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31.
John S Carroll 《Journal of experimental social psychology》1978,14(1):88-96
Previous studies have indicated that explaining a hypothetical event makes the event seem more likely through the creation of causal connections. However, such effects could arise through the use of the availability heuristic; that is, subjective likelihood is increased by an event becoming easier to imagine. Two experiments were designed to demonstrate this principle. In Experiment 1, subjects asked to imagine Jimmy Carter winning the presidential election (prior to the election) predicted that he was more likely to win than subjects asked to imagine Gerald Ford winning. In Experiment 2, subjects asked to imagine a good college football season for the previous championship team were more likely to predict a major bowl bid than subjects asked to imagine a bad season, although the effect did not appear in predictions of the season record. In both studies, subjects who were also asked to explain the imaginary event were no different from subjects who only imagined. Several other attributional distortions are interpreted in terms of the availability heuristic. 相似文献
32.
Alexander Skiles 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2015,45(1):100-112
Fine (1994 “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16) is widely thought to have refuted the simple modal account of essence, which takes the essential properties of a thing to be those it cannot exist without exemplifying. Yet, a number of philosophers have suggested resuscitating the simple modal account by appealing to distinctions akin to the distinction Lewis (1983. “New Work For a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377; 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell) draws between sparse and abundant properties, treating only those in the former class as candidates for essentiality. I argue that ‘sparse modalism’ succumbs to counterexamples similar to those originally posed by Fine, and fails to capture paradigmatic instances of essence involving abundant properties and relations. 相似文献
33.
Chris John Daly 《Synthese》2008,162(1):37-52
David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have
each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that
his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s
attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses
to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors. 相似文献
34.
Ira Kiourti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):343-352
In her (1996) Kadri Vihvelin argues that autoinfanticide is nomologically impossible and so that there is no sense in which time travelers
are able to commit it. In response, Theodore Sider (2002) defends the original Lewisian verdict (Lewis 1976) whereby, on a common understanding of ability, time travelers are able to kill their earlier selves and their failure to
do so is merely coincidental. This paper constitutes a critical note on arguments put forward by both Sider and Vihvelin.
I argue that although Sider’s criticism starts out promisingly he doesn’t succeed in establishing that Vihvelin’s analysis
fails, because (a) he neglects to rule out a class of counterfactuals to which Vihvelin’s sample-case may belong; and (b)
(together with Lewis) he is wrong to suggest that future facts are irrelevant in the evaluation of time travelers’ abilities.
I show instead that Vihvelin’s argument is viciously circular, indicating that even if there are nomological constraints on
autoinfanticide these cannot be established a priori.
相似文献
Ira KiourtiEmail: |
35.
Stacie Friend 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2017,95(1):29-42
I argue that judgments of what is ‘true in a fiction’ presuppose the Reality Assumption: the assumption that everything that is (really) true is fictionally the case, unless excluded by the work. By contrast with the more familiar Reality Principle, the Reality Assumption is not a rule for inferring implied content from what is explicit. Instead, it provides an array of real-world truths that can be used in such inferences. I claim that the Reality Assumption is essential to our ability to understand stories, drawing on a range of empirical evidence that demonstrates our reliance on it in narrative comprehension. However, the Reality Assumption has several unintuitive consequences, not least that what is fictionally the case includes countless facts that neither authors nor readers could (or should) ever consider. I argue that such consequences provide no reason to reject the Reality Assumption. I conclude that we should take fictions, like non-fictions, to be about the real world. 相似文献
36.
In this paper I start by briefly presenting an analysis of token cause and of token causal relevance that I developed elsewhere, and then apply it to the famous thirsty traveler riddle. One general outcome of the analysis of causal relevance employed here is that in preemption cases (early or late) the preempted cause is not a cause since it is causally irrelevant to the effect. I consider several variations of the thirsty traveler riddle. In the first variation the first enemy emptied the canteen and the second enemy threw it away. On this variation, the act of neither enemy comes out, on the analysis employed here, as causally relevant to, and thus not as a cause of, the fact that the traveler died, but the conjunction of the two acts is a cause of it. This version is a case of mutual preemption. I argue that it has the same structure as the voting paradox, which thus has an analogous solution. In the standard version, in which the first enemy added poison to the water in the traveler's canteen, the act of the second enemy (who threw the canteen away) comes out, on the analysis used here, as causally relevant to and as a cause of the fact that the traveler died, but the act of the first enemy comes out as neither. I also make a comparison with Lewis' accounts, and discuss alternative treatments of the puzzle such as those of Hart and Honore and of Gavison, Margalit, and Ullmann-Margalit. 相似文献
37.
Simon J. Evnine 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2018,48(1):142-157
This critical notice describes some of Thomas Sattig’s book The Double Lives of Objects: An Essay in the Metaphysics of the Ordinary World and raises several critical issues about it. 相似文献
38.
Alessandro Giovannelli 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):117-127
The goal of this paper is methodological. It offers a comprehensive mapping of the theoretical positions on the ethical criticism
of art, correcting omissions and inadequacies in the conceptual framework adopted in the current debate. Three principles
are recommended as general guidelines: ethical amenability, basic value pluralism, and relativity to ethical dimension. Hence
a taxonomy distinguishing between different versions of autonomism, moralism, and immoralism is established, by reference
to criteria that are different from what emerging in the current literature. The mapping is then proved capable of (1) locating
the various theories that have been proposed so far and clarifying such theories’ real commitments, (2) having the correct
relationship with actual art making and art criticism practices, and (3) showing the real weight of the alleged counter-example
to a moralist position of a work that succeeds artistically because of its immorality.
相似文献
Alessandro GiovannelliEmail: |
39.
John Kelsay 《The Journal of religious ethics》2010,38(3):485-493
The Center for the Study of World Religions (CSWR) project represented here through papers by Thomas Lewis, Aaron Stalnaker, Hans Lucht, and Lee Yearley (with responses) was motivated by the judgment that the trend toward a focus on virtue ethics, with attendant concern for techniques of forming selves, creates an opportunity for a dialogue with ethnographers. I argue that the CSWR essays neglect social and institutional considerations, as well as overdrawing the distinction between “formalist” and virtue approaches to the study of comparative ethics. 相似文献
40.
Diane Proudfoot 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2006,35(1):9-40
The canonical version of possible worlds semantics for story prefixes is due to David Lewis. This paper reassesses Lewis's
theory and draws attention to some novel problems for his account. 相似文献