Children's understanding of teaching: the role of knowledge and belief

The relation between preschoolers’ concept of teaching and theory of mind was explored to determine if there is a developmental change in understanding how teaching depends on knowledge and belief. The study tested whether 3- to 6-year-olds thought the awareness of a knowledge difference is necessary for teaching. The 3- and 4-year-olds understood teaching stories with clear knowledge differences and could correctly use that information to specify the teacher and learner. The 5- and 6-year-olds, who performed well on a standard false belief task, further understood that it was the teacher's belief about the knowledge difference that would actually govern teaching. The conceptual link to teaching suggests that theory of mind is critical for understanding other forms of knowledge acquisition besides perceptual access.     

Epistemology and artificial intelligence

In this essay we advance the view that analytical epistemology and artificial intelligence are complementary disciplines. Both fields study epistemic relations, but whereas artificial intelligence approaches this subject from the perspective of understanding formal and computational properties of frameworks purporting to model some epistemic relation or other, traditional epistemology approaches the subject from the perspective of understanding the properties of epistemic relations in terms of their conceptual properties. We argue that these two practices should not be conducted in isolation. We illustrate this point by discussing how to represent a class of inference forms found in standard inferential statistics. This class of inference forms is interesting because its members share two properties that are common to epistemic relations, namely defeasibility and paraconsistency. Our modeling of standard inferential statistical arguments exploits results from both logical artificial intelligence and analytical epistemology. We remark how our approach to this modeling problem may be generalized to an interdisciplinary approach to the study of epistemic relations.     

Getting emotional about ‘brain mobility’

Our purpose in this paper is to offer an historical and cultural account of the relationships between globalisation, the nation-state, emotion and the academic mobility policies that are driven by the knowledge economy. In so doing we seek to contribute to the emerging literature on the links between emotion, policy and globalisation. These links are under-researched and under-theorised. Seeking to build on Arjun Appadurai’s work on the global cultural economy, we coin the term ‘emoscapes’. Emoscapes, we argue, involve the movement and mobilisation of emotion on intersecting global, national and personal scales. This concept helps us to illuminate how emotion circulates within global power and knowledge geographies. We discuss global policy atmospherics in terms of the structural power relationship between different nation-states and regions, the feelings such relationships generate on matters of ‘brain mobility’ and the implications for policy. This provides a broad context for our discussion of the nation-state itself where we consider how the nation-state’s position within these global power formations contributes to national feelings. Taking the example of Australia, we look at its emotional archive, the implications for the ways in which Australian policies have territorialised the global ‘brain mobility’ policy discourse and the nation-state policy atmospherics involved. Ultimately we show how emoscapes have entered and influenced policy and how they are part of global and national power and knowledge geographies.     

心理账户和薪酬激励的实验研究

心理账户是人们在心理上对结果,尤其是经济结果的编码,分类和估价的过程,它反映了人们在进行资金财富决策过程中的心理认知过程。心理账户有着有别于经济账户的运算法则。实验研究发现,改变薪酬的预期参照点,可以改变人们对同一结果的认知评价,从而达到不同的激励效果;低金额奖酬时人们倾向于选择物品,而高金额奖酬是人们倾向与选择现金。     

The empirical case for role-governed categories

Most theories of categorization posit feature-based representations. Markman and Stilwell (2001) argued that many natural categories name roles in relational systems and therefore they are role-governed categories. There is little extant empirical evidence to support the existence of role-governed categories. Three experiments examine predictions for ways that role-governed categories should differ from feature-based categories. Experiment 1 shows that our knowledge of role-governed categories, in contrast to feature-based categories, is largely about properties extrinsic to category members. Experiment 2 shows that role-governed categories have more prominent ideals than feature-based categories. Experiment 3 demonstrates that novel role-governed categories are licensed by the instantiation of novel relational structures. We then discuss broader implications for the study of categories and concepts.     

