Inhibition within a reference frame during the interpretation of spatial language

Spatial terms such as right are potentially ambiguous because they can refer to different regions of space when defined by competing reference frames (e.g., my right within a relative reference frame versus an object's right within an intrinsic reference frame). In such situations, previous research has suggested that multiple reference frames are initially activated, followed by inhibition of the reference frame that is not ultimately selected to define the spatial term. Reference frames are complex multi-component representations, raising the question of exactly which components of the non-selected frame are inhibited. It is possible that the whole frame may be inhibited, including all axes and endpoints, or that only select endpoints and axes may be inhibited. Three experiments conducted using a negative priming paradigm revealed that only certain components of the non-selected reference frame were inhibited, consistent with the idea that some axes are privileged. These results also suggest that the components of a reference frame can be independently accessed. Implications for representing and accessing spatial information are discussed.     

幼儿心理状态术语的运用与心理理论的发展

本研究目的在于探讨幼儿在假装游戏中心理状态术语的应用,以及与错误信念的理解是否存在相关并具有一定的发展特征。57名3—5岁的幼儿参加了实验。研究程序包括两类标准错误信念任务及假装游戏的拍摄、麦卡锡幼儿言语智力测验。结果发现：(1)幼儿的一般言语能力与错误信念的理解存在显著相关;(2)幼儿心理状态术语的使用存在情境差异,且随年龄的增长具有“指向愿望一指向信念”的维度特征;(3)在控制相关因素之后,幼儿错误信念的理解与心理状态术语的应用及其特定范畴(习惯用语)之间仍然存在显著相关;与“真正涉及心理状态”之间的相关不再显著。     

The Theological Structure of Christian Faith and the Feasibility of a Global Ecological Ethic

Scientific evolutionary/ecological thinking is the basis for today's understanding that we are now in an ecological crisis. Religions, however, often resist reordering their thinking in light of scientific ideas, and this presents difficulties in trying to develop a viable global ecological ethic. In both the West and Asia religiomoral ecological concerns continue to be formulated largely in terms of traditional concepts rather than in more global terms, as scientific thinking about ecological matters might encourage them to do. The majority of this article is devoted to the kind of reformulation of Western Christian conceptions of God, humanity, and the relation between them that is necessary to address this problem. The question is then raised whether similar critical thinking about religiomoral issues raised by today's evolutionary/ecological scientific thinking is going on in Asian religions and whether it would be too presumptuous (in view of our colonial history) for us Westerners to ask for such rethinking. This leads to a final question: Without such transformations in religious traditions East and West, is the development of a truly global ecological ethic really feasible?     

Referential Intentions and Communicative Luck

Brian Loar [1976] observed that communicative success with singular terms requires more than correct referent assignment. For communicative success to be achieved, the audience must assign the right referent in the right way. Loar, and others since, took this to motivate Fregean accounts of the semantics of singular terms. Ray Buchanan [2014] has recently responded, maintaining that, although Loar is correct to claim that communicative success with singular terms requires more than correct referent assignment, this is compatible with direct reference approaches, as long as one also endorses an independently motivated Gricean view of communicative intentions. This paper argues that Buchanan's Gricean view cannot account for the full range of Loar cases. In doing so, it aims to explicate the structure of Loar's cases and thus to clarify the conditions that a theory must meet in order to adequately meet his challenge.     

Paradigm Terms: The Necessity of Kind Term Identifications Generalized

Standard Kripke-Putnam semantics is widely taken to entail that theoretical identifications like ‘Brontosauruses are Apatosauruses’ or ‘Gold is ⁷⁹Au’ are necessary, if true. I offer a new diagnosis as to why this modal consequence ensues. Central to my diagnosis is the concept of a paradigm term. I argue that modal and epistemic peculiarities that are commonly considered as distinctive of natural kind expressions are in fact traits that are shared by paradigm terms in general. Philosophical semantics should broaden its focus from natural kind expressions to paradigm terms.     

FAMILY CONFLICT MODERATES EARLY PARENT–CHILD BEHAVIORAL TRANSACTIONS

The reciprocal transactions that shape early parent–child relationships are influenced by contextual stress, such as family conflict. Although family conflict is a salient stressor to the family system, few studies have considered how parent–child transactions vary according to exposure to family conflict. The present study examined how family conflict alters early parent–child behavioral transactions. We utilized three waves of data from a multisite longitudinal study of low‐income families (N = 2, 876), child age 14 months, 24 months, and 36 months, to identify behavioral transactions of positive and negative maternal (supportiveness, negative regard) and child (engagement, negativity) behaviors. Results indicated that family conflict at 14 months diminished the positive association between maternal supportiveness and child engagement, and amplified the inverse association between maternal negativity and child engagement. Family conflict at 14 months also was associated with increased stability of child negativity and subsequent increased maternal negative regard at 36 months, in part via increases in 24‐month child negativity. In sum, family conflict occurring early in childhood predicted and moderated behavioral transactions between young children and their mothers.     

The Formal Structure of Kind Representations

Kind representations, concepts like table, triangle, dog, and planet, underlie generic language. Here, we investigate the formal structure of kind representations—the structure that distinguishes kind representations from other types of representations. The present studies confirm that participants distinguish generic-supporting properties of individuals (e.g., this watch is made of steel) and accidental properties (e.g., this watch is on the nightstand). Furthermore, work dating back to Aristotle establishes that only some generic-supporting properties bear a principled connection to the kind, that is, are true of an individual by virtue of its being a member of a specific kind (e.g., telling time for a watch). The present studies tested the hypothesis that principled connections are part of the formal structure of kind representations. Specifically, they tested whether they structure a newly learned kind representation. Experiment 1 found that introducing a property of a newly encountered novel kind in any one of four linguistic frames that provide evidence that a property has a principled connection to a kind (e.g., “It has fur because it is a blick”) led participants to infer a different conceptual consequence of principled connections (i.e., “There is something wrong with this blick, which does not have fur”) for which they had no direct evidence. Two introduction frames that provided no evidence for principled connections (e.g., “Almost all blicks have fur”) did not generate the same consequence. Experiment 2 found that all of the targeted properties were generic licensing, irrespective of the introduction frame. That the distinction between properties that bear principled connections to their kinds, and merely generic-supporting properties structures novel kind representations, provides strong evidence that this distinction is part of the formal structure of kind representations.