Translating Islam into the language of the Russian state and the Orthodox Church

ABSTRACT

This contribution analyses the discursive strategies exercised by Russia’s state-appointed Islamic authorities. It draws on a linguistic corpus that consists of speeches and sermons by Mufti Ravil’ Gainutdin, the head of a major Muslim Spiritual Directorate in Moscow. A multi-levelled analysis shows that the mufti’s lexical and rhetorical choices correspond to the discourse of the Russian Orthodox Church elites. This affinity is a discursive strategy that allows Gainutdin to position himself as the authoritative leader of Russia’s Islamic community and to construct Islam as Russia’s ‘familiar’ and ‘traditional’ religion.     

The Trinity in Qur’anic Idiom: Q 4.171 and the Christian Arabic Presentation of the Trinity as God,his Word,and his Spirit

ABSTRACT

Since the early centuries of Islam, the Qur’an’s deep imprint on Arabophone Christians has been evident, not only in their evocation of qur’anic language, but also in their creative employment of the text in constructing their own orthodox Christian Arabic theology. This article investigates the presentation of the Trinity as ‘God, his Word, and his Spirit’ in Christian Arabic theological tracts in the early centuries of Islam. It argues that Q 4.171 played a foundational role in constructing a distinct Christian Arabic Trinitarian theology and that Arabophone Christian writers discerned in it the nucleus of what could be developed as an orthodox Trinitarian theology. It traces the development of the Christian Arabic Trinitarian formulation in four works by Arabophone authors: John Damascene’s On Heresies 100; On the Triune Nature of God; the interreligious disputation in the court of the ?Abbāsid Caliph al-Ma?mūn attributed to the theologian Theodore Abū Qurra; and the apologetic letter by ?Abd al-Masī? al-Kindī. This article also makes observations on the implications of the Christian Arabic theological project for interreligious encounter in the early Islamic centuries.     

Narcissism lost: On translating and being translated1

The authors present a detailed account of the experiences shared in translating and having one’s work translated. Carneiro maintains that, in order to communicate with their readers, writers should relinquish the narcissistic satisfaction they derive from their texts in the original. Beyond this, she feels that, owing to a good understanding between her and her translator, the creativity in her original text persists in the translation. Brakel introduces himself to the IJPA readership and shows how he works when translating the cultural and linguistic nuances and peculiarities of Brazilian Portuguese. He concludes with some thoughts about the affect he experiences from his original work and the work he has translated.     

Power and Freedom in Heidegger’s First Notebook

ABSTRACT

In the first notebook published in Überlegungen II-VI, which covers the years 1931 and 1932, Martin Heidegger uses a conception of power that is different to that found in his later work. Rather than power being the expression of the will to will and source of ruin for humanity, he says that humanity can only be saved from ruin if it can pave the way for an “empowerment of being” (Ermächtigung des Seins). This article will show that this early understanding of power is related to Heidegger’s conception of freedom as the essence of truth, developing his thinking on this topic from the period of 1927–1930. It will show that the terms “empowerment of being” and “letting be” (Seinlassen) are akin, and that Heidegger uses the former to distance his thinking from potential misinterpretations of the essay “On the Essence of Truth”.     

Another way to think about psychological change: experiential vs. incremental

The traditional pre-post treatment difference reflects an incremental notion of change, where a quantity of some psychological function is added to (or subtracted from) a pretreatment quantity. This study presents a complementary, experiential notion of change. Rather than a difference, change is a feeling or experience of having changed, a feeling that one is different than before. Based on a post-treatment interview the Change after Psychotherapy (CHAP) is a method to quantify/rate such ‘differentness’ in terms of how extensively or radically the patient feels having changed. A pre-post quasi-experimental study (N = 49) comparing the CHAP with ratings on the Global Assessment of Functioning, the Karolinska Psychodynamic Profile and the Comprehensive Psychopathological Rating Scale-Self-Affective is reported. The results showed the CHAP to be a reliable, valid and sensitive way to assess an experiential kind of CHAP.     

Driving on familiar roads: Automaticity and inattention blindness

This paper describes our research into the processes that govern driver attention and behavior in familiar, well-practiced situations. The experiment examined the effects of extended practice on inattention blindness and detection of changes to the driving environment in a high-fidelity driving simulator. Participants were paid to drive a simulated road regularly over 3 months of testing. A range of measures, including detection task performance and driving performance, were collected over the course of 20 sessions. Performance from a yoked Control Group who experienced the same road scenarios in a single session was also measured. The data showed changes in what drivers reported noticing indicative of inattention blindness, and declining ratings of mental demand suggesting that many participants were “driving without awareness”. Extended practice also resulted in increased sensitivity for detecting changes to road features associated with vehicle guidance and improved performance on an embedded vehicle detection task (detection of a specific vehicle type). The data provide new light on a “tandem model” of driver behavior that includes both explicit and implicit processes involved in driving performance. The findings also suggest reasons drivers are most likely to crash at locations very near their homes.     

Enlivening thinking and speech in search of spiritual identity: the role of ‘speech formation’ in Steiner’s Waldorf education

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to clarify Steiner’s understanding of thinking and the way it influences the use of language in the classroom of 6–18 years old, and through that, to discuss how it eventually serves to capture one’s spiritual identity. First, the paper introduces Steiner’s notion of thinking, and then offers a general picture of what ‘speech formation’ is, and how it is actually used in a classroom. Secondly, the paper reviews Steiner’s view on child development and examines his understanding of embodied thinking in accordance with will, feeling and ‘I’ consciousness. Finally, it considers the role of ‘speech formation’ in relation to the development of thinking and speech, and to the genius of language which comes to work in the ‘space’ created through dialogue. (129 words)     

Daily Time-Place Learning in Young Children

Abstract

Pre-school children find it difficult to correctly report if it is morning or afternoon. The present study tested whether children could learn a non-verbal Time-Place Learning (TPL) task that depended on time of day. Twenty-five 4-year-olds were repeatedly asked to find a toy in one of two boxes. Children in the Cued condition were told the toy was in one box in the morning and in another box in the afternoon. Children in the Not Cued condition were told the toy was sometimes in one box and sometimes in the other box. After 80 trials, children were asked if it was morning or afternoon. About 65% of the children learned the TPL task, and about three-quarters of the children verbally identified if it was morning or afternoon. However, the children who learned the TPL task were not necessarily the children who correctly answered whether it was morning or afternoon, and those in the Cued condition were no more likely to solve the task than those in the Not Cued condition. The implication is that children have a sense of time that can be used to solve spatio-temporal contingencies, but does not depend on the verbal understanding of time of day.     

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.