Is the paradox of fiction soluble in psychology?

If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more common for scholars to try to dismiss it using data and theories from psychology. In opposition to this trend, the present paper argues that the paradox of fiction cannot be dissolved in the ways recommended by the recent literature. We start by showing how contemporary attempts at dissolving the paradox assume that it emerges from theoretical commitments regarding the nature of emotions. Next, we argue that the paradox of fiction rather emerges from everyday observations, the validity of which is independent of any such commitment. This is why we then go on to claim that a mere appeal to psychology in order to discredit these theoretical commitments cannot dissolve the paradox. We bring our discussion to a close on a more positive note by exploring how the paradox could in fact be solved by an adequate theory of the emotions.     

"好人"如何一生平安?——走出"德福悖论"的怪圈

德福悖论现象一直是道德生活中所面,临的重大问题之一,为历代思想家所关注。在市场经济时代,“好人”虽不再是一个不言“利”的主体,但他能否“一生平安”,德福之间能否统一,关键在于“好人”是否处于一个“有道”或公正的社会制度里。     

A Moorean paradox of desire

A prevalent assumption among philosophers who believe that people can intentionally deceive themselves (intentionalists) is that they accomplish this by controlling what evidence they attend to. This article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of this claim, which we may call ‘attentionalism’. According to attentionalism, when one justifiably believes/suspects that not-p but wishes to make oneself believe that p, one may do this by shifting attention away from the considerations supportive of the belief that not-p and onto considerations supportive of the belief that p. The details of this theory are elaborated, its theoretical importance is pointed out, and it is argued that the strategy is supposed to work by leading to the repression of one's knowledge of the unwelcome considerations. However, I then show that the assumption that this is possible is opposed by the balance of a relevant body of empirical research, namely, the thought-suppression literature, and so intentionalism about self-deception cannot find vindication in the attentional theory.     

Why the Liar Does not Matter

This paper develops a classical model for our ordinary use of the truth predicate (1) that is able to address the liar's paradox and (2) that satisfies a very strong version of deflationism. Since the model is a classical in the sense that it has no truth value gaps, the model is able to address Tarski's indictment of our ordinary use of the predicate as inconsistent. Moreover, since it is able to address the liar's paradox, it responds to arguments against deflationism based upon that paradox alone. The model is based upon a notion of the complexity of propositions that a fixed set of speakers might express. A context-sensitive definition of the truth predicate is then provided based upon a class of possible worlds defined in terms of these speakers. Reasonable constraints on the memories and lifetimes of ordinary speakers are used to limit the set of propositions that they might express so that deflationist requirements are satisfied.     

受欺负与青少年外化问题关系的“健康环境悖论”：敌意性归因的中介作用

“健康环境悖论”是指在总体受欺负水平较低的环境中, 受欺负的个体会表现出更多适应问题。本研究以来自47个班级的1764名5年级到8年级学生为被试(男生956人, 平均年龄14.46岁), 考察了班级平均受欺负水平在个体受欺负经历与外化问题间的调节作用及敌意性归因的中介作用。结果发现：(1)受欺负与外化问题的关系存在“健康环境悖论”现象, 即班级平均受欺负水平能调节个体受欺负经历与外化问题的关系, 在班级平均受欺负水平较低的班级中受欺负经历与外化问题的关联更强; (2)班级平均受欺负水平对受欺负与外化问题的调节作用通过敌意性归因的中介作用实现。本研究证实了受欺负与外化问题的健康环境悖论现象, 并首次揭示了敌意性归因的中介作用机制。     

班级环境如何影响受欺负者的适应？健康环境悖论及其发生机制

“健康环境悖论”是指在受欺负水平相对较低的环境中,受欺负个体有更多的适应问题。通过梳理相关实证研究,本文从人际与认知两大方面分析健康环境悖论的发生机制。人际机制强调健康环境会影响同伴群体对于受欺负者的态度和受欺负者的友谊,这些不良的人际关系进一步加剧受欺负者的适应困难。认知机制认为健康环境会通过向上的社会比较和消极归因方式,影响受欺负者的适应问题。最后,我们讨论了中国文化背景下“健康环境悖论”的适用性问题、未来研究的发展方向和对于干预实践的建议。     

On Quantitative and Qualitative Parsimony

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place—that is, one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well.     

Confidentiality and paradox: the location of ethical space

Implicit in Jung's alchemical metaphor of the vas bene clausum is the idea of an analytic frame with a space inside it for something vital, a relationship between two selves, to develop. For this to happen, analysts must respect their patients' rights to confidentiality. The paper explores the analyst's state of mind and the intrapsychic processes that are constellated when struggling with ethical dilemmas about issues of confidentiality in analytic work. The author suggests that at times when analysts consider breaking confidentiality, there is often a disturbing inner conflict between their moral principles (codes of ethics) and their internal personal ethical attitude. At these difficult moments, the mutuality of the work and the vas bene clausum can be significantly disrupted. The analyst tries to find a third position, a mental and emotional ethical space where the subjective and the objective, the ethical and the unethical can become more companionable bedfellows.     

The wealth paradox: Prosperity and opposition to immigration

The idea that economic downturns and economic deprivation provoke tensions and intergroup hostility is remarkably pervasive. These accounts often work from the premise that economic crises and poverty provide “fertile soil” for populist parties and leaders with an anti-immigrant agenda. This may explain why we intuitively expect that “hard times” produce “harsh attitudes” towards minorities. However, there is also robust empirical evidence showing that intergroup hostility (and anti-immigration sentiments more specifically) can (i) surge in times of economic prosperity, and (ii) be widespread among relatively affluent groups. In this article, I will review evidence showing that intergroup hostility (such as anti-immigrant sentiments) can be equally prevalent in times of relative gratification as well as in times of relative deprivation (accounting for the “Wealth Paradox”). In the second part of this contribution, I will explore these processes through the lens of classic social identity theorising focusing on the way that status anxiety, status threat, and fear of falling among members of wealthier groups are shaped by the permeability of group boundaries and the security of wealth positions. I argue that social identity theorising, typically applied to explain the behaviour of low status groups, can provide a parsimonious and integrative account for why and when high status (i.e., as a result of affluence and prosperity) may be associated with hostility towards minorities rather than with greater tolerance.     

On Toleration,Charity, and Epistemic Fallibilism

In this paper I examine some presuppositions of toleration and pluralism and explore two models, viz., a deontological and a consequentialist model, respectively, which could support the view that rational agents should act in a tolerant way. Against the background which is offered by the first model, I give two arguments in favor of the view that people are better off and more rational if they act in a tolerant way. The first argument draws upon a principle of charity which is usually applied in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, but which could, equally well, work with regard to foundational issues in ethics and philosophy of action. The second argument is built upon the epistemic principle of fallibilism and it is meant to show that acting in a tolerant way is the rational thing to do from this perspective.