STEADY-STATE ASSESSMENT OF IMPULSIVE CHOICE IN LEWIS AND FISCHER 344 RATS: BETWEEN-CONDITION DELAY MANIPULATIONS

Previous research has shown that Lewis rats make more impulsive choices than Fischer 344 rats. Such strain-related differences in choice are important as they may provide an avenue for exploring genetic and neurochemical contributions to impulsive choice. The present systematic replication was designed to determine if these findings could be reproduced using a procedure less susceptible to within- or between-session carry-over effects that may have affected previous findings. Specifically, delays to the larger–later food reinforcer were manipulated between conditions following steady-state assessments of choice, and the order of delays across conditions was mixed. The results confirmed previous findings that Lewis rats made significantly more impulsive choices than Fischer 344 rats. Fischer 344 rats' preference for the larger–later reinforcer, on the other hand, was less extreme than reported in prior research, which may be due to carry-over effects inherent to the commonly used technique of systematically increasing delays within session. Previously reported across-strain motor differences were reproduced as Lewis rats had shorter latencies than Fischer 344 rats, although these latencies were not correlated with impulsive choice. Parallels between reduced dopamine function in Lewis rats and clinical reports of impulse-control disorders following treatment of Parkinson patients with selective D2/D3 dopamine agonists are discussed.     

Reasoning with Slippery Predicates

It is a commonplace that the extensions of most, perhaps all, vague predicates vary with such features as comparison class and paradigm and contrasting cases. My view proposes another, more pervasive contextual parameter. Vague predicates exhibit what I call open texture: in some circumstances, competent speakers can go either way in the borderline region. The shifting extension and anti-extensions of vague predicates are tracked by what David Lewis calls the “conversational score”, and are regulated by what Kit Fine calls penumbral connections, including a principle of tolerance. As I see it, vague predicates are response-dependent, or, better, judgement-dependent, at least in their borderline regions. This raises questions concerning how one reasons with such predicates. In this paper, I present a model theory for vague predicates, so construed. It is based on an overall supervaluationist-style framework, and it invokes analogues of Kripke structures for intuitionistic logic. I argue that the system captures, or at least nicely models, how one ought to reason with the shifting extensions (and anti-extensions) of vague predicates, as borderline cases are called and retracted in the course of a conversation. The model theory is illustrated with a forced march sorites series, and also with a thought experiment in which vague predicates interact with so-called future contingents. I show how to define various connectives and quantifiers in the language of the system, and how to express various penumbral connections and the principle of tolerance. The project fits into one of the topics of this special issue. In the course of reasoning, even with the external context held fixed, it is uncertain what the future extension of the vague predicates will be. Yet we still manage to reason with them. The system is based on that developed, more fully, in my Vagueness in Context, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, but some criticisms and replies to critics are incorporated.     

Propositional knowledge and know-how

This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley’ (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19–31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge.     

A Propositional Logic with Relative Identity Connective and a Partial Solution to the Paradox of Analysis

We construct a a system PLRI which is the classical propositional logic supplied with a ternary construction , interpreted as the intensional identity of statements and in the context . PLRI is a refinement of Roman Suszko’s sentential calculus with identity (SCI) whose identity connective is a binary one. We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to some algebraic models. We also show that PLRI can be used to give a partial solution to the paradox of analysis. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Agents of Reform?: Children’s Literature and Philosophy

