Reaction time measures in deception research: Comparing the effects of irrelevant and relevant stimulus–response compatibility

Evidence regarding the validity of reaction time (RT) measures in deception research is mixed. One possible reason for this inconsistency is that structurally different RT paradigms have been used. The aim of this study was to experimentally investigate whether structural differences between RT tasks are related to how effective those tasks are for capturing deception. We achieved this aim by comparing the effectiveness of relevant and irrelevant stimulus–response compatibility (SRC) tasks. We also investigated whether an intended but not yet completed mock crime could be assessed with both tasks. Results showed (1) a larger compatibility effect in the relevant SRC task compared to the irrelevant SRC task, (2) for both the completed and the intended crime. These results were replicated in a second experiment in which a semantic feature (instead of color) was used as critical response feature in the irrelevant SRC task. The findings support the idea that a structural analysis of deception tasks helps to identify RT measures that produce robust group effects, and that strong compatibility effects for both enacted crimes as well as merely intended crimes can be found with RT measures that are based on the manipulation of relevant SRC.     

Challenges to Audi's Ethical Intuitionism

Robert Audi's ethical intuitionism (Audi, 1997, 1998) deals effectively with standard epistemological problems facing the intuitionist. This is primarily because the notion of self-evidence employed by Audi commits to very little. Importantly, according to Audi we might understand a self-evident moral proposition and yet not believe it, and we might accept a self-evident proposition because it is self-evident, and yet fail to see that it is self-evident. I argue that these and similar features give rise to certain challenges to Audi's intuitionism. It becomes harder to argue that there are any self-evident propositions at all, or more than just a few such propositions. It is questionable whether all moral propositions that we take an interest in are evidentially connected to self-evident propositions. It is difficult to understand what could guide the sort conceptual revision that is likely to take place in our moral theorising. It is hard to account for the epistemic value of the sort of systematicity usually praised in moral theorising. Finally, it is difficult to see what difference the truth of Audi's ethical intuitionism would make to the way in which we (fail to) handle moral disagreement.     

Do incompatible arguments cause extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments? The role of congruence between argument compatibility and argument quality

Previous studies have demonstrated that arguments incompatible with prior beliefs are subjected to more extensive refutational processing, scrutinized longer, and judged to be weaker than arguments compatible with prior beliefs. However, this study suggests whether extensive processing is implemented when evaluating arguments is not decided by argument compatibility, but by congruence between two evaluating tendencies elicited by both argument compatibility and argument quality. Consistent with this perspective, the results of two experiments show that relative to congruent arguments, participants judged arguments eliciting incongruent evaluating tendencies as less extreme in strength, spent more time, and felt more hesitant generating strength judgments for them. The results also show that it is mainly incongruent arguments, not congruent arguments, whose strength ratings were more closely associated with the perceived personal importance of the issue, which intensified the tendency to evaluate arguments depending on argument compatibility. These results suggest that it is the incongruity between argument compatibility and argument quality, and not simply the argument compatibility, that plays a more important role in activating an extensive processing in the evaluation of arguments.     

Salvaging the Biological Design Argument in Light of Darwinism?

It is a common assumption that biological organisms appear as though they were designed. Prior to the Darwinian revolution, the order of biological organisms was often taken as a sign of their divine Creator. It is also commonly argued that Darwinian evolutionary theory as a good explanation for the adaptive complexity of biology reveals this appearance to be merely an illusion. However, in recent philosophical discussion several defenses of the compatibility of divine design and Darwinian evolution have emerged. These defenses insist not only that divine design and evolution are compatible, but even that biological organisms can continue to function as pointers to the Creator, even in a Darwinian cosmos. This article explores and extends these recent arguments. I analyze four different strategies for arguing that the wisdom of the Creator is apparent in biological organisms. The basic underlying assumption is that the products of some larger whole can reflect the rationality and designedness of that whole.     

When will is not the same as should: The role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals

Naïve reasoners reject logically valid conclusions from conditional rules if they can think of exceptions in which the antecedent is true, but the consequent is not. However, when reasoning with legal conditionals (e.g., “If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter”) people hardly consider exceptions but evaluate conclusions depending on their own sense of justice. We show that participants’ reluctance to consider exceptions in legal reasoning depends on the modal auxiliary used. In two experiments we phrased legal conditionals either with the modal “should” (i.e., “ . . . then this person should be punished”), or with “will” (i.e., “ . . . then this person will be punished”) and presented them as modus ponens or modus tollens inferences. Participants had to decide whether the offender should or will be punished (modus ponens) or whether the offender indeed committed the offence (modus tollens). For modus ponens inferences phrased with “should” we replicate previous findings showing that participants select conclusions on the basis of their own sense of justice (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the legal conditional is phrased with the modal “will” this effect is attenuated (Experiments 1 and 2), and exceptions are considered (Experiment 1). The modal auxiliary did not affect modus tollens inferences.     

The Argument from Design: What Is at Stake Theologically?

This article offers a brief overview of the argument for God's existence grounded in the evidence of design. It gives particular attention to the way the argument has evolved over time and in relation to changing scientific perspectives. The argument from de-sign has in fact been formulated and reformulated in response to the discoveries and challenges it has encountered from the field of science. The conclusion of the article explores the theological importance of this argument—its extent and its limits.     

Disagreements Over Analogies

This essay presents a dialogical framework for treating philosophical disagreements as persuasion dialogues with analogical argumentation, with the aim of recasting philosophical disputes as disagreements over analogies. This has two benefits: (1) it allows us to temporarily bypass conflicting metaphysical intuitions by focusing on paradigmatic examples, (dis)similarities, and the plausibility of conclusions for or against a given point of view; and (2) it can reveal new avenues of argumentation regarding a given issue. This approach to philosophical disagreements is illustrated by studying the role of argumentation by analogy in disputes over Lockean justifications of intellectual property rights, and disagreements over whether artificial agents should be treated as moral agents. Finally, a nonexhaustive list of possible global and local points of contention over analogical arguments is identified in order to highlight potential avenues of argumentation in disagreements over analogies.     

Strategic Maneuvering with the Intention of the Legislator in the Justification of Judicial Decisions

The author gives an analysis of the strategic manoeuvring in the justification of legal decisions from a pragma-dialectical perspective by showing how a judge tries to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical aims. On the basis of an analysis and evaluation of the argumentation given by the US Supreme Court in the famous Holy Trinity case, it is shown how in a case in which the judge wants to make an exception to a legal rule for the concrete case tries to meet the dialectical reasonableness norm by seeing to it that his standpoint is sufficiently defended according to the requirements of the burden of proof of a judge in a rational critical discussion and how he tries at the same time to be rhetorically convincing for the legal audience by presenting the decision as a choice that is in line with the argumentation schemes and starting points that can be considered as accepted by the legal community in the US and by the US community as a whole.

司法论证充分性辨析

司法论证充分性问题是一个和法学理论与司法实践都密切相关的问题,各种关于法律论证的争议是和规则治理与纠纷解决两种司法职能的互相冲撞息息相关的。什么样的法律论证才是最合适的,在法律资源有限的情况下,如何运用有限的资源达到司法实践的目的,是各国法制建设的一个永恒话题。文章试图以我国的司法情景为例,从理性思考与现实实践两个层面,展示法官在裁决中所运用的具有地方性知识性质的辅助资源具有实践合理性,说明司法论证应该也必须追求其充分性。