Drug Use Among Immigrant and Non‐immigrant Adolescents: Immigrant Paradox,Family and Peer Influences

The present study compared immigrant and Italian native adolescents with regard to drug use. Additionally, we analysed the role of family and peer risk and protective factors for drug use. Participants included 2533 Italian native and immigrant adolescents (mean age = 17.19, SD = 1.6; 66.7% male). Results showed that immigrant adolescents reported lower levels of marijuana and pharmaceutical drug abuse than non‐immigrant adolescents. These results confirm the so‐called immigrant paradox phenomenon: the counterintuitive finding that although immigrants often live under challenging conditions and reported lower economic affluence compared with nationals, some health outcomes have not always corresponded to their relative disadvantage. Immigrant adolescents also reported higher level of parental control and lower levels of affiliation with deviant peers, but lower levels of child disclosure, parental solicitation and parental knowledge. Socio‐economic status and parental monitoring showed equivalent effects on drug use for immigrant and non‐immigrant adolescents. Results have implications for preventive interventions for immigrant adolescents and families, including the need to develop programmes that leverage the benefits of the immigrant paradox for immigrant communities. Future research should analyse the processes that lead to lower levels of drug use in immigrant adolescents and investigate the influence of friendship networks on immigrant adolescent drug use behaviour. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

In Defence of Kripkenstein: On Lewis’ Proposed Solution to the Sceptical Argument

Abstract

In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke argues for an extreme form of meaning scepticism. One influential reply to Kripke’s arguments was developed by David Lewis. The reply developed by Lewis makes use of the notion of mind-independent relations of similarity and difference. The aim of the paper is to argue that Lewis’ reply is not satisfactory: the challenge to find a refutation of Kripke’s sceptical arguments remains unmet.     

Causes,Counterfactuals, and Non-Locality

In order to motivate the thesis that there is no single concept of causation that can do justice to all of our core intuitions concerning that concept, Ned Hall has argued that there is a conflict between a counterfactual criterion of causation and the condition of causal locality. In this paper I critically examine Hall's argument within the context of a more general discussion of the role of locality constraints in a causal conception of the world. I present two strategies that defenders of counterfactual accounts of causation can pursue to respond to Hall's challenge—including the adoption of a counterfactual condition that is sufficient for causal action-at-a-distance in place of Hall's ‘process’ condition—and conclude that Hall's argument against counterfactual accounts of causation is unsuccessful.     

Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism

The paradox of hedonism is the idea that making pleasure the only thing that we desire for its own sake can be self-defeating. Why would this be true? In this paper, I survey two prominent explanations, then develop a third possible explanation, inspired by Joseph Butler's classic discussion of the paradox. The existing accounts claim that the paradox arises because we are systematically incompetent at predicting what will make us happy, or because the greatest pleasures for human beings are found in certain special goods which hedonists cannot enjoy. On the account that I develop, the paradox is a consequence of a theory about the nature of pleasure, together with a view about the requirements of rational belief. Which of these explanations is correct, I argue, bears on central questions about how to understand the nature and extent of the paradox.     

Against Magnetism

Magnetism in meta-semantics is the view that the meaning of our words is determined in part by their use and in part by the objective naturalness of candidate meanings. This hypothesis is commonly attributed to David Lewis, and has been put to philosophical work by Brian Weatherson, Ted Sider and others. I argue that there is no evidence that Lewis ever endorsed the view, and that his actual account of language reveals good reasons against it.     

Keep or trade? An experimental study of the exchange paradox

The “exchange paradox”—also referred to in the literature by a variety of other names, notably the “two-envelopes problem”—is notoriously difficult, and experts are not all agreed as to its resolution. Some of the various expressions of the problem are open to more than one interpretation; some are stated in such a way that assumptions are required in order to fill in missing information that is essential to any resolution. In three experiments several versions of the problem were used, in each of which the information given was sufficient to determine an optimal choice strategy when it exists or to justify indifference regarding keeping or trading when such a strategy does not exist. College students who were presented with the various versions of the problem tended to base their choices on simple heuristics and to give little evidence of understanding the probabilistic implications of the differences in the problem statements.     

A Moorean paradox of desire

A prevalent assumption among philosophers who believe that people can intentionally deceive themselves (intentionalists) is that they accomplish this by controlling what evidence they attend to. This article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of this claim, which we may call ‘attentionalism’. According to attentionalism, when one justifiably believes/suspects that not-p but wishes to make oneself believe that p, one may do this by shifting attention away from the considerations supportive of the belief that not-p and onto considerations supportive of the belief that p. The details of this theory are elaborated, its theoretical importance is pointed out, and it is argued that the strategy is supposed to work by leading to the repression of one's knowledge of the unwelcome considerations. However, I then show that the assumption that this is possible is opposed by the balance of a relevant body of empirical research, namely, the thought-suppression literature, and so intentionalism about self-deception cannot find vindication in the attentional theory.     

RECRIMINATION IN THE ANALYTIC SITUATION: A HYPOTHESIS ABOUT ITS INFLUENCE ON PSYCHOANALYTICAL GROUPS

This paper deals with certain distortions in communication generated by mutual recrimination that is the result of disturbances in the ideal agencies of both parties. Although the ideal ego, superego and ego ideal participate equally in reproach, it is the latter which is the most decisive. In clinical experience, recrimination may easily colour the analytic dialogue. In such cases, interpretation loses its sense of clarification and another type of dialogue replaces it. There, words are used to take possession of the other, for its autonomy is a threat to the static character of the pathology of mourning. The problem of recrimination has also tainted the development of psychoanalysis, to the point of disrupting the process of discovery itself. This paper deals with repercussions in the psychoanalytic movement and also in the elements that constitute its structure. Finally, different variations and disturbances in the psychoanalytic ideal are considered, as well as the involvement of the psychoanalytic institution in preserving or transforming the ideal. Here the importance of institutions and institutional ideals is emphasised. Finally, we suggest that ideals either encourage or hinder the working through of individual and collective mourning.     

Why the Liar Does not Matter

This paper develops a classical model for our ordinary use of the truth predicate (1) that is able to address the liar's paradox and (2) that satisfies a very strong version of deflationism. Since the model is a classical in the sense that it has no truth value gaps, the model is able to address Tarski's indictment of our ordinary use of the predicate as inconsistent. Moreover, since it is able to address the liar's paradox, it responds to arguments against deflationism based upon that paradox alone. The model is based upon a notion of the complexity of propositions that a fixed set of speakers might express. A context-sensitive definition of the truth predicate is then provided based upon a class of possible worlds defined in terms of these speakers. Reasonable constraints on the memories and lifetimes of ordinary speakers are used to limit the set of propositions that they might express so that deflationist requirements are satisfied.