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181.
Two experiments are described in which subjects studied made-up, fantasy facts about well-known persons and then were asked to verify actual facts about these persons. Reaction time to the actual facts was longer the more fantasy propositions studied about a person. Reaction time was also longer when the verification test involved a mixture of actual and fantasy facts rather than just actual facts. A mathematical version of the ACT model (Anderson, 1976) was fit to the data. It provides a satisfactory fit, better than an alternate model. However, some of the parameter values estimated for the ACT model seemed unreasonable. 相似文献
182.
We show how to construct certain L
M, T
-type interpreted languages, with each such language containing meaningfulness and truth predicates which apply to itself. These languages are comparable in expressive power to the L
T
-type, truth-theoretic languages first considered by Kripke, yet each of our L
M, T
-type languages possesses the additional advantage that, within it, the meaninglessness of any given meaningless expression can itself be meaningfully expressed. One therefore has, for example, the object level truth (and meaningfulness) of the claim that the strengthened Liar is meaningless. 相似文献
183.
Xuefeng Wen 《Studia Logica》2007,85(2):251-260
We construct a a system PLRI which is the classical propositional logic supplied with a ternary construction , interpreted as the intensional identity of statements and in the context . PLRI is a refinement of Roman Suszko’s sentential calculus with identity (SCI) whose identity connective is a binary one.
We provide a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic and prove its soundness and completeness with respect to some algebraic
models. We also show that PLRI can be used to give a partial solution to the paradox of analysis.
Presented by Jacek Malinowski 相似文献
184.
Karen L. McGavock 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):129-143
Children’s literature was first published in the eighteenth century at a time when the philosophical ideas of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau on education and childhood were being discussed. Ironically, however, the first generation of children’s literature
(by Maria Edgeworth et al) was incongruous with Rousseau’s ideas since the works were didactic, constraining and demanded passive acceptance from their
readers. This instigated a deficit or reductionist model to represent childhood and children’s literature as simple and uncomplicated
and led to children’s literature being overlooked and its contribution to philosophical discussions being undermined. Although
Rousseau advocates freeing the child to develop, he does not feel that reading fiction promotes child development, which is
a weakness in an otherwise strong argument for educational reform. Yet, rather ironically, the second generation of children’s
writers, from Lewis Carroll onwards, more truly embraced Rousseau’s broader philosophical ideas on education and childhood
than their predecessors, encouraging and freeing readers to imagine, reflect and actively engage in ontological enquiry. The
emphasis had changed with the child being embraced in education and society as active participant rather than passive or disengaged
recipient. Works deemed to be seminal to the canon of children’s literature such as Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Peter Pan and The Chronicles of Narnia challenge readers to work through conflicts many of which can be identified retrospectively as exhibiting postmodern characteristics.
By exploring moral and spiritual dilemmas in their writing, Carroll, Barrie and Lewis’s works can be regarded as contributing
to discussions on theodical postmodernism. The successes of The Lord of the Rings and Narnia films suggest that there is an interest in exploring moral dilemmas, fulfilling a need (perhaps for tolerance
and understanding) in society at large. Children’s literature has an almost divine power to restore, to repair and to heal,
all characteristics of theodical postmodernism but differing from the more widely held conception of postmodernism which pulls
apart, exacerbates and exposes. Children’s literature therefore offers a healthy and constructive approach to working through
moral dilemmas. In their deconstruction of childhood, these authors have brought children’s literature closer to aspects of
enquiry traditionally found in the domain of adult mainstream literature. As the boundaries between childhood and adulthood
become more fluid, less certain, debate is centring around whether the canon of children’s literature itself has become redundant
or meaningless since there are no longer any restrictions on which subjects can be treated in children’s literature. Despite
the fact that children’s literature clearly engages with difficult issues, it continues to be left out of the critical equation,
not given serious attention, disregarded as simplistic and ignored in contemporary philosophical discussions concerning morality,
postmodernism and the future of childhood. With children’s literature coming closer to mainstream literature, and exhibiting
prominent features of postmodernism, however, it is only a matter of time before philosophical discussions actively engage
with children’s literature and recognise its contribution to the resolution and reconciliation of ontological dilemmas. When
this occurs, philosophy and children’s literature will re-engage, enriching contemporary investigations of existence, ethics
and knowledge and fruitfully developing thought in these areas. This paper aims to contribute to this process.
相似文献
Karen L. McGavockEmail: |
185.
改造和提升小农伦理——再读马克思的《路易·波拿巴的雾月十八日》 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
农民在历史发展中的重要地位和伟大成绩是不容否定的,但从伦理道德的角度看,农民还存在先天缺陷和局限性,这在马克思的《路易.波拿巴的雾月十八日》有精深的论述。重读马克思的这部伟大作品,可以为我们在新的历史条件下改造农民和传统伦理中存在的落后的小农意识提供有益的启示。 相似文献
186.
187.
实验1采用艾尔斯伯格悖论的研究范式,探究被试对模糊的厌恶倾向以及在决策过程中所采用的决策策略。结果发现:被试对确定选项和模糊选项的选择存在差异;在肯定形式下倾向于确定选项,而在否定形式下则倾向于模糊选项,采用了利益最大化策略。实验2采用艾尔斯伯格悖论的变式,通过操纵概率和任务类型,发现:模糊决策具有情境依赖性,并非任何情况下个体都厌恶模糊。当风险选项不能满足自己的需要,即获胜机率比较小时,人们会偏向模糊选项。 相似文献
188.
Stephen P. Schwartz 《New Ideas in Psychology》2009,27(1):18-31
Soritic thinking based on reasoning that is involved in the sorites paradox plays a crucial role in some forms of weakness of will. Such soritic reasoning leads to failures of behavior, but cannot be shown to be irrational by standard means. Thus weakness of will appears to be rational, whereas strength of will is irrational when viewed soritically. The puzzle is how to undermine weakness of will and expose it as irrational. Even though such weakness of will is not moral, moral-type reasoning involving the principle of equality can be brought to bear. Weakness of will can also be seen to be analogous to free-rider problems and the prisoner's dilemma. 相似文献
189.
Ming Hsiung 《Studia Logica》2009,91(2):239-271
A relativized version of Tarski’s T-scheme is introduced as a new principle of the truth predicate. Under the relativized
T-scheme, the paradoxical objects, such as the Liar sentence and Jourdain’s card sequence, are found to have certain relative
contradictoriness. That is, they are contradictory only in some frames in the sense that any valuation admissible for them
in these frames will lead to a contradiction. It is proved that for any positive integer n, the n-jump liar sentence is contradictory in and only in those frames containing at least an n-jump odd cycle. In particular, the Liar sentence is contradictory in and only in those frames containing at least an odd
cycle. The Liar sentence is also proved to be less contradictory than Jourdain’s card sequence: the latter must be contradictory
in those frames where the former is so, but not vice versa. Generally, the relative contradictoriness is the common characteristic of the paradoxical objects, but different paradoxical
objects may have different relative contradictoriness.
Presented by Heinrich Wansing 相似文献
190.
Andrei Yu. Khrennikov 《Journal of mathematical psychology》2009,53(5):378-2099
The use of quantum mechanical concepts in social science is a fairly new phenomenon. This paper uses one of quantum mechanics’ most basic concepts, probability interference, to explain the violation of an important decision theory principle (the ‘sure-thing principle’). We also attempt to introduce other quantum mechanical concepts in relation to the sure-thing principle violation. 相似文献