Kant on Acting from Juridical Duty

ABSTRACT

A much debated passage in the Metaphysics of Morals often leads commentators to believe that it is not possible to act from juridical duty. On the one hand, Kant says that all lawgiving includes an incentive ‘which connects a ground to determining choice to this action subjectively with the representation of the law’ (MM: 218). On the other hand, he claims that juridical lawgiving ‘does not include the incentive of duty in the law’ (MM: 219). The first claim seems to entail that agents can perform a juridical duty for the sake of that duty; the second seems to entail that agents cannot perform a juridical duty for the sake of that duty. This paper shows that it is possible to reconcile both passages and to claim that one can act from juridical duty in Kant’s terms. First, it gives an account of what can be called the paradox of juridical duties. Second, it discusses briefly how responses to the paradox remain somewhat unsatisfactory. Finally, it clarifies how agents can act with no other incentive but the actual juridical duty without endangering the Kantian morality-law divide.     

I. Kant after Virtue 1

Maclntyre's refurbishing of Aristotelian ethics aims to restore both intelligibility and rationality to moral discourse. In After Virtue he concentrates on showing how intelligible action requires that lives be led within institutional and cultural traditions. But he does not offer a developed account of practical reason which could provide grounds for seeking some rather than other intelligible continuations of lives and traditions. Despite Maclntyre's criticisms of Kant's ethics, a Kantian account of practical reasoning may complement his account of intelligibility. An appropriate interpretation of Kantian ethics is outlined, which escapes Maclntyre's criticisms, allows both for the universal character of basic moral principles and for the historical variability of intelligible action, and which makes moral worth or virtue the centre of the moral life. The refurbishing of Aristotelian ethics may be achieved by a Kantian completion.     

The adaptation of non‐western and Muslim immigrant adolescents in the Netherlands: An immigrant paradox?

van Geel, M. & Vedder, P. (2010). The adaptation of non‐western and Muslim immigrant adolescents in the Netherlands: An immigrant paradox? Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 51, 398–402. This article addresses the possible existence of an immigrant paradox in a sample of immigrant adolescents attending vocational schools in the Netherlands. An immigrant paradox is the finding that first generation immigrants show a more positive pattern of adaptation than nationals despite poorer economic conditions. Second generation immigrants regress to the nationals in terms of adaptation. A sample of 152 first generation immigrant adolescents, 285 second generation immigrant adolescents and 406 national adolescents completed self‐reports about socio‐economic status, psychological problems, behavioral problems and self‐esteem. The results supported the existence of an immigrant paradox in this sample. This indicates that further assimilation among immigrant adolescents does not necessarily lead to increased well being.     

Essence in abundance

Fine (1994 “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16) is widely thought to have refuted the simple modal account of essence, which takes the essential properties of a thing to be those it cannot exist without exemplifying. Yet, a number of philosophers have suggested resuscitating the simple modal account by appealing to distinctions akin to the distinction Lewis (1983. “New Work For a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377; 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell) draws between sparse and abundant properties, treating only those in the former class as candidates for essentiality. I argue that ‘sparse modalism’ succumbs to counterexamples similar to those originally posed by Fine, and fails to capture paradigmatic instances of essence involving abundant properties and relations.     

糖尿病与恶性肿瘤

糖尿病伴发恶性肿瘤的患者越来越多,两者并存时,相互作用,加重病情,预后不良,且有其一定的特点。二者都是消耗性疾病,免疫力低下,对化疗耐受性差,糖尿病的饮食控制与恶性肿瘤的营养支持又非常矛盾,因此治疗上有其一定的特殊性．这就要求我们用哲学上的具体问题具体分析的思想来正确认识其特点与治疗,在化疗过程中两者兼顾并注重药物、支持及心理等综合治疗,以达到最大限度的改善病情,提高病人的生存质量。     

A Model of Tolerance

According to the naive theory of vagueness, the vagueness of an expression consists in the existence of both positive and negative cases of application of the expression and in the non-existence of a sharp cut-off point between them. The sorites paradox shows the naive theory to be inconsistent in most logics proposed for a vague language. The paper explores the prospects of saving the naive theory by revising the logic in a novel way, placing principled restrictions on the transitivity of the consequence relation. A lattice-theoretical framework for a whole family of (zeroth-order) “tolerant logics” is proposed and developed. Particular care is devoted to the relation between the salient features of the formal apparatus and the informal logical and semantic notions they are supposed to model. A suitable non-transitive counterpart to classical logic is defined. Some of its properties are studied, and it is eventually shown how an appropriate regimentation of the naive theory of vagueness is consistent in such a logic.     

Sharvy’s Lucy and Benjamin Puzzle

Sharvy’s puzzle concerns a situation in which common knowledge of two parties is obtained by repeated observation each of the other, no fixed point being reached in finite time. Can a fixed point be reached?     

The methodology of genuine modal realism

David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors.     

Bayes factors: Prior sensitivity and model generalizability

Model selection is a central issue in mathematical psychology. One useful criterion for model selection is generalizability; that is, the chosen model should yield the best predictions for future data. Some researchers in psychology have proposed that the Bayes factor can be used for assessing model generalizability. An alternative method, known as the generalization criterion, has also been proposed for the same purpose. We argue that these two methods address different levels of model generalizability (local and global), and will often produce divergent conclusions. We illustrate this divergence by applying the Bayes factor and the generalization criterion to a comparison of retention functions. The application of alternative model selection criteria will also be demonstrated within the framework of model generalizability.     

Killing Baby Suzy

In her (1996) Kadri Vihvelin argues that autoinfanticide is nomologically impossible and so that there is no sense in which time travelers are able to commit it. In response, Theodore Sider (2002) defends the original Lewisian verdict (Lewis 1976) whereby, on a common understanding of ability, time travelers are able to kill their earlier selves and their failure to do so is merely coincidental. This paper constitutes a critical note on arguments put forward by both Sider and Vihvelin. I argue that although Sider’s criticism starts out promisingly he doesn’t succeed in establishing that Vihvelin’s analysis fails, because (a) he neglects to rule out a class of counterfactuals to which Vihvelin’s sample-case may belong; and (b) (together with Lewis) he is wrong to suggest that future facts are irrelevant in the evaluation of time travelers’ abilities. I show instead that Vihvelin’s argument is viciously circular, indicating that even if there are nomological constraints on autoinfanticide these cannot be established a priori.