亲子鉴定:科技维护家庭伦理存在的道德悖论

亲子鉴定对于维护家庭应有的婚姻观念和伦理关系的积极意义是不言而喻的;但同时也带来一系列需要引起注意的新问题,如强化了男子亲权的意义而忽视了女子亲权的意义、强化性关系的生理和血缘伦理意义而弱化了性关系的社会伦理意义,容易因诱发和助长夫妻间的不信任情绪而导致婚姻和家庭信任危机等;因此,国家和社会应当对亲子鉴定进行必要的引导和限制。     

The Creativity Paradox: An Introductory Essay

In this introductory article to the special issue, I explore the trope of paradox to think through the idea of creativity. Traditionally, metaphor has been the favored trope to conceptualize creativity: the combination of two existing elements into something different, something new. In this special issue, we focus on the trope of paradox as a trope defined by juxtaposition and an apparently irresolvable conflict to delineate creativity. Glossing the usefulness of paradox for artistic as well as scientific creativity, I show how the idea of Janusian thinking or being in two minds holds great potential to bridge creativity research in the humanities and social sciences. This issue starts building that bridge with multidisciplinary perspectives on creativity that, first, deconstruct apparent dichotomies in creativity research and, second, approach creativity as a situated, distributed concept.     

Epilogue: Creativity as Immersed Detachment

In this short epilogue, I reflect on a final, basic paradox when it comes to creativity: the fact that creators are simultaneously deeply immersed into their environment and their work and, at the same time, capable of taking distance from both in order to develop new perspectives on the situation or problem at hand. This particular state of “immersed detachment” is enabled by our existence as social and cultural beings, a condition that both constrains and frees our thinking and our action. Understanding this paradoxical condition and fostering it can have wide‐ranging benefits at a theoretical and practical level. Conceptually, it helps us understand why creativity depends, at once, on individuals and society, uniqueness and sameness, continuity and difference. Practically, it encourages those forms of immersion and connectivity that help rather than hinder creative agency.     

幸福悖论及其最新解释

横断研究认为收入和幸福感正相关; 长时时间序列(通常指10年及以上)研究认为二者无关, 这种矛盾的结论即构成了幸福悖论。传统上解释幸福悖论主要从理论着手, 如定点理论、适应理论、相对效用理论等。近年来, 学者们开始从“忽略变量”的角度解释, 文章分别介绍了收入不平等、受教育水平、社会资本、个人主义–集体主义、婚姻状态五种忽略变量。忽略变量对幸福感的消极效应抵消了收入对幸福感的积极效应, 导致了幸福悖论现象的发生。     

Room for a view: on the metaphysical subject of personal identity

Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of personal identity, including Derek Parfit, have either completely distorted or not understood Locke’s actual view. Shoemaker’s defense, which uses a “package deal” definition that relies on internal relations of synchronic and diachronic unity and employs the Ramsey–Lewis account to define personal identity, leaves far less room for psychological continuity views than for my own view, which, independently of its radical implications, is that (a) consciousness makes personal identity, and (b) in consciousness alone personal identity consists—which happens to be also Locke’s actual view. Moreover, the ubiquitous Fregean conception of borders and the so-called “ambiguity of is” collapse in the light of what Hintikka has called the “Frege trichotomy.” The Ramsey–Lewis account, due to the problematic way Shoemaker tries to bind the variables, makes it impossible for the neo-Lockean ala Shoemaker to fulfill the uniqueness clause required by all such Lewis style definitions; such attempts avoid circularity only at the expense of mistaking isomorphism with identity. Contrary to what virtually all philosophers writing on the topic assume, fission does not destroy personal identity. A proper analysis of public versus perspectival identification, derived using actual case studies from neuropsychiatry, provides the scientific, mathematical and logical frameworks for a new theory of self-reference, wherein “consciousness,” “self-consciousness,” and the “I,” can be precisely defined in terms of the subject and the subject-in-itself.     

