Die konstitutive Rolle von Technik in Der Konstruktivistischen Wissenschaftstheorie. Konsequenzen für die Technikphilosophie

Suumary   The constitutive role of technology in the constructive theory of science. Consequences for the philosophy of technology. Technology plays an important role in the constructivistic reconstructions of the natural sciences. However, there is no in-depth view or thorough explication of the term “technology” and its connotations and relations in those exercises. Technology, there, is seen as a more or less evident part of the lifeworld’s A priori of the natural sciences. This paper is dedicated to the reconstruction of the function of technology in the argumentations chains and proto-theories which shall, in the constructivistic (methodical) theory of sciences, provide the methodical fundament of the sciences. In a second step, the aspects of technology are identified which are indispensable to fulfil the functions of technology in the argumentation chains mentioned above. Finally, these aspects are related to current debates in the philosophy of technology.     

Sacrificing Value

ABSTRACT

When is sacrifice – and particularly self-sacrifice – called for? This question turns out to be difficult to answer, for it tends to arise when values conflict, and hence the answer to it depends on how conflicts of values are to be resolved. If values are constructed, and if there is no single right way to construct them or prioritize them when they conflict, though there are identifiable ways in which the construction of values can go wrong, we may be left in a position of ambivalence about what should be sacrificed. In cases of conflict in which self-sacrifice is one of the options, ambivalence may be particularly appropriate. In part this is because there may be in such cases special sources of plurality and incommensurability of values, because the conflict is likely to be between something that is valued by a social group, and something that is valued particularly by an individual who has to consider self-sacrificing. And in part it is because individuals may have trouble balancing self-regarding and other-regarding concerns in the process of value construction. This paper elaborates these complications, and presents cases in which we might suspect that someone has self-sacrificed too much or too little.     

‚Was Ist Begründung?’ Schwierigkeiten durch den Primat der Pragmatik vor der Semantik am Beispiel des Erlanger/Konstanzer Konstruktivismus

‘What is justification?’-Constructivism of Erlangen/Constanceschool as an example for problems resulting from priority of pragmatics to semantics. - R. Brandom's ‘Making it explicit’ is an attempt to work out how semantics is rooted in pragmatics: meaning in use and conceptual content in social functional roles. A philosophy that also focuses on reconstructing those norms that are implicit in pragmatics and constitutive to semanticsis developed by Constructivism of Erlangen/Constance school. This enquiry tries to work out that a discussion of constructivism might be useful for a comprehension of Brandom's ‘theory of expression’, because both philosophical positions meet themselves in a pragmatic way of justification that makes it impossible to justify claims to all rational beings but only to members of those communities that share the same interests and institutions.     

How rejection of essences expresses despair

The Self and the ego in Jung's psychology are an instance of what Edmund Husserl called a 'double intentionality': one tending toward meaning is distinct from another tending toward meaning, yet they are reciprocally inseparable from each other. As perception in a present moment and memory of a past are impossible without each other, so an intending of ego and that of Self are impossible without each other. Accompanying the ego (mostly in the background) during each moment of time is a tending towards a particular Idea or essence. This reciprocity is expressed in a unique way over a lifetime and is like the relation of mother and child, and so it is important for all of us born of women to retain a sense of essences and the fullness of Self. 'Constructivism', however, is a current belief held by some feminists, and it influences both theorizing and practice in analytical psychology. It involves a rejection of essences, a revision of Jung's Idea of Self, and an attempt to conduct analysis without reference to an intentional subjective Self. Such constructivist revision expresses a despair both about essences as Ideas and about Self as intentional and subjective. It is despair over Self in a Kierkegaardian sense.     

The social construction of gender

The categories provided by the language of our culture give us a meaning-making framework that guides our perception of the world. This paper views the process of categorizing people from a constructivist perspective. It argues that many categories such as race, nationality, homosexuality, and gender are arbitrary social constructions created to fill some human purpose based on sociopolitical rather than biological or natural considerations. Similarity among people may arise from a history of being in the same category rather than being the basis for categorization. Whereas people are attached to categories that shape their identity and unite with other persons from similar categories to fight for their rights, they should also envisage the possibility of revising these arbitrary categories.     

Ethical attentiveness

Kantian virtue can be construed as a condition of an agent which secures adherence to the requirements of morality in the face of the ever-present possibility of inner conflict with counter-ethical considerations. This paper claims that this conception of virtue does not fit in well with one essential characteristic of the virtuous agent; that he or she is attentive to the well-being of others. After some preliminary remarks about virtue-related evaluations, the paper criticises the Kantian conception of virtue in the light of certain characteristics of ethical attentiveness. The paper concludes by developing a notion of ethical habituation which includes the training of attention.     

Can Rawls’ Constructivism Avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma? In Reply to Shafer-Landau

In this essay, I consider two challenges implicit in Russ Shafer-Landau’s criticism of constructivists: the realism challenge and the relativism challenge, respectively. I do not try to offer a decisive set of objections to the challenges; instead I argue that some objective versions of constructivism, especially Rawls’s constructivism, are not susceptible to the criticisms.     

Wie Natürlich ist das System der Natürlichen Deduktion?

How natural is natural deduction?– Gentzen's system of natural deduction intends to fit logical rules to the effective mathematical reasoning in order to overcome the artificiality of deductions in axiomatic systems (¶ 2). In spite of this reform some of Gentzen's rules for natural deduction are criticised by psychologists and natural language philosophers for remaining unnatural. The criticism focuses on the principle of extensionality and on formalism of logic (¶ 3). After sketching the criticism relatively to the main rules, I argue that the criteria of economy, simplicity, pertinence etc., on which the objections are based, transcend the strict domain of logic and apply to arguments in general (¶ 4). (¶ 5) deals with Frege's critique of the concept of naturalness as regards logic. It is shown that this concept means a regression into psychologism and is exposed to the same difficulties as are: relativity, lack of precision, the error of arguing from `is' to `ought' (the naturalistic fallacy). Despite of these, the concept of naturalness plays the role of a diffuse ideal which favours the construction of alternative deductive systems in contrast to the platonic conception of logic (¶ 6).     

试论家庭治疗的理论基础

按照历史发展的顺序,从精神分析、系统论与控制论、依附理论以及建构主义这四个方面对家庭治疗的理论基础进行了论述,并对这四种理论取向对家庭治疗的贡献以及依附理论与家庭治疗的异同进行了探讨.     

Findings follow framings: navigating the empirical turn

In this paper, I outline several methodological questions that we need to confront. The chief question is how can we identify the nature of technological change and its varied cultural consequences—including social, political, institutional, and economic dimensions—when our different research methods, using distinct ‘levels’ or ‘scales’ of analysis, yield contradictory results. What can we say, in other words, when our findings about technology follow from the framings of our inquiries? In slightly different terms, can we combine insights from the fine-grained “social shaping of technology” as well as from complementary approaches accenting the “technological shaping of society?” As a way forward, I will suggest conducting multi-scale inquiries into the processes of technological and cultural change. This will involve recognizing and conceptualizing the analytical scales or levels on which we conduct inquiry (very roughly, micro, meso, macro) as well as outlining strategies for moving within and between these scales or levels. Of course we want and need diverse methodologies for analyzing technology and culture. I find myself in sympathy with geographer Brenner (New state spaces: urban governance and the rescaling of statehood, 2004, p. 7), who aspires to a “theoretically precise yet also historically specific conceptualization of [technological change] as a key dimension of social, political and economic life.”