Restructuring partitioned knowledge: the role of recoordination in category learning

Knowledge restructuring refers to changes in the strategy with which people solve a given problem. Two types of knowledge restructuring are supported by existing category learning models. The first is a relearning process, which involves incremental updating of knowledge as learning progresses. The second is a recoordination process, which involves novel changes in the way existing knowledge is applied to the task. Whereas relearning is supported by both single- and multiple-module models of category learning, only multiple-module models support recoordination. To date, only relearning has been directly supported empirically. We report two category learning experiments that provide direct evidence of recoordination. People can fluidly alternate between different categorization strategies, and moreover, can reinstate an old strategy even after prolonged use of an alternative. The knowledge restructuring data are not well fit by a single-module model (ALCOVE). By contrast, a multiple-module model (ATRIUM) quantitatively accounts for recoordination. Low-level changes in the distribution of dimensional attention are shown to subsequently affect how ATRIUM coordinates its modular knowledge. We argue that learning about complex tasks occurs at the level of the partial knowledge elements used to generate a response strategy.     

The metacognitions of climate change

How do individuals think about global climate change? Although a body of research on the cognitive elements of climate change has begun to accumulate (e.g., Bord, O'Connor, & Fisher, 2000, few studies have distinguished between categories of cognitions. One key distinction is between primary, direct thoughts such as perceptions and evaluations, and secondary, indirect thoughts which reflect upon and control primary cognitions (Petty, Brinol, Tormala, & Wegner, 2007); secondary thoughts are thus considered metacognitive. This distinction is important to climate change engagement given that primary and secondary thoughts may exert independent effects on behavior. Three metacognitive elements of climate change are delineated: metacognitive knowledge, or assessments of confidence in one's thoughts; metacognitive certainty, or assessments of the likelihood of an outcome; and metacognitive importance, or the relative emphasis placed on one's thoughts. The relations between these dimensions and climate change-relevant behaviors are explored. Possibilities for future research are also discussed.     

The effect of expertise on the relation between implicit and explicit attitude measures: An information availability/accessibility perspective

Three experiments investigate expertise as a moderator of the relationship between implicit and explicit attitude measures. Prior research suggests that greater expertise leads to stronger implicit–explicit relations; however, a cognitive view of expertise can also predict a weaker implicit–explicit relation. Our framework helps to resolve that seeming contradiction on the basis of the availability/accessibility of attributes versus attitudes in explicit attitude measures. We show that object specificity and contextual factors (e.g., instructions and prior evaluations in a survey) differentially affect the availability/accessibility of global attitudes and attribute information for novices versus experts, thus determining how expertise moderates the implicit–explicit relation.     

A formal framework for modelling the developmental course of competence and performance in the distance,speed, and time domain

The developmental course in the distance–speed–time domain is still a matter of debate. Traditional stage models are contested by theories of continuous development and adaptive thinking. In the present work, we introduce a formal framework for modelling the developmental course in this domain, grounding on Competence-based Knowledge Space Theory. This framework, as a more general case, widely includes assumptions and facets of previous models and covers empirical findings collected based on different experimental paradigms. By a distinction of latent competences and observable performance, model validation is not bound to a certain experimental paradigm and no one-to-one correspondence between competences and tasks is required. Therefore, the framework has the potential to bridge the gap between stage models and models of continuous development. The approach also precisely defines misconceptions, for example overgeneralization, and empirically investigates their occurrence. In the present work, we established a prototypical model for the development of understanding the distance–speed–time system. We extended this model with definitions based on different perspectives of overgeneralization. The assumptions of the model and its extensions were examined on the basis of the results of two empirical investigations using six judgment task types. The results yielded a reasonably good fit of model and data. No evidence was found for the occurrence of overgeneralization in this domain. The theoretical model and empirical results are discussed with respect to their relationship to other developmental models and theories.     

Epistemic means and ends: a reply to Hofmann

How is epistemic justification related to knowledge? Is it, as widely thought, constitutive of knowledge? Is it merely a means to knowledge, or merely a means to something else, such as truth? In a recent article in this journal, Hofmann (2005, Synthese, 146(3), 357–369) addresses these questions in attempting to defend an important argument articulated by Sartwell (1992, The Journal of Philosophy, 89(4), 167–180) and reconstructed and criticized by Le Morvan (2002, Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 56(2), 151–168). This Sartwellian argument purported to show that, since epistemic justification is of merely instrumental value, it is not constitutive of knowledge. In this paper, I argue that Hofmann’s defense of Sartwell fails, but that its failure brings to light some important lessons concerning the nature of justification and its relationship to truth and knowledge.