial pool of 114 items was generated by the research team. After a content validity process, 65 items were retained for analysis. Exploratory structural equation modeling was used as an analytic strategy to identify the most appropriate factor structure for the PCPSTQ. Decisions about the most appropriate model were made using multiple fit indices. To examine the construct validity of the PCPSTQ, a series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine differences in processes of change use across stage of change.ResultsIn the current study, validity evidence provided support for a 7-factor process of change measure (χ² = 325.84, p < .001; Comparative Fit Index = .971; Tucker Lewis Index = .945; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation = .037; Standard Root Mean Square Residual = .020). Results also supported the construct validity of the scale as a significant difference in process of change use across stage of change was reported for all seven processes.ConclusionsResults of the current study support the factor structure and construct validity of the PCPSTQ. It appears that the processes of behavior change reported across multiple behavior change domains might also be viable for sport psychology professionals.     

How Might I Have Been?

What would my life have been like if I had been born more intelligent? Or taller? Or a member of the opposite sex? Or a non‐biological being? It is plausible that some of these questions make sense, while others stretch the limits of sense making. In addressing questions of how I might have been, genetic essentialism is popular, but this article argues that genetic essentialism, and other versions of origin essentialism for organisms, must be rejected. It considers the prospects for counterpart theory and shows how counterpart theory can be used to illuminate volitional accounts of identity as proposed by Harry Frankfurt. This enables one to make sense of claims that, say, being gay, or Deaf, or Black, can be essential to someone's identity. The discussion is then extended to show how it can be made applicable to the transworld identity theorist who denies that individuals possess essential properties.     

Delay discounting in Lewis and Fischer 344 rats: steady-state and rapid-determination adjusting-amount procedures

Lewis rats have been shown to make more impulsive choices than Fischer 344 rats in discrete-trial choice procedures that arrange fixed (i.e., nontitrating) reinforcement parameters. However, nontitrating procedures yield only gross estimates of preference, as choice measures in animal subjects are rarely graded at the level of the individual subject. The present study was designed to examine potential strain differences in delay discounting using an adjusting-amount procedure, in which distributed (rather than exclusive) choice is observed due to dynamic titration of reinforcer magnitude across trials. Using a steady-state version of the adjusting-amount procedure in which delay was manipulated between experimental conditions, steeper delay discounting was observed in Lewis rats compared to Fischer 344 rats; further, delay discounting in both strains was well described by the traditional hyperbolic discounting model. However, upon partial completion of the present study, a study published elsewhere (Wilhelm & Mitchell, 2009) demonstrated no difference in delay discounting between these strains with the use of a more rapid version of the adjusting-amount procedure (i.e., in which delay is manipulated daily). Thus, following completion of the steady-state assessment in the present study, all surviving Lewis and Fischer 344 rats completed an approximation of this rapid-determination procedure in which no strain difference in delay discounting was observed.     

On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did not Believe or Want …

Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg‐raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not‐p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency to equivocate in arguments for the enthymematicity of arguments (e.g., Lewis Carroll's paradox, Hume's problem) as well as in arguments for the enthymematicity of action explanations (e.g., arguments for psychologism and for explanatory individualism). The article concludes with a warning, because the equivocation is often helpful in teaching and because neg‐raising verbs include philosophically vital verbs: desire, want, intend, think, suppose, imagine, expect, feel, seem, appear.     

Belief and Self‐consciousness

Abstract

This paper is about what is distinctive about first‐person beliefs. I discuss several sets of puzzling cases of first‐person belief. The first focus on the relation between belief and action, while the second focus on the relation of belief to subjectivity. I argue that in the absence of an explanation of the dispositional difference, individuating such beliefs more finely than truth conditions merely marks the difference. I argue that the puzzles reveal a difference in the ways that I am disposed to revise my beliefs about myself. This point develops the insight that Anscombe and others had that those of an agent’s beliefs about himself that manifest that special self‐consciousness are not based on observation, testimony or inference. The puzzles show that this kind of self‐consciousness involves, not a special kind of belief or even a special kind of self‐reference, but a special kind of belief revision policy.     

Interference with real world knowledge

Two experiments are described in which subjects studied made-up, fantasy facts about well-known persons and then were asked to verify actual facts about these persons. Reaction time to the actual facts was longer the more fantasy propositions studied about a person. Reaction time was also longer when the verification test involved a mixture of actual and fantasy facts rather than just actual facts. A mathematical version of the ACT model (Anderson, 1976) was fit to the data. It provides a satisfactory fit, better than an alternate model. However, some of the parameter values estimated for the ACT model seemed unreasonable.     

Learning on a response continuum: Comparison of a linear change and a functional learning model

Two reinforcement schedules were used to compare the predictive validity of a linear change model with a functional learning model. In one schedule, termed “convergent,” the linear change model predicts convergence to the optimum response, while in the other, termed “divergent,” this model predicts that a subject's response will not converge. The functional learning model predicts convergence in both cases. Another factor that was varied was presence or absence of random error or “noise” in the relationship between response and outcome. In the “noiseless” condition, in which no noise is added, a subject could discover the optimum response by chance, so that some subjects could appear to have converged fortuitously. In the “noisy” conditions such chance apparent convergence could not occur.The results did not unequivocally favor either model. While the linear change model's prediction of nonconvergence in the divergent conditions (particularly the “noisy” divergent condition) was not sustained, there was a clear difference in speed of convergence, counter to the prediction inferred from the functional learning model. Evidence that at least some subjects were utilizing a functional learning strategy was adduced from the fact that subjects were able to “map out” the relation between response and outcome quite accurately in a follow-up task. Almost all subjects in the “noisy” conditions had evidently “learned” a strong linear relation, with slope closely matching the veridical one.The data were consistent with a hybrid model assuming a “hierarchy of cognitive strategies” in which more complex strategies (e.g., functional learning) are utilized only when the simpler ones (e.g., a linear change strategy) fail to solve the problem.     

Merleau-Ponty and Carroll on the Power of Movies

Movies have a striking aesthetic power: they can draw us in and induce a peculiar mode of involvement in their images – they absorb us. While absorbed in a movie, we lose track both of the passage of time and of the fact that we are sitting in a dark room with other people watching the play of light upon a screen. What is the source of the power of movies? Noël Carroll, who cites Maurice Merleau-Ponty as an influence on his account of the power of movies, agrees with Merleau-Ponty that our perceptual experience of movies draws on many of the capacities at work in our perceptual experience of everyday situations. Yet Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception shows that Carroll’s emphasis on intellectual inference and the entertaining of unasserted thoughts is a distortion of the phenomenology of cinematic absorption. According to Merleau-Ponty, such intellectual operations come into play in cases of breakdown but should not be read back into the primary absorbed experience as being implicitly operative all along. After presenting and criticizing Carroll’s view, I interpret and expand upon Merleau-Ponty’s position, showing that his version of the analogy between cinematic perception and everyday perception is more convincing than Carroll’s.