The ‘uncanny’, the sacred and the narcissism of culture: The development of the ego and the progress of civilization1

The report by a member of the Brazilian parliament that the rejection of physical deformity is natural and instinctive, and the Muslim reaction to the publication in the Western press of cartoons considered to be offensive to their religion, serve as an introduction to the examination of conflicts in human relations. The two episodes may be classified as representing the sense of the ‘uncanny’, attributed by Freud to the narcissism that remained from primitive cultures, in which the shadow cast by the body and the mirrored reflection of the latter probably generated the idea of soul‐which would be the narcissistic phenomenon causing the illusion of immortality. The presence of this illusion as a support for the beliefs of present‐day civilized peoples makes clear the inopportune influence of primitive mental states in areas where more developed ones should prevail. The persistence of the omnipotent thinking derived from these states provides the possibility of drawing a parallel between the development of the ego‐evolution from narcissism to object relation‐and the progress of civilization. In this context, the majority of social conflicts can be attributed to the deficient object relation resulting from the strength of primary narcissism, which generates a tendency to reject that which is different and to facilitate the emergence of destructive aggressiveness. The progress of civilization would then occur by means of a development of the ego compatible with object relations that lead to a drastic reduction in destructiveness.     

A computational model of event segmentation from perceptual prediction

People tend to perceive ongoing continuous activity as series of discrete events. This partitioning of continuous activity may occur, in part, because events correspond to dynamic patterns that have recurred across different contexts. Recurring patterns may lead to reliable sequential dependencies in observers' experiences, which then can be used to guide perception. The current set of simulations investigated whether this statistical structure within events can be used 1) to develop stable internal representations that facilitate perception and 2) to learn when to update such representations in a self-organizing manner. These simulations demonstrate that experience with recurring patterns enables a system to accurately predict upcoming stimuli within an event, to identify boundaries between such events based on transient increases in prediction error, and to use such boundaries to improve prediction about subsequent activities.     

Switching between sensory and affective systems incurs processing costs

Recent models of the conceptual system hold that concepts are grounded in simulations of actual experiences with instances of those concepts in sensory-motor systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Solomon & Barsalou, 2001). Studies supportive of such a viewhave shown that verifying a property of a concept in one modality, and then switching to verify a property of a different concept in a different modality generates temporal processing costs similar to the cost of switching modalities in perception. In addition to non-emotional concepts, the present experiment investigated switching costs in verifying properties of positive and negative (emotional) concepts. Properties of emotional concepts were taken from vision, audition, and the affective system. Parallel to switching costs in neutral concepts, the study showed that for positive and negative concepts, verifying properties from different modalities produced processing costs such that reaction times were longer and error rates were higher. Importantly, this effect was observed when switching from the affective system to sensory modalities, and vice-versa. These results support the embodied cognition view of emotion in humans.     

Overestimation of Knowledge About Word Meanings: The “Misplaced Meaning” Effect

Children and adults may not realize how much they depend on external sources in understanding word meanings. Four experiments investigated the existence and developmental course of a “Misplaced Meaning” (MM) effect, wherein children and adults overestimate their knowledge about the meanings of various words by underestimating how much they rely on outside sources to determine precise reference. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that children and adults show a highly consistent MM effect, and that it is stronger in young children. Study 3 demonstrates that adults are explicitly aware of the availability of outside knowledge, and that this awareness may be related to the strength of the MM effect. Study 4 rules out general overconfidence effects by examining a metalinguistic task in which adults are well calibrated.     

Evidence that stakes don’t matter for evidence

Some philosophers have recently defended anti-intellectualism with respect to knowledge and evidence. In this paper, I assess anti-intellectualism about evidence, which claims a relation between one's evidence and the practical benefits or costs of being right or wrong about the propositions supported by that evidence. Proponents of anti-intellectualism generally regard their view as not at all obvious, but nonetheless strongly supported by appeal to our intuitive judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases. Anti-Intellectualism is thus taken by its proponents to be a surprising truth. I show that, though peoples’ explicit judgments about the general issue of whether or not non-epistemic factors make an epistemic difference are often in line with anti-intellectualism, their judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases do not display a pattern that would clearly support anti-intellectualism about evidence. Thus, anti-intellectualism about evidence is not entirely surprising, and intuitive assessments of hypothetical cases do not clearly support its truth.     

Content and process priming: A review

The last forty years of social science research have produced over 12,000 articles on priming. The range, complexity, and novelty of priming effects are hard to comprehend, let alone explain, using a single model or perspective. In this review, we discuss content priming and process priming effects. We then propose an integrative model that can account for the combined results.     

BION'S THINKING ABOUT GROUPS: A STUDY OF INFLUENCE AND ORIGINALITY

One of Bion's least‐acknowledged contributions to psychoanalytic theory is his study of the relationship between the mind of the individual (the ability to think), the mentalities of groups of which the individual is a member, and the individual's bodily states. Bion's early work on group therapy evolved into a study of the interplay between mind and bodily instincts associated with being a member of a group, and became the impetus for his theory of thinking. On the foundation of Bion's ideas concerning this interaction among the thinking of the individual, group mentality, and the psyche‐soma, the author presents his thoughts on the ways in which group mentality is recognizable in the analysis of individuals.     

THE OBJECT‐PRESERVING FUNCTION OF SADOMASOCHISM

The terms sadism, masochism, and sadomasochism seem to have become increasingly, if loosely, associated with aggression in psychoanalytic discourse. This is due in part to the fact that Freud's changing ideas generated confusion about the relative contributions of libido and aggression. The author reviews Freud's variable usage and offers a clinical vignette to illustrate the importance of noticing how sadomasochism may maintain a tie to the object by controlling it. The author offers a developmental speculation for the role reversibility typical of sadomasochistic manifestations. He closes with a comment on the role of sadomasochistic aims in adult sexual perversion.     

Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?

We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence (Experiments 1 and 2A) or testimony providing causal information (Experiment 2B). Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why probabilistic evidence does not produce knowledge. The experiments instead suggest that people deny knowledge because they distrust drawing conclusions about an individual based on reasoning about the population to which it belongs, a tendency previously identified by “judgment and decision making” researchers. Consistent with this, participants were more willing to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence that is specific to a particular case (Experiments 3A and 3B).