Die konstitutive Rolle von Technik in Der Konstruktivistischen Wissenschaftstheorie. Konsequenzen für die Technikphilosophie

Suumary   The constitutive role of technology in the constructive theory of science. Consequences for the philosophy of technology. Technology plays an important role in the constructivistic reconstructions of the natural sciences. However, there is no in-depth view or thorough explication of the term “technology” and its connotations and relations in those exercises. Technology, there, is seen as a more or less evident part of the lifeworld’s A priori of the natural sciences. This paper is dedicated to the reconstruction of the function of technology in the argumentations chains and proto-theories which shall, in the constructivistic (methodical) theory of sciences, provide the methodical fundament of the sciences. In a second step, the aspects of technology are identified which are indispensable to fulfil the functions of technology in the argumentation chains mentioned above. Finally, these aspects are related to current debates in the philosophy of technology.     

The social epistemologist in search of a position from which to argue

The relevance of Fuller's version of social epistemology to argumentation theory is highlighted, in response to critics who claim that I am not sufficiently critical of the social grounds of knowledge production. Responding to Lyne, I first consider the strengths and weaknesses of relying on economic images to capture the social. Then, I tackle two contrary objections: Brian Baigrie claims social epistemology is not social enough, while Angelo Corlett wonders whether it may be too social. Finally, I counter Malcolm Ashmore, who argues that social epistemology is not sensitive to reflexive implications of its own doctrines. I conclude that a rhetoric needs to be forged that enables those wishing to transform knowledge production to make their case plausibly to those whose behavior needs to be changed most. At the moment, science critics preach to the converted, a fate that the social epistemologist should not wish to share.     

Therapist Role in Narrative Group Psychotherapy

With its assumptions about the interpersonal origins of individual learning, narrative theory suggests certain leadership functions for group therapists: providing a perspective on how multiple meanings may be constructed about experience; leading the process of deconstructing individual narratives through careful questioning to distinguish persons from problems; enlisting participants in active awareness and engagement with group dynamics and group process; and enabling the co-creation of a group narrative through the development of a new community of conversations.     

3岁幼儿的二级观点采择及合作互动的影响

研究以经典的乌龟任务(实验1)和改良的滤镜任务(实验2)对3岁幼儿的二级观点采择进行探究, 并探讨其在短暂的社会互动前后的变化。结果表明：(1) 3岁幼儿尚难以自发进行二级观点采择, 但已具备进行这一加工的潜质; (2)短暂的合作互动可在一定程度上提高幼儿采择他人观点的成功率, 而竞争互动则无类似影响。该发现为从建构主义角度解释视觉观点采择发展提供了新的证据。     

文化心理学方法论的扩展性探索

方法论对于一个学科的发展至关重要。从根本上说,方法论的基本内涵是关于研究对象与研究方法及二者关系的理论预设,而其核心目标是实现研究对象与研究方法的匹配。从文化心理学的研究现状看,现有的方法论尚未实现研究对象与研究方法之间的协调,从而构成文化心理学发展的潜在困境。基于对文化心理学的理论诉求和研究现状的把握,本文提出了文化心理学方法论的六个扩展方向:研究对象上从外显到内隐、从元素到整体、从抽象到具体; 研究方法上从现象到机制、从单向到双向、从静态到动态。     

Evolution‐revolution and the cosmos

The purpose of this paper is to sketch some remarks about the evolution of psychology within contemporary cognitive sciences and its consequences on the definition of the object of a (one) scientific psychology. Arguments are stated on empirical experience from interdisciplinary research and on experimental investigations in psycholinguistics and knowledge representation.     

The commonsense conception and its relation to scientific theory

Abstract

In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O ‐ which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality — and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from each other, however: though both have their own practices, the way we interpret reality scientifically presupposes our commonsense conception.     

Does rationality presuppose irrationality

Abstract

Although irrationality always presupposes rationality, I think there are good arguments to claim that sometimes rationality presupposes irrationality.This paper tries to show how irrational action can support rationality in two ways: it can develop and preserve rationality. I also argue that sometimes the development and the conservation of rationality can only be realized by irrational action.     

Findings follow framings: navigating the empirical turn

In this paper, I outline several methodological questions that we need to confront. The chief question is how can we identify the nature of technological change and its varied cultural consequences—including social, political, institutional, and economic dimensions—when our different research methods, using distinct ‘levels’ or ‘scales’ of analysis, yield contradictory results. What can we say, in other words, when our findings about technology follow from the framings of our inquiries? In slightly different terms, can we combine insights from the fine-grained “social shaping of technology” as well as from complementary approaches accenting the “technological shaping of society?” As a way forward, I will suggest conducting multi-scale inquiries into the processes of technological and cultural change. This will involve recognizing and conceptualizing the analytical scales or levels on which we conduct inquiry (very roughly, micro, meso, macro) as well as outlining strategies for moving within and between these scales or levels. Of course we want and need diverse methodologies for analyzing technology and culture. I find myself in sympathy with geographer Brenner (New state spaces: urban governance and the rescaling of statehood, 2004, p. 7), who aspires to a “theoretically precise yet also historically specific conceptualization of [technological change] as a key dimension of social, political and economic life.”