Slippery Slopes and Collapsing Taboos

A slippery slope argument is an argument to this twofold effect. First, that if a policy or practice P is permitted, then we lack the dialectical resources to demonstrate that a similar policy or practice P* is not permissible. Since P* is indeed not permissible, we should not endorse policy or practice P. At the heart of such arguments is the idea of dialectical impotence, the inability to stop the acceptance of apparently small deviations from a heretofore secure policy or practice from leading to apparently large and unacceptable deviations. Using examples of analogical arguments and sorites arguments I examine this phenomenon in the context of collapsing taboos.     

Evaluating arguments during instigations of defence motivation and accuracy motivation

When people evaluate the strength of an argument, their motivations are likely to influence the evaluation. However, few studies have specifically investigated the influences of motivational factors on argument evaluation. This study examined the effects of defence and accuracy motivations on argument evaluation. According to the compatibility between the advocated positions of arguments and participants' prior beliefs and the objective strength of arguments, participants evaluated four types of arguments: compatible‐strong, compatible‐weak, incompatible‐strong, and incompatible‐weak arguments. Experiment 1 revealed that participants possessing a high defence motivation rated compatible‐weak arguments as stronger and incompatible‐strong ones as weaker than participants possessing a low defence motivation. However, the strength ratings between the high and low defence groups regarding both compatible‐strong and incompatible‐weak arguments were similar. Experiment 2 revealed that when participants possessed a high accuracy motivation, they rated compatible‐weak arguments as weaker and incompatible‐strong ones as stronger than when they possessed a low accuracy motivation. However, participants' ratings on both compatible‐strong and incompatible‐weak arguments were similar when comparing high and low accuracy conditions. The results suggest that defence and accuracy motivations are two major motives influencing argument evaluation. However, they primarily influence the evaluation results for compatible‐weak and incompatible‐strong arguments, but not for compatible‐strong and incompatible‐weak arguments.     

Metadialogues for Resolving Burden of Proof Disputes

In this paper, a solution to the problem of analyzing burden of proof in argumentation is developed by building on the pioneering work of Erik C. W. Krabbe on metadialogues. Three classic cases of burden of proof disputes are analyzed, showing how metadialogue theory can solve the problems they pose. The solution is based on five dialectical requirements: (1) global burden of proof needs to be set at the confrontation stage of a dialogue, (2) there need to be special mechanisms for resolving disputes about burden of proof at all four stages of the dialogue, (3) they are especially significant during the argumentation stage, where burden of proof often shifts back and forth at each move, (4) such local shifts need to be partly regulated by the global burden of proof already set, and (5) the connection between burden of proof and the speech act of making a presumption in a dialogue needs to be clarified.     

医疗界与法律界的关系问题——中国医疗秩序重构中的重要课题

医疗秩序是指各医疗要素的合理配置、医疗关系中各主体的有规则的有序互动所形成的整齐规则状态。当今中国医疗失序的本质是医疗正义的缺失。医疗秩序重构和恢复的实质在于医疗正义的彰显。在彰显医疗正义的过程中,需要研究解决的重要课题之一是如何处理作为医疗实践者的医疗界与作为正义实践者的法律界之间的关系。     

Constitutive elements of the concept of human aggression

An analysis of the constitutive elements of the concept of human aggression is made. These constitutive elements are explications of the analytically true implications of the concept of human aggression as they are imbedded into the structure of “normal” language. The analysis results in the following proposal for a definition of the concept of human aggression. Human aggression is characterized—at least from the point of view of the person affected or a neutral judge—as an inconsiderate or malicious violation of a norm which implies current or potential harm by a person actively responsible; characterizing the violation of the norm as “inconsiderate” or “malicious” implies that no arguments for exoneration (e.g., excuses or justifications) will be accepted. These six constitutive elements of the concept of human aggression are discussed; in particular, the structure of possible arguments for incrimination and exoneration is outlined in detail. Finally, some consequences for future research are drawn from this suggestion for the definition of human aggression.     

TRANSCENDING OUR BIOLOGY: A VIRTUE ETHICS INTERPRETATION OF THE APPEAL TO NATURE IN TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

“Arguments from nature” are used, and have historically been used, in popular responses to advances in technology and to environmental issues—there is a widely shared body of ethical intuitions that nature, or perhaps human nature, sets some limits on the kinds of ends that we should seek, the kinds of things that we should do, or the kinds of lives that we should lead. Virtue ethics can provide the context for a defensible form of the argument from nature, and one that makes proper sense of its enduring role in debates concerning our relationship to technology and the environment. However, the notion of an ethics founded upon an account of the essential features of human nature is controversial. On the one hand, contemporary biological science no longer defines species by their essential characteristics, so from a biological point of view there just are no essential characteristics of human beings. On the other hand, it might be argued that humans have, in some sense, “transcended our biology,” so an understanding of humans as a biological species is extraneous to ethical questions. In this article, I examine and defend the argument from nature, as a way to ground an ethic of virtue, from some of the more common criticisms that are made against it. I argue that, properly interpreted as an appeal to an evaluative account of human nature, the argument from nature is defensible with the context of virtue ethics and, in this light, I show how arguments from nature made in popular responses to technological and environmental issues are best understood.     

Reviews

The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion Without Religion, John D. Caputo, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1997. The Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion, xxix + 374 pp. ISBN 0–253–21112–3 (pbk.)

Religion in the Contemporary World: A Sociological Introduction, Alan Aldridge, Polity Press: Cambridge, 2000. vii, 232 pp. ISBN 0–7456–2083–3

The Anthropology of Religion, Fiona Bowie, Oxford, Blackwell. 1999. 284pp, tables & bibliogr. ISBN 0–631 20848–8 (pbk)

Theorizing about Myth, Robert Segal, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 1999. 184pp. Cloth £45, paper £15. ISBN 1–558–49194–5 (hbk), 1–558–49191–0 (pbk)     

Does rationality presuppose irrationality

Abstract

Although irrationality always presupposes rationality, I think there are good arguments to claim that sometimes rationality presupposes irrationality.This paper tries to show how irrational action can support rationality in two ways: it can develop and preserve rationality. I also argue that sometimes the development and the conservation of rationality can only be realized by irrational action.     

Can including pros and cons increase the helpfulness and persuasiveness of online reviews? The interactive effects of ratings and arguments

One guideline given to online reviewers is to acknowledge a product's pros and cons. Yet, I argue that presenting two sides is not always more helpful and can even be less persuasive than presenting one side. Specifically, the effects of two- versus one-sided arguments depend on the perceived consistency between a reviewer's arguments and rating. Across a content analysis and three experiments that vary the information provided in the online review and whether the ratings are positive or negative, the results support these predictions. Furthermore, beliefs that the reviewer is able (vs. willing) to tell the truth mediated the effects.     

To escape blame, don't be a hero—Be a victim

In situations where people (or their lawyers) seek to escape blame for wrongdoing, they often use one of two strategies: frame themselves as a hero (hero strategy) or as a victim (victim strategy). The hero strategy acknowledges wrongdoing, but highlights previous good deeds to offset blame. The victim strategy also acknowledges wrongdoing, but highlights the harms suffered by the perpetrator to deflect blame. Although commonsense suggests that past good deeds can offset blame from transgressions, moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009) suggests otherwise. Despite past good deeds, heroes remain blameworthy as moral agents. On the other hand, victims are moral patients and thus incapable of blame. Three studies found that victim strategy consistently reduced blame, while the hero strategy was at best ineffectual and at worst harmful. This effect appeared to stem from how the minds of victims and heroes are perceived.