Consciousness of the self (COS) and explicit knowledge

Starting with distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge and the traditional philosophical distinction between COS (the consciousness of self) as an object and COS as a subject, we suggest a triple classification of COS experience into three modes, each corresponding to a different state of consciousness. When one acts automatically COS is totally embedded within the representation of the environment. When one monitors or attends to one's experience, the self is implied by an explicit representation of one's attitudes, consistent with Descartes' cogito insight 'I think therefore I am' (1641,1984). However, a reflexive thought, e.g., 'I know fact x,' requires an explicit representation of the self. This analysis highlights the existence of an intermediate mode of COS as a subject and suggests its possible connection to monitoring one's behavior.     

Women's knowledge of prenatal ultrasound and informed choice

This study evaluated women's understanding of prenatal ultrasound in terms of meeting the requirements for informed choice. A cross-sectional survey was conducted to evaluate (1) how information is provided, (2) women's perceived value of the information received and, (3) their understanding of ultrasound in relation to the principles of informed choice. Women (n = 113) completed a questionnaire prior to their 18-week ultrasound. Fifty-five percent stated they received no information from their care provider. Only 31.9% considered health care providers as a very helpful source of information. Yet, 69.0% stated their care provider gave them information that facilitated their understanding. Gaps were identified in women's understanding of ultrasound. Specifically, 46.0% did not view ultrasound as a screen for anomalies; some were uncertain about the safety (18.6%), diagnostic capabilities (26.5%), and limitations of testing (37.2%). These results suggest that women's understanding of ultrasound does not meet the requirements of informed choice.     

Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience

The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode the emotions and sensations they experience. A common functional mechanism is at the basis of both body awareness and basic forms of social understanding: embodied simulation. It will be shown that the present proposal is consistent with some of the perspectives offered by phenomenology.     

Evidence for dissociable neural mechanisms underlying inference generation in familiar and less-familiar scenarios

In this study, we investigated whether the left and right hemispheres are differentially involved in causal inference generation. Participants read short inference-promoting texts that described either familiar or less-familiar scenarios. After each text, they performed a lexical decision on a letter string (which sometimes constituted an inference-related word) presented directly to the left or right hemisphere. Response-time results indicated that hemisphere of direct presentation interacted with type of inference scenario. When test stimuli were presented directly to the left hemisphere, lexical decisions were facilitated following familiar but not following less-familiar inference scenarios, whereas when test stimuli were presented directly to the right hemisphere, facilitation was observed in both familiar and less-familiar conditions. Thus, inferences may be generated in different ways depending on which of two dissociable neural subsystems underlies the activation of background information.     

Preschool teachers' pedagogical content knowledge predicts willingness to scaffold early science learning

Background

The importance of diagnostic and scaffolding activities for early science learning has been shown consistently. However, preschool teachers scarcely engage in them. We developed an instrument to assess preschool teachers' willingness to engage in diagnostic and scaffolding activities in science learning situations and examined its relation with teachers' knowledge, beliefs and practice.

Aims

We validate an instrument to assess willingness to engage in scaffolding and diagnostic activities and study the interplay between willingness, learning beliefs, content knowledge (CK) and pedagogical content knowledge (PCK) in the context of science learning, particularly block play.

Sample(s)

A total of N = 151 preschool teachers from 41 kindergartens in Germany participated in our study.

Methods

Preschool teachers completed a questionnaire, which took approximately 1 hour of time. We drew a subsample of N = 73 teachers and observed their practice during a 30 min block play episode.

Results

With our instrument, we were able to distinguish between preschool teachers' willingness to diagnose and to scaffold. Preschool teachers' co-constructivist beliefs and PCK predicted willingness to engage in diagnosing, PCK also predicted willingness to engage in scaffolding. Associations between learning beliefs and practice were inconsistent.

Conclusions

Our study highlights aspects of the association between preschool teachers' PCK and their willingness to engage in diagnosing and scaffolding. However, we found inconsistencies between preschool teachers' beliefs and practice, which call for further clarification.     

Empirical indistinguishability: From the knowledge structure to the skills

Recent literature has pointed out that the basic local independence model (BLIM) when applied to some specific instances of knowledge structures presents identifiability issues. Furthermore, it has been shown that for such instances the model presents a stronger form of unidentifiability named empirical indistinguishability, which leads to the fact that the existence of certain knowledge states in such structures cannot be empirically tested. In this article the notion of indistinguishability is extended to skill maps and, more generally, to the competence-based knowledge space theory. Theoretical results are provided showing that skill maps can be empirically indistinguishable from one another. The most relevant consequence of this is that for some skills there is no empirical evidence to establish their existence. This result is strictly related to the type of probabilistic model investigated, which is essentially the BLIM. Alternative models may exist or can be developed in knowledge space theory for which this indistinguishability problem disappears.