Is knowledge of causes sufficient for understanding?

According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. If my defense is successful, it would cast doubt on an influential account of the epistemic value of understanding.     

SIMPLIFYING HEURISTICS VERSUS CAREFUL THINKING: SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF MILLENNIAL SPIRITUAL ISSUES

There is ample evidence that humans (and other primates) possess a knowledge instinct—a biologically driven impulse to make coherent sense of the world at the highest level possible. Yet behavioral decision‐making data suggest a contrary biological drive to minimize cognitive effort by solving problems using simplifying heuristics. Individuals differ, and the same person varies over time, in the strength of the knowledge instinct. Neuroimaging studies suggest which brain regions might mediate the balance between knowledge expansion and heuristic simplification. One region implicated in primary emotional experience is more activated in individuals who use primitive heuristics, whereas two areas of the cortex are more activated in individuals with a strong knowledge drive: one region implicated in detecting risk or conflict and another implicated in generating creative ideas. Knowledge maximization and effort minimization are both evolutionary adaptations, and both are valuable in different contexts. Effort minimization helps us make minor and routine decisions efficiently, whereas knowledge maximization connects us to the beautiful, to the sublime, and to our highest aspirations. We relate the opposition between the knowledge instinct and heuristics to the biblical story of the fall, and argue that the causal scientific worldview is mathematically equivalent to teleological arguments from final causes. Elements of a scientific program are formulated to address unresolved issues.     

Hidden consequences of the group-serving bias: Causal attributions and the quality of group decision making

A long stream of research in attribution theory suggests that groups are biased toward attributing their success to factors that are internal to their group. However, the existing research has confounded two types of attributions that are both internal to the group, but theoretically distinct: (1) attributions that differentiate between the contributions made by each individual group member and (2) attributions that focus on the group as a whole. This dichotomy is important because, drawing on theories of social influence, we predict that different types of attributions will have different consequences for the quality of group decision making. In Experiment 1, individually focused attributions for past success caused groups to consider more divergent alternatives prior to making a shared decision. In Experiment 2, individually focused attributions for past success facilitated the sharing of unique information and improved decision accuracy. These findings suggest that the group-serving tendency to internalize success may have important consequences for group performance that have not yet been considered in current research.     

Relativism about Reasons

Historians must be sensitive to the alienness of the past. Insofar as they are concerned with their actors’ reasoning, they must (through open-minded empirical investigation) find out how their actors thought, and not assume that they thought like us. This is familiar historiographical advice, but pushed too far it can be brought to conflict with rather weak assumptions about what historians must presuppose if they are to interpret their actors at all. The present paper sketches those assumptions, and argues that the influential ‘Strong Program’ in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) falls foul of them. We do not argue from the correctness of the assumptions to the falsity of SSK. Rather, we note the incompatibility, and then show how SSK theorists’ tendency to take interpretation for granted blinds them—and perhaps their readers—to the existence of the conflict.

Can infants be "taught" to attend to a new physical variable in an event category? The case of height in covering events

As they observe or produce events, infants identify variables that help them predict outcomes in each category of events. How do infants identify a new variable? An explanation-based learning (EBL) account suggests three essential steps: (1) observing contrastive outcomes relevant to the variable; (2) discovering the conditions associated with these outcomes; and (3) generating an explanation for the condition-outcome regularity discovered. In Experiments 1-3, 9-month-old infants watched events designed to "teach" them the variable height in covering events. After watching these events, designed in accord with the EBL account, the infants detected a height violation in a covering event, three months earlier than they ordinarily would have. In Experiments 4-6, the "teaching" events were modified to remove one of the EBL steps, and the infants no longer detected the height violation. The present findings thus support the EBL account and help specify the processes by which infants acquire their physical knowledge.     

Can children resist making interpretations when uncertain?

In two experiments, we examined young children's ability to delay a response to ambiguous input. In Experiment 1, 5- and 6-year-olds performed as poorly when they needed to choose between basing an interpretation on ambiguous input and delaying an interpretation as when making explicit evaluations of knowledge, whereas 7- and 8-year-olds found the former task easy. In Experiment 2, 5- and 6-year-olds performed well on a task that required delaying a response but removed the need to decide between strategies. We discuss children's difficulty with ambiguity in terms of the decision-making demands made by different procedures. These demands appear to cause particular problems for young children.     

Distributed skill functions and the meshing of knowledge structures

The scope of knowledge space theory was extended by bringing into the picture the underlying skills and capabilities that are relevant to solving the problems in a knowledge domain. A major challenge to this approach comes from the need to aggregate distributed information on (partially) overlapping domains and skill sets. The notion of a distributed skill function is introduced for formalizing the integration of several skill functions that represent the assignment of skills to problems. It is shown that their consistency is captured by the meshability of the delineated knowledge structures. This result draws upon a characterization of the meshing of finite or infinite collections of knowledge structures, which extends and generalizes previous results on the binary case. The discussion covers implications for knowledge assessment and for practical applications, such as integrating skill assignments coming from different experts or distributed resources in technology-enhanced learning.     

知识背景对觉察配对词间语义联系的影响

研究探讨了生物领域知识丰富者和贫乏者判断来自生物领域或一般领域亲疏度不同的配对词间联系的差异。采用2（生物领域丰富者和贫乏者）×2（生物领域配对词和一般领域配对词）×2（语义关系疏远配对词和语义关系密切配对词）混合实验设计,要求被试尽快判断4种类型共120组配对词的两个词间是否存在语义上的联系。结果发现：生物领域知识丰富者比贫乏者更倾向于接受生物领域配对词间的联系,且在判断生物领域关系疏远配对词时花费更长时间;而两者在判断一般领域配对词间的联系时,无论在接受性或反应时上均不存在差异。这一结果说明,知识背景影响个体觉察特定范畴或特定领域中观念间联系的敏感性,觉察观念间联系的能力表现出领域特殊的特征。     

The emotional experience of K

The author raises the question of the emotional experience of K in Bion's schema of affective links, L, H, and K, suggesting that it is the emotional experience of feeling curious. He explores the central role curiosity has in 'On arrogance' and 'Attacks on linking' and hypothesizes that in Learning from experience the more complex notion of K is introduced in its place. Thus, Bion's affective schema is taken to be a version of Freud's account of experience in terms of instinctual impulses recast in terms of emotional experience. Freud's primary developmental dichotomy, the tensions between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, can be seen as the dichotomy of tensions between the emotional experience of L/H and the emotional experience of K. This suggests that the potential tension between K and L/H is critical to what happens in the consulting room. Finally the author argues that containing as a developmental dynamic is an expression of a K-state-of-mind and thus the container is thus a container-in-K. It concludes that one important aspect of what Bion called -K is an attack on a K-state-of-mind by an intrusion of L/H which has the effect of contaminating and dominating the urge to know.     

The consequences of unmet needs: the evolving role of motivation in consumer research

This paper proposes that dominant theories of human motivation rest on the notion of salient unmet needs. Motivational theories, represented by biological instinct theories (thesis) and social cognitive theories (antithesis), are now showing signs of synthesis within the domain of consumer research. Consumer and marketing research techniques can be made more insightful and actionable by introducing measures of the behavioural and emotional meaning of unmet needs through integration of the key elements of motivation research within a quantitative measurement system. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications.