In Defence of the Open Question Argument

The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

从混沌角度浅谈凋亡悖论

细胞凋亡是生命科学研究的热点之一,随着近年来研究的愈加深入,新的发现对传统凋亡机制及观念提出了挑战,凋亡悖论应运而生。凋亡悖论的提出是一个值得深入探讨的哲学问题,表明需要对当前科学研究中的还原论方法和线性思维方式进行深刻反思,这提示对于生命现象这类复杂系统科学研究需要混沌思维。     

教条悖论：行为心理学家的新挑战

在各种专业或私人情境中, 人们经常需要整合不同的意见来判断某一观点的对错。当观点的形式类似于将多个论点组合而成的逻辑公式(使用“且”、“或”等逻辑连接词)时, 容易产生教条悖论(doctrinal paradox)。即, 虽然整体意见支持该观点是正确的(或错误的), 但是分析这些整体意见中所包含的各个论点, 却会得到相反的结论。教条悖论是判断整合研究中关注的重要问题, 已在各科学领域引发大量的规范性研究。行为心理学家需在这个重要问题上开展系统研究。本文简要介绍了教条悖论及其过往研究, 总结已有的行为数据, 并指出未来行为研究的方向和视角。     

Numeral Classifiers and the White Horse Paradox

This paper presents an interpretation of Gongsun Long＇s white horse paradox. The Chinese sentence he uses to state his main thesis （Bai ma fei ma） has two potential readings： （a） The white horses are not horses. （b） The white horses are not the horses Although （a） gives the usual and correct reading of the sentence, according to the interpretation, Gongsun Long takes it to state （b）. He gives good arguments for （b） while taking them to establish （a） as well, for he fails to distinguish between the two different theses. In presenting this interpretation, the paper gives an account of the function of numeral classifiers and discusses the semantics of count nouns in languages with no grammatical number system, including classical Chinese and classifier languages （e.g., contemporary Chinese）.     

Truthmakers and necessary connections

In this paper I examine the objection to truthmaker theory, forcibly made by David Lewis and endorsed by many, that it violates the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. In Sect. 1 I present the argument that acceptance of truthmakers commits us to necessary connections. In Sect. 2 I examine Lewis’ ‘Things-qua-truthmakers’ theory which attempts to give truthmakers without such a commitment, and find it wanting. In Sects. 3–5 I discuss various formulations of the denial of necessary connections and argue that each of them is either false or compatible with truthmaker theory. In Sect. 6 I show how the truthmaker theorist can resist the charge that they are committed to necessary exclusions between possible existents. I conclude that there is no good objection to truthmaker theory on the grounds that it violates the Humean dictum.     

Abstraction in Algorithmic Logic

We develop a functional abstraction principle for the type-free algorithmic logic introduced in our earlier work. Our approach is based on the standard combinators but is supplemented by the novel use of evaluation trees. Then we show that the abstraction principle leads to a Curry fixed point, a statement C that asserts C ⇒ A where A is any given statement. When A is false, such a C yields a paradoxical situation. As discussed in our earlier work, this situation leaves one no choice but to restrict the use of a certain class of implicational rules including modus ponens.     

Sleeping beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs

This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not. Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than those of Lewis’ account.

The Donkey Problem

The Donkey Problem (as I am calling it) concerns the relationship between more and less fundamental ontologies. I will claim that the moral to draw from the Donkey Problem is that the less fundamental objects are merely conventional. This conventionalism has consequences for the 3D/4D debate. Four-dimensionalism is motivated by a desire to avoid coinciding objects, but once we accept that the non-fundamental ontology is conventional there is no longer any reason to reject coincidence. I therefore encourage 4Dists to become even more radical—embrace the Donkey Problem’s conventionalism and deflate the debate between 3Dists and 4Dists.

A Note on Priest's Finite Inconsistent Arithmetics

We give a complete characterization of Priest's Finite Inconsistent Arithmetics observing that his original putative characterization included arithmetics which cannot in fact be realized.