Egalitarian nonconsequentialism and the levelling down objection

Telic egalitarianism is famously threatened by the levelling down objection. In its canonical form, the objection purports to show that it is not, in itself, an improvement if inequality is reduced. In a variant that is less often discussed, the objection is that telic egalitarians are committed to believing that sometimes one ought to reduce inequality, even when doing so makes no one better off. The standard egalitarian response to this ‘all things considered’ variant of the levelling down objection is to embed egalitarianism in a pluralist consequentialist moral theory. In section 1, I briefly recapitulate this familiar strategy. In section 2, I argue that this standard pluralist consequentialist response is inadequate. The inadequacy of the standard response, I argue, stems from the fact that the following are jointly inconsistent: (1) a commitment to levelling down's impermissibility; (2) standard pluralist egalitarian consequentialism; (3) inequality being of non‐trivial importance; and (4) the most plausible measures of inequality's badness. In section 3, I show that egalitarians can better respond to the all‐things‐considered levelling down objection by embedding egalitarianism in a nonconsequentialist moral theory.     

正确认识和对待"举证责任倒置"

“举证责任倒置”作为处理民事诉讼中的例外原则运用于医疗纠纷的处理必将对医患关系的根本好转提供有利的措施保证,如何认识和对待“举主责任倒置”是一个崭新的课题,就此,我们谈点不成熟的看法。     

Guiding Decision Makers' Eye Movements with (Un)Predictable Object Locations

We propose a new approach for guiding eye movements by controlling the predictability of object locations. We hypothesize that when a high (low) relevance object has a predictable location, observers are more (less) likely to fixate it compared with objects in unpredictable locations. We tested this hypothesis in three decision‐making studies, manipulating the location of a product label in an unpredictable, a predictable, and a mixed visual environment. In Study 1 and Study 2, we find that participants are less likely to fixate a low and medium relevance label in a predictable location, and in Study 3, we find that participants are more likely to fixate a high relevance label in a predictable location. Our findings suggest that predictable locations increase while unpredictable locations decrease top‐down control. The approach can be used to increase or decrease eye movements towards specific information depending on the goals of the choice architect. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Too much – not enough. The representation of the body and the meaning of symptoms in patients with eating disorders

Eating disorders cover different clinical syndromes, all of which are characterized by an immense focus on food, body and weight, an endless attempt to combat the body and by a fluctuation between ‘too much and not enough’ on different levels (e.g., behaviourally, mentally, physically).

The aim of this article is to contribute to the psychoanalytic understanding of eating disorders, to highlight the vital importance of the symptoms as a psychological survival strategy and to illustrate similarities between eating disordered patients as well as the very different pathways that can lead to an eating disorder. Two clinical cases are presented, one very shortly and one in more detail.     

“Hearing voices”: Auditory hallucinations as failure of top‐down control of bottom‐up perceptual processes

Auditory hallucination is a key characteristic of schizophrenia that seriously debilitates the patient, with consequences for social engagement with others. Hallucinatory experiences are also observed in healthy individuals in the general population who report “hearing voices” in the absence of an external acoustic input. A view on auditory hallucinations and “hearing voices” is presented that regards such phenomena as perceptual processes, originating from speech perception areas in the left temporal lobe. Healthy individuals “hearing voices” are, however, often aware that the experience comes from inner thought processes, which is not reported by hallucinating patients. A perceptual model can therefore, not alone explain the difference in the phenomenology of how the “voices heard” are attributed to either an inner or outer cause. An expanded model is thus presented which takes into account top‐down cognitive control, localized to prefrontal cortical areas, to inhibit and re‐attribute the perceptual mis‐representations. The expanded model is suggested to be empirically validated using a dichotic listening speech perception paradigm with instructions for top‐down control of attention focus to either the right or left side in auditory space. It is furthermore suggested to use fMRI to validate the temporal and frontal lobe neuronal correlates of the cognitive processes involved in auditory hallucinations.     

GOD, WAR, AND CONSCIENCE

Many military officers believe that they morally ought to obey legal orders to fight even in unjust wars: they have a moral obligation to exercise indiscriminate obedience to legal orders to fight. I argue that officers should not be required to exercise indiscriminate obedience: certain theistic commitments to which many citizens and officers adhere prohibit indiscriminate obedience to legal orders to fight. This theistic argument constitutes adequate reason not to require officers to exercise indiscriminate obedience. However, this raises a further question: namely, whether it is appropriate to rely on such a theistic argument when shaping the moral requirements of military officership. I argue that citizens and officers have good reason to make public decisions solely on religious grounds and so are free to follow my theistic argument when shaping the requirements of military officership.     

UNJUST WAR AND THE CATHOLIC SOLDIER

Roman Catholic teaching holds both that wars must conform to certain criteria in order to be considered morally justifiable, and that individuals are accountable for the moral content of their actions. Are Catholics serving in the armed forces therefore required to refuse to serve in unjust wars? Are they entitled—or obligated—to defer to the judgments of others as to whether a war is just? If so, whose judgment? I suggest that there are exceptional characteristics of military service that may factor in the formation of conscience as it is described in Catholic teaching. Specifically, just as the Church sees the indispensable role of the armed forces in protecting society as reconciling the use of force with the Catholic injunction to seek peace, so too may the indispensable role of obedience and deference to authority in the armed forces—while never supplanting the responsibilities of individual discernment—reconcile fighting in an unjust war with the obligations of conscience.     

Internal reasons and practical limits on rational deliberation

I argue that agent-causal libertarianism has a strong initial rejoinder to Mele's luck argument against it, but that his claim that it has yet to be explained how agent-causation yields responsibility-conferring control has significant force. I suggest an avenue of response. Subsequently, I raise objections to Mele's criticisms of my four-case manipulation argument against compatibilism.     

No ground for doomsday

The ability of providing an adequate supervenience base for tensed truths may seem to be one of the main theoretical advantages of both the growing-block and the moving-spotlight theory of time over presentism. However, in this paper I will argue that some propositions appear to be as problematic for growing-block theorists as past-directed propositions are for presentists, namely propositions stating that nothing will be the case in the future. Furthermore, I will show that the moving-spotlight theory can adequately address all the main supervenience challenges that can be levelled against A-theories of time. I will, thus, conclude that, at least as far as the supervenience principle is concerned, the moving-spotlight theory should be preferred over both presentism and the growing-block theory.     

Re‐acquisition of upright vision while wearing visually left–right reversing goggles1

Abstract: The present research aimed to identify the important factor that makes it difficult to re‐acquire upright vision when wearing visually transposed goggles. The author wore left‐right reversing goggles and up‐down reversing goggles each for 14 days in 1986 and in 1990, respectively. When lying on one side with the left‐right reversing goggles on, the observer could get upside‐down vision, which made it possible to compare the difficulty of attaining upright vision when wearing up‐down reversing goggles. The only difference between the two situations is the dimension of the body image to be exchanged: The observer had to exchange the left and right halves of his body in the former situation and had to exchange along the top‐bottom axis of body in the latter situation. Introspective data revealed that attaining an upright sense is easier in the former situation; this means that the asymmetrical structure of our body in the top‐bottom dimension is an important factor in the difficulty of re‐acquiring upright vision.