人的老化与社会情绪选择理论

当今世界人口老龄化带来的诸多影响日益受到人们的关注与重视,老化研究也逐渐成为心理学家关注的热点。社会情绪选择理论是基于老化问题而提出的一个新理论。总结这一理论的基本假设和理论框架,并对目前有关此理论的实证研究进行了整理概括,最后指出了该领域尚存在的一些问题,并对未来前景进行了展望。     

The paradox of happiness: towards an alternative explanation

There is a common empirical finding in many countries that substantial increases in real per capita income do not correspond to equivalent increases of individual happiness. These findings have puzzled many economists that some have called the “paradox of happiness”. There have been a number of explanations regarding this paradox. This paper attempts to tackle the paradox of happiness by employing the idea of hierarchical choice. The hierarchical approach implies that there are some basic human needs which must be satisfied before non-basic needs come into the picture. The paper argues that the hierarchical structure of needs implies that the satisfaction of basic needs provides substantial increases to individual happiness compared to the subsequent satisfaction of secondary needs. This might also be an alternative explanation of empirical findings showing a positive relationship between income and happiness up to certain level of income. It can also be combined with existing explanations of the paradox and thus enhance our understanding of the issue.

Your Self: did you find it or did you make it?

Abstract: In this paper ¹ 1 This is a slightly edited version of a paper that was pre‐circulated to members of the Society of Analtyical Psychology for discussion at the monthly meeting of the ‘analytic group’ on 4^th November 1991. Sub‐headings and some references have been added by the Editor, Warren Colman.
, written in draft form in 1991 and now posthumously published, the late Louis Zinkin ² 2 The late Louis Zinkin was a practising analytical psychologist and group analyst, a training analyst of the S.A.P., honorary consultant psychotherapist and senior lecturer at St George's Hospital, London, and associate of the Group‐Analytic Practice, London. He died on 13^th March 1993.
presents a constructivist view of the self. He considers some of the paradoxes in Jungian definitions of the self and compares these to Winnicott's ‘forbidden question’ regarding the transitional object: ‘Did you find it or did you make it?’. He argues that, for the purposes of a coherent scientific theory, these apparent paradoxes need to be formulated in an internally consistent way. Bemused by the many contradictions in Jung's thinking, he proposes making a fresh start by thinking in terms of people in social interaction with each other rather than as solitary subjects, as Jung did. This leads him to the view that the self comes into existence through continuing interaction with other people. Drawing on the work of Harré and Vygotsky, he suggests that the public self is prior to the private self and that one becomes real through recognition by other people in and through language and culture. The paper was discussed at a meeting held at the Society of Analytical Psychology in November 1991 and an edited version of the taped discussion follows.     

AI,ME AND LEWIS (ABELIAN IMPLICATION,MATERIAL EQUIVALENCE AND C I LEWIS 1920)

C I Lewis showed up Down Under in 2005, in e-mails initiated by Allen Hazen of Melbourne. Their topic was the system Hazen called FL (a Funny Logic), axiomatized in passing in Lewis 1921. I show that FL is the system MEN of material equivalence with negation. But negation plays no special role in MEN. Symbolizing equivalence with → and defining ∼A inferentially as A→f, the theorems of MEN are just those of the underlying theory ME of pure material equivalence. This accords with the treatment of negation in the Abelian l-group logic A of Meyer and Slaney (Abelian logic. Abstract, Journal of Symbolic Logic 46, 425–426, 1981), which also defines ∼A inferentially with no special conditions on f. The paper then concentrates on the pure implicational part AI of A, the simple logic of Abelian groups. The integers Z were known to be characteristic for AI, with every non-theorem B refutable mod some Zn for finite n. Noted here is that AI is pre-tabular, having the Scroggs property that every proper extension SI of AI, closed under substitution and detachment, has some finite Zn as its characteristic matrix. In particular FL is the extension for which n = 2 (Lewis, The structure of logic and its relation to other systems. The Journal of Philosophy 18, 505–516, 1921; Meyer and Slaney, Abelian logic. Abstract. Journal of Symbolic Logic 46, 425–426, 1981; This is an abstract of the much longer paper finally published in 1989 in G. G. Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman, eds., Paraconsistent logic: essays on the inconsistent, Philosophica Verlag, Munich, pp. 245–288, 1989). Meyer was supported in this work as a Visiting Fellow in the College of Engineering and Computer Science, ANU.     

Antecedent-Relative Comparative World Similarity

In “Backward Causation and the Stalnaker–Lewis Approach to Counterfactuals,” Analysis 62:191–7, (2002), Michael Tooley argues that if a certain kind of backward causation is possible, then a Stalnaker–Lewis comparative world similarity account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. In “Tooley on Backward Causation,” Analysis 63:157–62, (2003), Paul Noordhof argues that Tooley’s example can be reconciled with a Stalnaker–Lewis account of counterfactuals if the comparative world similarity relation on which the Stalnaker–Lewis account relies is allowed to be antecedent-relative. In this paper I show that taking comparative world similarity to be antecedent-relative results in a formal semantics which is a comparative world similarity semantics in name only.