Response acquisition by zebrafish (Danio rerio) with delayed reinforcement

Zebrafish (Danio rerio) is a common vertebrate animal model in biomedical research and is a promising species for studying how genes interact with environmental factors in determining behavior. The present study investigated how reinforcement parameters affect zebrafish behavior by assessing response acquisition with delayed reinforcement, which has been studied with other species (e.g., rats, pigeons, humans, etc.) but not with zebrafish. Twenty‐four experimentally naïve subjects were exposed to a tandem fixed‐ratio 1 differential‐reinforcement‐of‐other‐behavior x‐s schedule of reinforcement, where x varied across subjects. There were six different delay‐to‐reinforcement durations and sets of four fish were assigned to each delay duration. All of the fish assigned to a 0‐, 0.5‐, or 1‐s delay acquired responding. Two fish acquired responding with a 3‐s delay and one fish appeared to have acquired it with a 6‐s delay although the latter result was less clear. None acquired responding with a 12‐s delay. These results suggest that zebrafish behavior is sensitive to delays to reinforcement and the time frame over which reinforcement is effective may be limited approximately to 6 s. This time frame is shorter than that found with other species. Practical and theoretical implications of the present finding are discussed.     

Cross-modal working memory binding and word recognition skills: how specific is the link?

Recent research has suggested that the creation of temporary bound representations of information from different sources within working memory uniquely relates to word recognition abilities in school-age children. However, it is unclear to what extent this link is attributable specifically to the binding ability for cross-modal information. This study examined the performance of Grade 3 (8–9 years old) children on binding tasks requiring either temporary association formation of two visual items (i.e., within-modal binding) or pairs of visually presented abstract shapes and auditorily presented nonwords (i.e., cross-modal binding). Children’s word recognition skills were related to performance on the cross-modal binding task but not on the within-modal binding task. Further regression models showed that cross-modal binding memory was a significant predictor of word recognition when memory for its constituent elements, general abilities, and crucially, within-modal binding memory were taken into account. These findings may suggest a specific link between the ability to bind information across modalities within working memory and word recognition skills.     

Effects of neutral and enthusiastic praise on the rate of discrimination acquisition

Previous research has shown that praise is an effective reinforcer; however, few researchers have evaluated whether qualitative differences in praise affect responding. The purpose of the current study was to compare the effects of neutral, enthusiastic, and no praise on the rate of matching‐to‐sample acquisition during discrete‐trial training with adults diagnosed with autism and an intellectual disability. In addition, we evaluated preference for neutral, enthusiastic, and no praise. All three participants acquired responses slightly faster during the enthusiastic praise condition. Preference assessment results showed that one participant preferred enthusiastic praise, whereas the two other participants showed indiscriminate selections.     

Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias

Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing or at least next to nothing. Nearly no one actually believes that skepticism is true. Yet it has remained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skeptic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an interaction between two factors. First, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly than perceptual belief. Second, people evaluate inferential belief more harshly when its content is negative (i.e., that something is not the case) than when it is positive (i.e., that something is the case). It just so happens that potent skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on negative inferential beliefs, and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psychology.     

Learning General Phonological Rules From Distributional Information: A Computational Model

Phonological rules create alternations in the phonetic realizations of related words. These rules must be learned by infants in order to identify the phonological inventory, the morphological structure, and the lexicon of a language. Recent work proposes a computational model for the learning of one kind of phonological alternation, allophony (Peperkamp, Le Calvez, Nadal, & Dupoux, 2006). This paper extends the model to account for learning of a broader set of phonological alternations and the formalization of these alternations as general rules. In Experiment 1, we apply the original model to new data in Dutch and demonstrate its limitations in learning nonallophonic rules. In Experiment 2, we extend the model to allow it to learn general rules for alternations that apply to a class of segments. In Experiment 3, the model is further extended to allow for generalization by context; we argue that this generalization must be constrained by linguistic principles.     

Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links ((Experiments 1–3). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).     

Knowledge of memory functions in European and Asian American adults and children: The relation to autobiographical memory

This study investigated explicit knowledge of autobiographical memory functions using a newly developed questionnaire. European and Asian American adults (N = 57) and school-aged children (N = 68) indicated their agreement with 13 statements about why people think about and share memories pertaining to four broad functions—self, social, directive and emotion regulation. Children were interviewed for personal memories concurrently with the memory function knowledge assessment and again 3 months later. It was found that adults agreed to the self, social and directive purposes of memory to a greater extent than did children, whereas European American children agreed to the emotion regulation purposes of memory to a greater extent than did European American adults. Furthermore, European American children endorsed more self and emotion regulation functions than did Asian American children, whereas Asian American adults endorsed more directive functions than did European American adults. Children's endorsement of memory functions, particularly social functions, was associated with more detailed and personally meaningful memories. These findings are informative for the understanding of developmental and cultural influences on memory function knowledge and of the relation of such knowledge to autobiographical memory development.     

Why is number word learning hard? Evidence from bilingual learners

Young children typically take between 18 months and 2 years to learn the meanings of number words. In the present study, we investigated this developmental trajectory in bilingual preschoolers to examine the relative contributions of two factors in number word learning: (1) the construction of numerical concepts, and (2) the mapping of language specific words onto these concepts. We found that children learn the meanings of small number words (i.e., one, two, and three) independently in each language, indicating that observed delays in learning these words are attributable to difficulties in mapping words to concepts. In contrast, children generally learned to accurately count larger sets (i.e., five or greater) simultaneously in their two languages, suggesting that the difficulty in learning to count is not tied to a specific language. We also replicated previous studies that found that children learn the counting procedure before they learn its logic – i.e., that for any natural number, n, the successor of n in the count list denotes the cardinality n + 1. Consistent with past studies, we found that children’s knowledge of successors is first acquired incrementally. In bilinguals, we found that this knowledge exhibits item-specific transfer between languages, suggesting that the logic of the positive integers may not be stored in a language-specific format. We conclude that delays in learning the meanings of small number words are mainly due to language-specific processes of mapping words to concepts, whereas the logic and procedures of counting appear to be learned in a format that is independent of a particular language and thus transfers rapidly from one language to the other in development.