The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

Assertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cognitive beings. Philosophers have recently built an impressive case that the norm of assertion is factive. That is, you should make an assertion only if it is true. Thus far the case for a factive norm of assertion been based on observational data. This paper adds experimental evidence in favor of a factive norm from six studies. In these studies, an assertion’s truth value dramatically affects whether people think it should be made. Whereas nearly everyone agreed that a true assertion supported by good evidence should be made, most people judged that a false assertion supported by good evidence should not be made. The studies also suggest that people are consciously aware of criteria that guide their evaluation of assertions. Evidence is also presented that some intuitive support for a non-factive norm of assertion comes from a surprising tendency people have to misdescribe cases of blameless rule-breaking as cases where no rule is broken.     

Going beyond the facts: Young children extend knowledge by integrating episodes

The major question posed in this research was whether 4- and 6-year-olds productively extend their knowledge by integrating information acquired in separate episodes. The vehicle was a read-aloud activity during which children were presented with a novel fact in each of two passages. In Experiment 1, both age groups showed evidence of integration between the passages. For the 6-year-olds, the evidence came in the form of responses to open-ended questions. The 4-year-olds recognized the correct answers but did not generate them in the open-ended question format. The 6-year-olds who generated the correct answers also were likely to recall both of the individual facts presented in the passages. In Experiment 2, we tested whether the 4-year-olds’ integration performance would improve if their memory for the individual facts improved. Extra exposure to the individual facts resulted in higher levels of integration performance in both recall and recognition testing. The roles of memory and other potential sources of age-related differences in integration performance are discussed.     

Assessing complex problem-solving skills with multiple complex systems

In this paper we propose the multiple complex systems (MCS) approach for assessing domain-general complex problem-solving (CPS) skills and its processes knowledge acquisition and knowledge application. After defining the construct and the formal frameworks for describing complex problems, we emphasise some of the measurement issues inherent in assessing CPS skills with single tasks (i.e., fixed item difficulty, low or unknown reliability, and a large impact of random errors). With examples of the MicroDYN test and the MicroFIN test (two instances of the MCS approach), we show how to adequately score problem-solving skills by using multiple tasks. We discuss implications for problem-solving research and the assessment of CPS skills in general.     

Construction of visual cognitive computation model for sports psychology based on knowledge atlas

A total of 584 thematic journals were included in the “Chinese Journal of Psychology” from 1996 to 2017 as the basic data set for this study, using bibliometrics, co-occurrence analysis, word frequency analysis, etc., and using CiteSpace III. Software mapping of knowledge. Visual analysis of published papers, research hotspots, research topic time zones, core authors, author co-occurrences, and research institutions of sports psychology research in China. It aims to fully grasp the dynamics of research on the development of sports psychology in China. The process provides a valuable reference for the theoretical research and practice of sports psychology in China. The results show that: Taking time as the axis, the amount of published documents can be divided into three stages: slow growth stage, rapid growth stage, and stable development stage; research topic time zone is also divided into three stages, and the basis for division of each stage is For the introduction of national sports reforms or new policies; 1996–2017, the focus of sports psychology disciplines is the application of sports psychology in physical education and sports training; the core authors in the field are representatives of Yan Jun, Wang Jin, and Yan. Gang Yan, etc.; The core organization of the volume of documents issued is based on professional sports colleges. The representative agency is Beijing Sport University.     

Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe

There is currently much controversy about which, if any, mental states chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates understand. In the current two studies we tested both chimpanzees’ and human children’s understanding of both knowledge-ignorance and false belief - in the same experimental paradigm involving competition with a conspecific. We found that whereas 6-year-old children understood both of these mental states, chimpanzees understood knowledge-ignorance but not false belief. After ruling out various alternative explanations of these and related findings, we conclude that in at least some situations chimpanzees know what others know. Possible explanations for their failure in the highly similar false belief task are discussed.     

Life and death in Freudian metapsychology: A reappraisal of the second instinctual dualism1

In this paper we re‐examine the second instinctual dualism hypothesis introduced by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. We suggest that the life instinct hypothesis as something opposed to the death instinct does not seem to fit into this theory easily. On the other hand, death instinct turns out to be an internal necessity of Freudian metapsychological theory from the beginning of Freud ’s metapsychological writing. We shall argue, based on the ideas formulated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and in later metapsychological texts, that Freud could not wholly justify the existence of an opposition and a symmetry between the two classes of instincts. Even though up to his last works Freud held on to this instinctual dualism, again and again his arguments lead to the idea that the life instincts should be regarded, ultimately, as death instincts.     

Sharvy’s Lucy and Benjamin Puzzle

Sharvy’s puzzle concerns a situation in which common knowledge of two parties is obtained by repeated observation each of the other, no fixed point being reached in finite time. Can a fixed point be reached?     

Epistemic comparative conditionals

The interest of epistemic comparative conditionals comes from the fact that they represent genuine ‘comparative epistemic relations’ between propositions, situations, evidences, abilities, interests, etc. This paper argues that various types of epistemic comparative conditionals uniformly represent comparative epistemic relations via the comparison of epistemic positions rather than the comparison of epistemic standards. This consequence is considered as a general constraint on a theory of knowledge attribution, and then further used to argue against the contextualist thesis that, in some cases, considering a new counter- possibility can raise the epistemic standard of knowledge attribution. Instead, the paper shows that considering a new counter-possibility can only lower the epistemic position of a putative knower. Moreover, since the comparison, by the nature of conditionals, is free from any commitment to the truth-values of specific knowledge attributions, my conclusion is free from the debate between contextualism and invariantism on whether the truth-value of a knowledge attribution can actually vary with context.     

Elaboration and consequences of anchored estimates: An attitudinal perspective on numerical anchoring

In the standard numerical anchoring paradigm, the influence of externally provided anchors on judgment is typically explained as a result of elaborate thinking (i.e., confirmatory hypothesis testing that selectively activates anchor-consistent information in memory). In contrast, theories of attitude change suggest that the same judgments can result from relatively thoughtful or non-thoughtful processes, with more thoughtful processes resulting in judgments that last longer over time and better resist future attempts at change. Guided by an attitudinal approach to anchoring, four studies manipulated participants’ level of cognitive load to produce relatively high versus low levels of thinking. These studies show that, although anchoring can occur under both high and low thought conditions, anchoring based on a higher level of thinking involves greater use of judgment-relevant background knowledge, persists longer over time, is more resistant to subsequent attempts at social influence, and is less likely to result from direct numeric priming.     

Relevant possibilities

There are a number of relevant alternatives accounts of knowledge in the literature, including those by contextualists (like Lewis and Cohen), and invariantists (like Dretske). Despite widespread discussion of such views, an explication of the notion of relevance is conspicuously absent from the literature. Without a careful explication of that notion, relevant alternatives accounts resist evaluation. This paper attempts to aid in the evaluation of those accounts, by providing an account of relevance. The account rejects two common presuppositions about the notion of relevance. The account holds that worlds, rather than alternatives, are relevant, and that distant worlds can be relevant. Relevant worlds turn out to be those worlds at which an alternative to one’s belief obtains, and is such that one’s epistemic position (with respect to what one believes at the actual world) is worse than it is at the actual world.