特质焦虑初中生使用减弱调节策略的效果:一项ERP研究

采用情绪反应性-调节图片任务,考察特质焦虑青少年在下调负性情绪反应时的神经生理变化。结果发现,从行为学数据上看,两组被试都能达到下调目标,但低特质焦虑组的调节能力较强。从脑电数据上看,在刺激呈现之后300-600ms,高特质焦虑被试在负性情绪减弱调节效应方面显著小于低特质焦虑被试。在600-1000ms,高特质焦虑被试产生的LPP显著大于低特质焦虑被试。在1000ms以后,两组被试不存在显著差异。这就表明,我国高特质焦虑青少年对情绪反应有意调节能力总体较好,但较低特质焦虑青少年而言可能存在一定滞后性。     

利用倒转图考察儿童认知发展的初步研究

利用倒转图设计的实验考察了3—6岁儿童视觉认知的发展特点,研究结果表明：3岁儿童对倒转后的图形重新认知有难度。4岁及以后的儿童对倒转图重新认知的能力得到迅速发展。对倒转图的认知不仅涉及视知觉能力,同时也反映了儿童关于二维图画表征的观念。我们推测,在3岁或更早儿童的观念中,二维图画与其所指物之间的关系是严格的一一对应的。研究还对利用倒转图考察儿童知觉观点采择的可行性进行了探讨。倒转图可以成为研究儿童认知及社会性发展的有效工具。     

Re‐acquisition of upright vision while wearing visually left–right reversing goggles1

Abstract: The present research aimed to identify the important factor that makes it difficult to re‐acquire upright vision when wearing visually transposed goggles. The author wore left‐right reversing goggles and up‐down reversing goggles each for 14 days in 1986 and in 1990, respectively. When lying on one side with the left‐right reversing goggles on, the observer could get upside‐down vision, which made it possible to compare the difficulty of attaining upright vision when wearing up‐down reversing goggles. The only difference between the two situations is the dimension of the body image to be exchanged: The observer had to exchange the left and right halves of his body in the former situation and had to exchange along the top‐bottom axis of body in the latter situation. Introspective data revealed that attaining an upright sense is easier in the former situation; this means that the asymmetrical structure of our body in the top‐bottom dimension is an important factor in the difficulty of re‐acquiring upright vision.     

Interpreting ambiguous stimuli: Separating perceptual and judgmental biases

Interpreting ambiguous situations is not a purely data-driven process but can be biased towards positive interpretations by top-down influences. The present study tries to identify the underlying processes of these top-down influences. There are two separable types of processes that can be influenced by motivational biases: A perceptual bias affects information uptake whereas a judgmental bias affects acceptance criteria for positive and negative outcomes. In the present study, motivated influences on perception and judgment were investigated with a simple color discrimination task in which ambiguous stimuli had to be classified according to their dominating color. One of two colors indicated a financial gain or a loss, whereas a third color was neutral. To separate perceptual and judgmental biases, Ratcliff’s [Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85, 59–108] diffusion model was employed. Results revealed motivational influences on perception and judgment.     

Modal fictionalism and possible-worlds discourse

The Brock-Rosen problem has been one of the most thoroughly discussed objections to the modal fictionalism bruited in Gideon Rosen’s ‘Modal Fictionalism’. But there is a more fundamental problem with modal fictionalism, at least as it is normally explained: the position does not resolve the tension that motivated it. I argue that if we pay attention to a neglected aspect of modal fictionalism, we will see how to resolve this tension—and we will also find a persuasive reply to the Brock-Rosen objection. Finally, I discuss an alternative reading of Rosen, and argue that this position is also able to fend off the Brock-Rosen objection.     

Is conscientious objection incompatible with a physician’s professional obligations?

