Young children's sensitivity to probabilistic phonotactics in the developing lexicon

A series of three experiments examined children's sensitivity to probabilistic phonotactic structure as reflected in the relative frequencies with which speech sounds occur and co-occur in American English. Children, ages 212 and 312 years, participated in a nonword repetition task that examined their sensitivity to the frequency of individual phonetic segments and to the frequency of combinations of segments. After partialling out ease of articulation and lexical variables, both groups of children repeated higher phonotactic frequency nonwords more accurately than they did low phonotactic frequency nonwords, suggesting sensitivity to phoneme frequency. In addition, sensitivity to individual phonetic segments increased with age. Finally, older children, but not younger children, were sensitive to the frequency of larger (diphone) units. These results suggest not only that young children are sensitive to fine-grained acoustic-phonetic information in the developing lexicon but also that sensitivity to all aspects of the sound structure increases over development. Implications for the acoustic nature of both developing and mature lexical representations are discussed.     

Learning about life and death in early childhood

have argued that young children initially understand biological phenomena in terms of vitalism, a mode of construal in which "life" or "life-force" is the central causal-explanatory concept. This study investigated the development of vitalistic reasoning in young children's concepts of life, the human body and death. Sixty preschool children between the ages of 3 years, 7 months and 5 years, 11 months participated. All children were initially given structured interviews to assess their knowledge of (1) human body function and (2) death. From this sample 40 children in the Training group were taught about the human body and how it functions to maintain life. The Control group (n=20) received no training. All 60 children were subsequently reassessed on their knowledge of human body function and death. Results from the initial interviews indicated that young children who spontaneously appealed to vitalistic concepts in reasoning about human body functioning were also more sophisticated in their understanding of death. Results from the posttraining interviews showed that children readily learned to adopt a vitalistic approach to human body functioning, and that this learning coincided with significant development in their understanding of human body function, and of death. The overall pattern of results supports the claim that the acquisition of a vitalistic causal-explanatory framework serves to structure children's concepts and facilitates learning in the domain of biology.     

Pavlovian eyeblink conditioning in combat veterans with and without post-traumatic stress disorder

Several recent studies have investigated relationships between post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and learning and memory problems. These reports have found in general that not only does PTSD affect trauma-related memories, but when patients with PTSD are compared with similar trauma patients without PTSD, general memory impairments have been found. The present paper reports a study in which associative learning, using Pavlovian eyeblink conditioning, was investigated in combat veterans with and without chronic PTSD, using interstimulus intervals of 500 and 1000 msec in two separate experiments. Although several recent reports suggest that larger-magnitude autonomic conditioned responses occur in patients with PTSD during Pavlovian conditoning, the present study found evidence of impaired Pavlovian eyeblink conditioning in combat veterans with and without PTSD, compared to non-combat veterans. Although these data suggest that combat leads to an impaired associative learning process regardless of whether PTSD is apparent, a group of community-dwelling combat veterans not under medical treatment showed normal conditioning, suggesting that variables other than prior combat must also be involved.     

灵棋课法的由来及其符号解读

本文将灵棋占法当作"易占"的一个支派加以研究.作者以<道藏>本及<四库全书>本中的<灵棋经>为基本文献,考察"灵棋课法"的由来与归属.作者认为,从道书记载情形看,灵棋课法早先应该属于道教使用的一种卜筮技艺.在分析了灵棋课法与易学的关系之后,作者从神明崇拜的角度进一步考察灵棋课法的道教色彩,阐述了该法所蕴含的思想旨趣,发掘其象征底蕴.     

Karl Schmitz-Moormann: Our Intellectual Legacy From a Great Mind

Karl Schmitz-Moormann's thought as expressed in his last book exemplifies Catholic theology based on realism, flow, evolution, and free will. Categories of creation are reviewed: from nothing, continuous, called forth, informed, and free.     

The Development of Person–Vocation Fit: A Longitudinal Study Among Young Employees

This two-phase panel study examines the development of the congruence between vocational interests and perceived skill requirements. Participants were 492 Dutch men and women between 18 and 26 years old, with a paid job in both phases. Three hypotheses inspired by the theory of work adjustment (Dawis and Lofquist 1984) and congruence theory (Holland 1992) were tested, using a composite index of fit proposed by Cronbach and Gleser (1953). The first hypothesis proposing that participants experiencing incongruence between their vocational interests and their perceived skill requirements are dissatisfied with their job was supported. The hypothesis that incongruence has a positive relationship with job change and a negative relationship with tenure was not confirmed. The expectation that the congruence between vocational interests and perceived skill requirements increases over time was confirmed. Furthermore, exploring determinants of change in vocational interests and perceived skill requirements, it was found that change in these domains was predicted by different variables, educational level being the only common factor. It is concluded that this study supports the longitudinal propositions of prevailing work-related person-environment fit theories.     