Children’s literature was first published in the eighteenth century at a time when the philosophical ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on education and childhood were being discussed. Ironically, however, the first generation of children’s literature (by Maria Edgeworth et al) was incongruous with Rousseau’s ideas since the works were didactic, constraining and demanded passive acceptance from their readers. This instigated a deficit or reductionist model to represent childhood and children’s literature as simple and uncomplicated and led to children’s literature being overlooked and its contribution to philosophical discussions being undermined. Although Rousseau advocates freeing the child to develop, he does not feel that reading fiction promotes child development, which is a weakness in an otherwise strong argument for educational reform. Yet, rather ironically, the second generation of children’s writers, from Lewis Carroll onwards, more truly embraced Rousseau’s broader philosophical ideas on education and childhood than their predecessors, encouraging and freeing readers to imagine, reflect and actively engage in ontological enquiry. The emphasis had changed with the child being embraced in education and society as active participant rather than passive or disengaged recipient. Works deemed to be seminal to the canon of children’s literature such as Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Peter Pan and The Chronicles of Narnia challenge readers to work through conflicts many of which can be identified retrospectively as exhibiting postmodern characteristics. By exploring moral and spiritual dilemmas in their writing, Carroll, Barrie and Lewis’s works can be regarded as contributing to discussions on theodical postmodernism. The successes of The Lord of the Rings and Narnia films suggest that there is an interest in exploring moral dilemmas, fulfilling a need (perhaps for tolerance and understanding) in society at large. Children’s literature has an almost divine power to restore, to repair and to heal, all characteristics of theodical postmodernism but differing from the more widely held conception of postmodernism which pulls apart, exacerbates and exposes. Children’s literature therefore offers a healthy and constructive approach to working through moral dilemmas. In their deconstruction of childhood, these authors have brought children’s literature closer to aspects of enquiry traditionally found in the domain of adult mainstream literature. As the boundaries between childhood and adulthood become more fluid, less certain, debate is centring around whether the canon of children’s literature itself has become redundant or meaningless since there are no longer any restrictions on which subjects can be treated in children’s literature. Despite the fact that children’s literature clearly engages with difficult issues, it continues to be left out of the critical equation, not given serious attention, disregarded as simplistic and ignored in contemporary philosophical discussions concerning morality, postmodernism and the future of childhood. With children’s literature coming closer to mainstream literature, and exhibiting prominent features of postmodernism, however, it is only a matter of time before philosophical discussions actively engage with children’s literature and recognise its contribution to the resolution and reconciliation of ontological dilemmas. When this occurs, philosophy and children’s literature will re-engage, enriching contemporary investigations of existence, ethics and knowledge and fruitfully developing thought in these areas. This paper aims to contribute to this process.

META‐HUMANS AND METANOIA: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF EXTRATERRESTRIALS

Abstract. Although we do not know whether intelligent extraterrestrials exist, they are a permanent fixture of literature and philosophical argument. Part of their appeal is that they watch us from above and thus serve as a metaphor for human self‐reflexivity. This makes fictional aliens especially useful when moral issues are at stake. In order to evaluate stories about aliens with respect to moral conclusions two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the stories have to be detailed enough that we can understand the circumstances of the aliens' moral choices. Therefore science fiction often is more useful than arguments involving aliens in short technical papers. Second, their fictional lives need to be possible in our own universe, or very nearly so, in order to be relevant for our own moral conduct. Taking as an example the unfallen aliens in C. S. Lewis's novels Out of the Silent Planet (1938) and Perelandra (1943), we can acknowledge the theological interest and literary subtlety. Nonetheless, the stories fail as moral parables in one important respect: The aliens depicted could not be a product of evolution in our universe, at least as we currently understand its scientific laws. This realization has important consequences for our self‐understanding and thus underlines how fictional aliens can be useful in making sense of the complexities involved in moral argumentation.     

Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation

The aggregation of individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions is called judgment aggregation. Literature in social choice and political theory has claimed that judgment aggregation raises serious concerns. For example, consider a set of premises and a conclusion where the latter is logically equivalent to the former. When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (the conclusion). This problem is known as the discursive dilemma (or paradox). The discursive dilemma is a serious problem since it is not clear whether a collective outcome exists in these cases, and if it does, what it is like. Moreover, the two suggested escape-routes from the paradox—the so-called premise-based procedure and the conclusion-based procedure—are not, as I will show, satisfactory methods for group decision-making. In this paper I introduce a new aggregation procedure inspired by an operator defined in artificial intelligence in order to merge belief bases. The result is that we do not need to worry about paradoxical outcomes, since these arise only when inconsistent collective judgments are not ruled out from the set of possible solutions.     

Creatio Continua

Sometimes in the third-person and sometimes in the first of creativity itself, this transdisciplinary and intercultural essay performs the premise that creativity everywhere is the creatio continua of a cosmopoiesis fully reducible neither to any sum of supposed parts, nor to any terminate, finished totum of viewpoint, event, or objectifiable what. It suggests that in experiencing an ethic of releasement from fixed ego-perspectives in this holism of self-organizingly creative creatio, the contemplative temperament sustainingly embodies the paradoxical ecology of contrasting orientations and their integrated mutual coevolution.     

Criminal Attempts and the Penal Lottery

In most penal systems, success is punished more than failure. For example, murder is punished more severely than attempted murder. But success or failure is often determined by luck. It thus appears that punishment is allotted on the basis of arbitrary factors. The problem of criminal attempts is the question of how to best resolve this apparent tension. One particularly sophisticated attempt at resolution, first developed by David Lewis, holds that such differential punishment is not unjust when understood as a natural penal lottery. What is most interesting about this view is that it does not appear to involve a commitment to resultant moral luck. I argue that the natural penal lottery fails to deliver justice. Upon analysis, it carries the same implication that it sought to avoid—namely, a commitment to resultant moral luck. I then argue that there can be, in principle, no penal lottery that delivers justice, natural or otherwise.