In response to physicians who refuse to provide medical services that are contrary to their ethical and/or religious beliefs, it is sometimes asserted that anyone who is not willing to provide legally and professionally permitted medical services should choose another profession. This article critically examines the underlying assumption that conscientious objection is incompatible with a physician’s professional obligations (the “incompatibility thesis”). Several accounts of the professional obligations of physicians are explored: general ethical theories (consequentialism, contractarianism, and rights-based theories), internal morality (essentialist and non-essentialist conceptions), reciprocal justice, social contract, and promising. It is argued that none of these accounts of a physician’s professional obligations unequivocally supports the incompatibility thesis.

Comprehension of simple quantifiers: empirical evaluation of a computational model

We examine the verification of simple quantifiers in natural language from a computational model perspective. We refer to previous neuropsychological investigations of the same problem and suggest extending their experimental setting. Moreover, we give some direct empirical evidence linking computational complexity predictions with cognitive reality. In the empirical study we compare time needed for understanding different types of quantifiers. We show that the computational distinction between quantifiers recognized by finite-automata and push-down automata is psychologically relevant. Our research improves upon, the hypotheses and explanatory power of recent neuroimaging studies as well as provides evidence for the claim that human linguistic abilities are constrained by computational complexity.     

The new growing block theory vs presentism

It was once held to be a virtue of the growing block theory that it combines temporal dynamism with a straightforward account of in virtue of what past-tensed propositions are true, and an explanation for why some future-tensed propositions are not true (assuming they are not). This put the growing block theory ahead of its principal dynamist rival: presentism. Recently, new growing block theorists have suggested that what makes true, past-tensed propositions, is not the same kind of thing as what makes true, present-tensed propositions. They have done so in an attempt to defuse a particular epistemic objection to their view. In this paper it is argued that the new growing block theorist faces a dilemma. The more unified a strategy is for responding to the epistemic objection, the more that strategy results in the new growing block model positing truthmakers that are similar to those posited by the presentist, which erodes the purported advantage of the growing block theory over presentism. On the other hand, versions of the new growing block theory that embrace disunified strategies are better able to differentiate themselves from presentism, but are unattractive because of their disunity.     

Linguistic and Perceptual Mapping in Spatial Representations: An Attentional Account

Building on evidence for embodied representations, we investigated whether Spanish spatial terms map onto the NEAR/FAR perceptual division of space. Using a long horizontal display, we measured congruency effects during the processing of spatial terms presented in NEAR or FAR space. Across three experiments, we manipulated the task demands in order to investigate the role of endogenous attention in linguistic and perceptual space mapping. We predicted congruency effects only when spatial properties were relevant for the task (reaching estimation task, Experiment 1) but not when attention was allocated to other features (lexical decision, Experiment 2; and color, Experiment 3). Results showed faster responses for words presented in Near‐space in all experiments. Consistent with our hypothesis, congruency effects were observed only when a reaching estimate was requested. Our results add important evidence for the role of top‐down processing in congruency effects from embodied representations of spatial terms.     

On Hare's attempt to bridge the Kantian-consequentialist gap: A response to Forschler's rejoinder

In a paper in this journal (Wall 2016), the author of the present paper critiqued Scott Forschler's attempt (2013) to establish that Jens Timmermann's argument (2005) against R. M. Hare's attempt (1981) to bridge the Kantian-consequentialist gap is unsuccessful. Forschler's thesis is that Hare's utilitarianism is strictly normative, not metaethical. In Hare's ethical rationalism, which is metaethical but contains no intrinsic ends (Forschler 2013), reason determines the proper ends, and preference satisfaction has no value prior to reason's determinations (Forschler 2013). The present author responded that Hare's moral approach presupposes that preference satisfaction is the ultimate end (Wall 2016) and that an analysis of preference satisfaction in Hare's moral approach cannot be confined to normative ethics. Forschler's rejoinder (2017) suggests that Hare's moral theory was misinterpreted by the author, who now shows that such a judgment results from significant oversights concerning the foundation of Hare's moral theory and utilitarian foundations.