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151.
The difficulties with formalizing the intensional notions necessity, knowability and omniscience, and rational belief are well-known. If these notions are formalized as predicates applying to (codes of) sentences, then from apparently weak and uncontroversial logical principles governing these notions, outright contradictions can be derived. Tense logic is one of the best understood and most extensively developed branches of intensional logic. In tense logic, the temporal notions future and past are formalized as sentential operators rather than as predicates. The question therefore arises whether the notions that are investigated in tense logic can be consistently formalized as predicates. In this paper it is shown that the answer to this question is negative. The logical treatment of the notions of future and past as predicates gives rise to paradoxes due the specific interplay between both notions. For this reason, the tense paradoxes that will be presented are not identical to the paradoxes referred to above. 相似文献
152.
Rafał Palczewski 《Studia Logica》2007,86(3):455-478
Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch’s paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We also show how we can combine our point of view on Fitch’s paradox with the others. Next we give an answer to the question: is distributed knowability factive? At the end, we present some details concerning a construction of anti-realist modal epistemic logic. 相似文献
153.
Igor Douven 《Studia Logica》2007,86(2):149-182
Fitch’s paradox shows, from fairly innocent-looking assumptions, that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable
truths. This is generally thought to deliver a blow to antirealist positions that imply that all truths are knowable. The
present paper argues that a probabilistic version of antirealism escapes Fitch’s result while still offering all that antirealists
should care for. 相似文献
154.
P. Schlenker 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2007,36(3):251-307
Although it was traditionally thought that self-reference is a crucial ingredient of semantic paradoxes, Yablo (1993, 2004) showed that this was not so by displaying an infinite series of sentences none of which is self-referential but which, taken
together, are paradoxical. Yablo’s paradox consists of a countable series of linearly ordered sentences s(0), s(1), s(2),... , where each s(i) says: For each k >
i, s(k) is false (or equivalently: For no k >
i is s(k) true). We generalize Yablo’s results along two dimensions. First, we study the behavior of generalized Yablo-series in which each
sentence s(i) has the form: For Q k >
i, s(k) is true, where Q is a generalized quantifier (e.g., no, every, infinitely many, etc). We show that under broad conditions all the sentences in the series must have the same truth value, and we derive a characterization of those values of Q for which the series is paradoxical. Second, we show that in the Strong Kleene trivalent logic Yablo’s results are a special case of a more general fact: under
certain conditions, any semantic phenomenon that involves self-reference can be emulated without self-reference. Various translation procedures that eliminate self-reference from a non-quantificational language are defined and characterized.
An Appendix sketches an extension to quantificational languages, as well as a new argument that Yablo’s paradox and the translations
we offer do not involve self-reference. 相似文献
155.
Susan Rogerson 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2007,36(2):155-179
Curry's paradox, sometimes described as a general version of the better known Russell's paradox, has intrigued logicians for
some time. This paper examines the paradox in a natural deduction setting and critically examines some proposed restrictions
to the logic by Fitch and Prawitz. We then offer a tentative counterexample to a conjecture by Tennant proposing a criterion
for what is to count as a genuine paradox. 相似文献
156.
Stability and Paradox in Algorithmic Logic 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
There is significant interest in type-free systems that allow flexible self-application. Such systems are of interest in property
theory, natural language semantics, the theory of truth, theoretical computer science, the theory of classes, and category
theory. While there are a variety of proposed type-free systems, there is a particularly natural type-free system that we
believe is prototypical: the logic of recursive algorithms. Algorithmic logic is the study of basic statements concerning algorithms and the algorithmic rules of inference between such statements. As
shown in [1], the threat of paradoxes, such as the Curry paradox, requires care in implementing rules of inference in this context. As
in any type-free logic, some traditional rules will fail. The first part of the paper develops a rich collection of inference
rules that do not lead to paradox. The second part identifies traditional rules of logic that are paradoxical in algorithmic
logic, and so should be viewed with suspicion in type-free logic generally. 相似文献
157.
Robert G. Hudson 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):511-523
It is often claimed that anti-realists are compelled to reject the inference of the knowability paradox, that there are no
unknown truths. I call those anti-realists who feel so compelled ‘faint-hearted’, and argue in turn that anti-realists should
affirm this inference, if it is to be consistent. A major part of my strategy in defending anti-realism is to formulate an
anti-realist definition of truth according to which a statement is true only if it is verified by someone, at some time. I
also liberalize what is meant by a verification to allow for indirect forms of verification. From this vantage point, I examine
a key objection to anti-realism, that it is committed to the necessary existence of minds, and reject a response to this problem
set forth by Michael Hand. In turn I provide a more successful anti-realist response to the necessary minds problem that incorporates
what I call an ‘agential’ view of verification. I conclude by considering what intellectual cost there is to being an anti-realist
in the sense I am advocating. 相似文献
158.
Gregory Landini 《Axiomathes》2009,19(2):115-142
This is a critical discussion of Nino B. Cocchiarella’s book “Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism.” It focuses on paradoxes
of hyperintensionality that may arise in formal systems of intensional logic.
相似文献
Gregory LandiniEmail: |
159.
John Kelsay 《The Journal of religious ethics》2010,38(3):485-493
The Center for the Study of World Religions (CSWR) project represented here through papers by Thomas Lewis, Aaron Stalnaker, Hans Lucht, and Lee Yearley (with responses) was motivated by the judgment that the trend toward a focus on virtue ethics, with attendant concern for techniques of forming selves, creates an opportunity for a dialogue with ethnographers. I argue that the CSWR essays neglect social and institutional considerations, as well as overdrawing the distinction between “formalist” and virtue approaches to the study of comparative ethics. 相似文献
160.