Fear of falling and falls in older adults with mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer’s disease

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to explore the influence of social importance on prospective remembering in younger and older adults as a possible factor contributing to the age-prospective memory paradox. Using a between-subjects design, 40 younger and 40 older adults worked on a time-based prospective memory task in which social importance was varied. Overall, younger adults outperformed older adults in the prospective memory task. Importantly, in contrast to younger adults, older adults' prospective memory performance was significantly better in the social importance condition than in the standard condition. This interaction was not reflected in participants' time-monitoring behaviour. Findings are discussed in the context of recent prospective memory theories.     

Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation

The aggregation of individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions is called judgment aggregation. Literature in social choice and political theory has claimed that judgment aggregation raises serious concerns. For example, consider a set of premises and a conclusion where the latter is logically equivalent to the former. When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (the conclusion). This problem is known as the discursive dilemma (or paradox). The discursive dilemma is a serious problem since it is not clear whether a collective outcome exists in these cases, and if it does, what it is like. Moreover, the two suggested escape-routes from the paradox—the so-called premise-based procedure and the conclusion-based procedure—are not, as I will show, satisfactory methods for group decision-making. In this paper I introduce a new aggregation procedure inspired by an operator defined in artificial intelligence in order to merge belief bases. The result is that we do not need to worry about paradoxical outcomes, since these arise only when inconsistent collective judgments are not ruled out from the set of possible solutions.     

META‐HUMANS AND METANOIA: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF EXTRATERRESTRIALS

Abstract. Although we do not know whether intelligent extraterrestrials exist, they are a permanent fixture of literature and philosophical argument. Part of their appeal is that they watch us from above and thus serve as a metaphor for human self‐reflexivity. This makes fictional aliens especially useful when moral issues are at stake. In order to evaluate stories about aliens with respect to moral conclusions two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the stories have to be detailed enough that we can understand the circumstances of the aliens' moral choices. Therefore science fiction often is more useful than arguments involving aliens in short technical papers. Second, their fictional lives need to be possible in our own universe, or very nearly so, in order to be relevant for our own moral conduct. Taking as an example the unfallen aliens in C. S. Lewis's novels Out of the Silent Planet (1938) and Perelandra (1943), we can acknowledge the theological interest and literary subtlety. Nonetheless, the stories fail as moral parables in one important respect: The aliens depicted could not be a product of evolution in our universe, at least as we currently understand its scientific laws. This realization has important consequences for our self‐understanding and thus underlines how fictional aliens can be useful in making sense of the complexities involved in moral argumentation.     

A human laboratory test of eysenck's theory of incubation: A search for the resolution of the neurotic paradox

A number of recent attempts have been made by neobehaviorists to resolve the neurotic paradox by incorporating a nontraditional learning principle. Eysenck's concept of incubation represents one of these attempts and is the subject matter of this paper. Incubation theory states that under certain conditions exposure to a fear-provoking conditioned stimulus (CS) can result in a substained growth of fear. This concept is used to explain extreme avoidance (symptom) maintenance in extinction. To test this theory, three conditions identified by Eysenck and considered critical to the development of incubation were manipulated in a classical conditioning paradigm: unconditioned stimulus (UCS) intensity, duration of CS exposure, and individual differences in neuroticism/introversion. Both physiological and self-report fear measures were taken. Results indicated that, contrary to incubation theory, fear extinguished in all groups. Long durations of CS exposure were found to be more effective than brief exposure in reducing fear of highly fearful subjects. Clinical implications for therapies using fear exposure such as flooding and implosion were discussed, as well as the resolution of the neurotic paradox via established learning principles.     

Visual attention at three months as a predictor of cognitive functioning at two years of age

The purpose of the present study was to examine the predictive power of various cognitive skills at 3 months of age in terms of later cognitive functioning. Habituating to redundant and recovering to novel stimuli at 3 months of age were found to predict later intellectual functioning at 24 months better than 3-month global intelligence or object permanence scores. In terms of information processing skills, recovery predicted later intelligence test scores better than habituation. It is suggested that changes in cognitive functioning may be viewed as a transformation of skills from one age to another rather than as a continuum of the same skills. With regard to the cognitive abilities of the 3-month-old, it is suggested that information processing may be central to cognitive functioning at this age.     

Neonates' heart rate,sucking rhythm,and sucking amplitude as a function of the sweet taste

In previous studies of human newborn sucking, the effects of increasing fluid sweetness and/or volume included a decrease in sucking rate within sucking bursts and, paradoxically, an increase in heart rate. To determine whether the heart rate increase can be attributed to increased sucking amplitude for sweeter fluids, sucking and heart rates of 20 full-term infants were studied. Half sucked for three consecutive 2-min periods, first receiving small drops of water for each suck, then no fluid, then 15% sucrose. The other half experienced the reverse order. The results for sucking and heart rate were consistent with previous studies; sucking rates within bursts were slowest for sucrose and fastest for no fluid. Heart rate was higher for sucrose than for the other fluid conditions, however, only in the water-first group. The heart rate increase was significant on statistical tests which controlled for sucking amplitude as well as for several other motor variables. Sucking amplitude itself varied with fluid sweetness in the water-first group only, in which it was highest for water. There were more total sucks, longer sucking bursts, and less time between successive bursts under the sucrose condition. Multivariate statistics helped establish a set of dependent variables—sucking rate within bursts, total number of sucks, and heart rate—which most parsimoniously describes the effects of fluid sweetness. A hedonic explanation of the response of newborns to sweetness is thus reiterated.     

Curry's paradox in contractionless constructive logic

We propose contractionless constructive logic which is obtained from Nelson's constructive logic by deleting contractions. We discuss the consistency of a naive set theory based on the proposed logic in relation to Curry's paradox. The philosophical significance of contractionless constructive logic is also argued in comparison with Fitch's and Prawitz's systems.     

Deflationary Truth and the Liar

Journal of Philosophical Logic -     

自我参照加工中的频率作用二重性

本实验在三种加工水平下考察了自我参照加工和频率作用二重性的关系,实验分为回忆部分和再认部分,三组被试分别进行自我参照、他人参照和一般语义加工,再认测验包括R／K判断。结果发现,在一般的回忆和再认模式下,自我参照加工中的频率作用二重性依然存在,即回忆中高频词的成绩优于低频词,而再认中低频词的成绩优于高频词;但在R／K判断上,对于低频词,无论哪一种参照加工的R都大于K,但对于高频词,只有自我参照加工的R仍大于K。最后,本文从自我参照加工的独特性对结果进行了讨论。     

Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy

Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof invalid. My conclusion is that no reductio of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.