On the Double-Reference Character of ＂Hexagram＂ Names in the Yijing： Engaging Fregean＆Kripkean Approaches to the Issue of How Reference Is Possible

This paper aims to examine the general issue of how reference is possible in philosophy of language through a case analysis of the ＂double reference＂ semantic-syntactic structure of ideographic hexagram （guaxiang 卦象） names in the Yijing text. I regard the case of the ＂hexagram＂ names as being quite representative of the ＂double-reference＂ semantic-syntactic structure of referring names. I thus explore how the general morals drawn from this account of ＂hexagram＂ names can engage two representative approaches, the Fregean and Kripkean ones, and contribute to our understanding and treatment of the issue of reference.     

Halldén-Completeness in Super-Intuitionistic Predicate Logics

One criterion of constructive logics is the disjunction, property (DP). The Halldén-completeness is a weak DP, and is related to the relevance principle and variable separation. This concept is well-understood in the case of propositional logics. We extend this notion to predicate logics. Then three counterparts naturally arise. We discuss relationships between these properties and meet-irreducibility in the lattice of logics.     

Extended Quantum Logic

The concept of quantum logic is extended so that it covers a more general set of propositions that involve non-trivial probabilities. This structure is shown to be embedded into a multi-modal framework, which has desirable logical properties such as an axiomatization, the finite model property and decidability.     

The problem with descriptive correctness

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the normativity of meaning was thought to be more-or-less ‘incontestable.’ But in the last 25 years, many philosophers of mind and language have contested it in several seemingly different ways. This, however, is somewhat illusory. There is an unappreciated commonality among most anti-normativist arguments, and this commonality, I argue, poses a problem for anti-normativism. The result, however, is not a wholesale rejection of anti-normativism. Rather, an insight from the anti-normativist position can be harnessed to reveal an unappreciated position in the normativity of meaning debate.