Innate versus learned recognition of conspecifics in great spotted cuckoos Clamator glandarius

When birds raised by another species become adults, they (if they are non-brood-parasitic species) usually attempt to mate with birds of their foster species rather than with birds of their own species, a phenomenon called sexual imprinting. Avian brood parasites lay their eggs in nests of other species (the hosts) that rear the young, but the problem of sexual imprinting among brood parasites has generally been neglected, and brood parasites have been considered as an exception among birds. Here, we show, with data from field observations and field experiments, firstly, that adult great spotted cuckoos Clamator glandarius sometimes maintain contact with both older nestling and fledgling cuckoos. Adult cuckoos visited parasitized nests during the last days of the nestling period (5 observations) and, when parasitic chicks left the nest, adult cuckoos maintained contact with the young (14 observations). Adults and fledgling cuckoos communicated vocally (5 observations), and an adult great spotted cuckoo even fed a parasite fledgling in two cases. Secondly, when experimentally cross-fostered in nests of magpie Pica pica hosts outside the parasite breeding range (thus avoiding visual and acoustic communication with adult cuckoos), young cuckoos did not learn to recognize their own species when only one cuckoo chick was introduced per nest, but they learnt to recognize conspecifics when two cuckoos were reared together. This means that young great spotted cuckoos apparently must learn to recognize conspecifics, that is, recognition is not innate. Social interactions between adult brood parasites and young have also been reported in other brood parasites; thus, brood parasites are probably not an exception to the general phenomenon of imprinting, and young brood parasites may need to be imprinted on conspecifics, although more studies on other brood parasite species are needed to confirm this. Received: 7 January 1999 / Accepted after revision: 27 February 1999     

Found in Translation: Late Bilinguals Do Automatically Activate Their Native Language When They Are Not Using It

In their paper “Do Bilinguals Automatically Activate Their Native Language When They Are Not Using it?”, Costa, Pannunzi, Deco, and Pickering (Cognitive Science, 2017) proposed a reinterpretation of Thierry and Wu's (2004, 2007) finding of native language‐based (Chinese, L1) ERP effects when they tested Chinese–English late bilinguals exclusively in their second language (English, L2). Using simulations in a six‐node Hebbian learning model (three L1 nodes, three L2 nodes), Costa et al. suggested that form overlaps in L1 between otherwise unrelated words create a persistent relationship between their L2 translations. In this scenario, words in the nascent L2 lexicon overlapping in their L1 translations would become linked during learning because of the form overlap in L1; once the L2 words are learned, the direct link between them would be sufficient to generate robust, apparently “L1‐mediated” priming without requiring any activation of L1 translations. Costa et al. contend that links between L2 words remain beyond the learning phase, even after links to L1 representations have been severed, and thus that their model affords an alternative account to (but not a rebuttal of) Thierry and Wu's claim of language non‐selective activation—or automatic activation of translation equivalents—in late bilinguals. In this response, we build on Costa et al.'s original simulation code, showing that it can only reproduce L1‐independent priming when implementing the L1 disconnection in their particular way. By contrast, when severing inter‐language connections bidirectionally, their model fails to retain any sizeable influence of L1 form overlap on L2 activations. The model is not the theory, however, and we discuss several issues that would need to be addressed in further attempts to model language non‐selective activation in late bilinguals.     

《周易正义》的刑罚适用原则探源

在严格区别《周易》、王弼《周易注》及《周易正义》三者不同思想的基础上,厘清《周易正义》所蕴含的法律思想是《周易正义》法律视角研究的当务之急。作为《周易正义》法律思想的表征体系,《周易正义》中的刑罚适用原则可简述为:区分故意与过失原则、轻刑原则、重刑原则。这些原则的形成有其特定的哲学基础。     

Knowledge despite falsehood

I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S's false belief that p is not essential to S's cognition. S's knowledge is instead due to S's belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S (dispositionally) believes (and knows). S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed.