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231.
L. A. Paul 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2017,60(3):189-207
AbstractI argue that we can understand the de se by employing the subjective mode of presentation or, if one’s ontology permits it, by defending an abundant ontology of perspectival personal properties or facts. I do this in the context of a discussion of Cappelen and Dever’s recent criticisms of the de se. Then, I discuss the distinctive role of the first personal perspective in discussions about empathy, rational deference, and self-understanding, and develop a way to frame the problem of lacking prospective access to your future self as a problem with your capacity to imaginatively empathize with your (possible) future selves. 相似文献
232.
This paper presents a new theory of vagueness, which is designed to retain the virtues of the fuzzy theory, while avoiding the problem of higher-order vagueness. The theory presented here accommodates the idea that for any statement S
1 to the effect that Bob is bald is x true, for x in [0,1], there should be a further statement S
2 which tells us how true S
1 is, and so on – that is, it accommodates higher-order vagueness – without resorting to the claim that the metalanguage in which the semantics of vagueness is presented is itself vague, and without requiring us to abandon the idea that the logic – as opposed to the semantics – of vague discourse is classical. I model the extension of a vague predicate P as a blurry set, this being a function which assigns a degree of membership or degree function to each object o, where a degree function in turn assigns an element of [0,1] to each finite sequence of elements of [0,1]. The idea is that the assignment to the sequence 0.3,0.2, for example, represents the degree to which it is true to say that it is 0.2 true that o is P to degree 0.3. The philosophical merits of my theory are discussed in detail, and the theory is compared with other extensions and generalisations of fuzzy logic in the literature. 相似文献
233.
Some philosophers have tried to establish a connection between the normativity of instrumental rationality and the paradox
presented by Lewis Carroll in his 1895 paper “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” I here examine and argue against accounts
of this connection presented by Peter Railton and James Dreier before presenting my own account and discussing its implications
for instrumentalism (the view that all there is to practical rationality is instrumental rationality). In my view, the potential
for a Carroll-style regress just shows us that since instrumental rationality involves a higher-order commitment to combine
our willing an end with our taking the necessary means, it therefore cannot, on pain of regress, itself be added as a conjunct
to one of the elements to be combined. This view does not support instrumentalism. 相似文献
234.
Seung Chun Lee 《International Journal of Children's Spirituality》2015,20(1):15-28
This paper examines C. S. Lewis’ perspective of myth or fantasy literature which has mesmerized, and exerted great impact on, young learners’ hearts. In a society entrenched in postmodern ideologies, the understanding of what principles govern the construction of ethical and spiritual identity of young learners is often lost. In this context, well-written children’s literature can be a wonderful avenue where they can restore the value of the ordinary world, escape from the bondage of sinister world and enhance their sense of supernatural world. This paper argues that these are the major values Lewis held dear in the work of mythopoeia such as The Chronicles of Narnia. It also argues that Lewis’ fantasy novels for children were primarily his attempt to allow them to experience the mythic quality of good stories, i.e., to savour a more ultimate reality and divine truth through the myriad fantastic images and supernatural imagination. 相似文献
235.
Zhiheng Tang 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2015,93(4):688-705
For the framework of event causation—i.e. the framework according to which causation is a relation between events—absences or omissions pose a problem. Absences, it is generally agreed, are not events; so, under the framework of event causation, they cannot be causally related. But, as a matter of fact, absences are often taken to be causes or effects. The problem of absence causation is thus how to make sense of causation that apparently involves absences as causes or effects. In an influential paper, Helen Beebee offers a partial solution to the problem by giving an account of causation by absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be causes). I argue that Beebee's account can be extended to cover causation of absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be effects) as well. More importantly, I argue that the extended Beebeeian account calls for a major modification to David Lewis's theory of causal explanation, usually taken as standard. Compared to the standard theory, the result of this modification, which I shall call ‘the liberal theory of causal explanation’, has, among other things, the advantage of being able to accommodate causal explanations in which the explananda are not given in terms of events. 相似文献
236.
237.
238.
Andrew C. Khoury 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2018,96(4):779-792
In most penal systems, success is punished more than failure. For example, murder is punished more severely than attempted murder. But success or failure is often determined by luck. It thus appears that punishment is allotted on the basis of arbitrary factors. The problem of criminal attempts is the question of how to best resolve this apparent tension. One particularly sophisticated attempt at resolution, first developed by David Lewis, holds that such differential punishment is not unjust when understood as a natural penal lottery. What is most interesting about this view is that it does not appear to involve a commitment to resultant moral luck. I argue that the natural penal lottery fails to deliver justice. Upon analysis, it carries the same implication that it sought to avoid—namely, a commitment to resultant moral luck. I then argue that there can be, in principle, no penal lottery that delivers justice, natural or otherwise. 相似文献
239.
A.J. Cotnoir 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2018,96(3):592-609
The divine attributes of omniscience and omnipotence have faced objections to their very consistency. Such objections rely on reasoning parallel to semantic paradoxes such as the Liar or to set-theoretic paradoxes like Russell's paradox. With the advent of paraconsistent logics, dialetheism—the view that some contradictions are true—became a major player in the search for a solution to such paradoxes. This paper explores whether dialetheism, armed with the tools of paraconsistent logics, has the resources to respond to the objections levelled against the divine attributes. 相似文献
240.
Alessandra Bertocchi 《Argumentation》2003,17(1):113-122
Adjectives can be gradable or non-gradable and this aspect of their meaning is responsible for their different distribution and also for their classification into two different classes of antonyms. Non-gradable antonyms are called contradictories: they are neither true nor false together and exclude any middle term; gradable antonyms are called contraries: they are not simultaneously true, but may be simultaneously false. While with contraries a negative disjunction (neque...neque) can define an intermediate level, with contradictories it simply means that either term of the disjunction is excluded. There are however some Latin examples, such as neque vivus neque mortuus (`neither alive nor dead'), where the negation of a contradictory pair is used to convey a third, intermediate value. This third possibility is precisely what gives place to a paradox. Such an intermediate level can be defined also by terms like semivivus, semianimis (`half-dead'). Following Ducrot's theory on argumentation, such terms represent an argumentative attenuation, not with respect to life, rather with respect to death. With contradictories, in fact, the use of semi-, like the use of negation, gives the assertion of the opposite term as a result. 相似文献