Conscious and unconscious proportion effects in masked priming

The global neuronal workspace theory [Dehaene, S., & Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, 79, 1–37.] proposes that it is impossible for an unconscious stimulus to be used strategically to enhance task performance (bottom–up effect), while a fully consciously perceived stimulus can be used to improve task performance (top–down effect). Two experiments were designed to investigate these hypotheses. In a first experiment we investigated whether a manipulation of the proportion of Arabic/number word targets had a top–down effect. Since the subjects were fully aware of the target, we expected that this manipulation could be used to enhance task performance. In a second experiment we determined whether a manipulation of the proportion of Arabic/number word primes had a bottom–up effect. Since the subjects were unaware of the prime, we hypothesized that they would be unable to use the manipulation to enhance task performance and therefore the manipulation would have no effect. Both hypotheses were largely confirmed.     

Thinking about the Needy: A Reprise

This article discusses Jan Narvesons Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Todays World, and Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy? and their relation to my Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations. Section 2 points out that Narvesons concerns differ from mine, so that often his claims and mine fail to engage each other. For example, his focus is on the poor, mine the needy, and while many poor are needy, and vice versa, our obligations may differ regarding the poor than regarding the needy. Also, Narveson invokes a narrow conception of morality as those rules that government or society may compel people to follow. Given a broader, more plausible, conception of morality, many of Narvesons claims actually support my substantive views. Section 3 shows that many of Narvesons claims are relevant to the best means of aiding the needy, but do not challenge the validity of that end. This is true, for example, of his claims about the role of poor governments, the importance of freedom, the undesirability of mere handouts, and the effects of bad economic policies. Section 4 defends the importance of my distinction between acting justly and acting for reasons of justice. It illustrates that on several widely shared conceptions of justice there might be agent-neutralreasons of justice to aid the needy, even if from an agent-relative perspective one would not be acting unjustly if one failed to do so. Section 5 contests Narvesons portrayal of egalitarianism as concerned about inequality of wealth, per se, as insensitive to prior wrongs, and as holding that the worse-off have a right to be made better off at the expense of the well-off. In addition, it rejects Narvesons contention that egalitarians violate impartiality, and aim to impose their personal tastes on others. Section 6 challenges a fundamental assumption underlying Narvesons doctrine of mutual advantage. In addition, it denies that egalitarians are irrational merely because equality can conflict with the pareto principle. More generally, by appealing to impersonal ideals, it challenges the widely held view that the pareto principle is a condition of rationality. Section 7 argues that Narvesons meta-ethical assumptions are controversial, internally inconsistent, in tension with his normative views, and ultimately a version of skepticism. In addition, it challenges Narvesons view about the role intuitions play in moral theory. Section 8 clarifies points where Narvesons discussion of my views may be misleading. Finally, the paper notes the role that moral reasons may play in deliberation and action, but emphasizes the philosophical and theoretical nature of my work. My aim is to determine the moral considerations that are relevant to how people should act regarding the needy. Whether people will actually be moved to so act, for those reasons or otherwise, is another matter.     

On Hare's attempt to bridge the Kantian-consequentialist gap: A response to Forschler's rejoinder

In a paper in this journal (Wall 2016), the author of the present paper critiqued Scott Forschler's attempt (2013) to establish that Jens Timmermann's argument (2005) against R. M. Hare's attempt (1981) to bridge the Kantian-consequentialist gap is unsuccessful. Forschler's thesis is that Hare's utilitarianism is strictly normative, not metaethical. In Hare's ethical rationalism, which is metaethical but contains no intrinsic ends (Forschler 2013), reason determines the proper ends, and preference satisfaction has no value prior to reason's determinations (Forschler 2013). The present author responded that Hare's moral approach presupposes that preference satisfaction is the ultimate end (Wall 2016) and that an analysis of preference satisfaction in Hare's moral approach cannot be confined to normative ethics. Forschler's rejoinder (2017) suggests that Hare's moral theory was misinterpreted by the author, who now shows that such a judgment results from significant oversights concerning the foundation of Hare's moral theory and utilitarian foundations.     

The new growing block theory vs presentism

It was once held to be a virtue of the growing block theory that it combines temporal dynamism with a straightforward account of in virtue of what past-tensed propositions are true, and an explanation for why some future-tensed propositions are not true (assuming they are not). This put the growing block theory ahead of its principal dynamist rival: presentism. Recently, new growing block theorists have suggested that what makes true, past-tensed propositions, is not the same kind of thing as what makes true, present-tensed propositions. They have done so in an attempt to defuse a particular epistemic objection to their view. In this paper it is argued that the new growing block theorist faces a dilemma. The more unified a strategy is for responding to the epistemic objection, the more that strategy results in the new growing block model positing truthmakers that are similar to those posited by the presentist, which erodes the purported advantage of the growing block theory over presentism. On the other hand, versions of the new growing block theory that embrace disunified strategies are better able to differentiate themselves from presentism, but are unattractive because of their disunity.     

Linguistic and Perceptual Mapping in Spatial Representations: An Attentional Account

Building on evidence for embodied representations, we investigated whether Spanish spatial terms map onto the NEAR/FAR perceptual division of space. Using a long horizontal display, we measured congruency effects during the processing of spatial terms presented in NEAR or FAR space. Across three experiments, we manipulated the task demands in order to investigate the role of endogenous attention in linguistic and perceptual space mapping. We predicted congruency effects only when spatial properties were relevant for the task (reaching estimation task, Experiment 1) but not when attention was allocated to other features (lexical decision, Experiment 2; and color, Experiment 3). Results showed faster responses for words presented in Near‐space in all experiments. Consistent with our hypothesis, congruency effects were observed only when a reaching estimate was requested. Our results add important evidence for the role of top‐down processing in congruency effects from embodied representations of spatial terms.     

Comprehension of simple quantifiers: empirical evaluation of a computational model

We examine the verification of simple quantifiers in natural language from a computational model perspective. We refer to previous neuropsychological investigations of the same problem and suggest extending their experimental setting. Moreover, we give some direct empirical evidence linking computational complexity predictions with cognitive reality. In the empirical study we compare time needed for understanding different types of quantifiers. We show that the computational distinction between quantifiers recognized by finite-automata and push-down automata is psychologically relevant. Our research improves upon, the hypotheses and explanatory power of recent neuroimaging studies as well as provides evidence for the claim that human linguistic abilities are constrained by computational complexity.     

The Peace Work and Witness of the Churches in the German Democratic Republic and the World Disorder of the 21st Century

This article is an edited translation of an address given in Erfurt, Germany, on 12 May 2019, to celebrate the 90th birthday of Heino Falcke, dean (provost) of Erfurt from 1973 until his retirement in 1994. Falcke, who was also a member of the working group on Church and Society of the World Council of Churches, played a central role in developing the theological and ethical response of Protestant churches in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to the threats to peace in a nuclear age. This was expressed in the “renunciation of the spirt, logic, and practice of deterrence.” This article seeks to set out the insights from the peace work and witness of the churches in the GDR against the background of the “world disorder of the 21st century.”