Three ways of watching a sports video

It does not typically seem to be worthwhile rewatching a sport match, for example, in a video recording, once the result is known. Sports matches are like detective stories. Once one knows ‘whodunit’, there seems little point in revisiting the tale. By drawing on an argument from musicologist Edward T. Cone, this paper argues that certain sports matches may be revisited with profit. The initial experience of a game may be of a series of events that are often ambiguous or confusing as to their meaning or purpose. The full appreciation of a sport match requires, not just this initial familiarity with the immediately perceived events of the game, but also an awareness of the tactics being deployed by both sides. An understanding of tactics and strategy is akin to the analysis of a piece of music (or other art work). A further (third) viewing of the game, during which one can appreciate how the tactics inform the events naively experienced in the first viewing, will yield, it will be argued, an aesthetic pleasure. This takes the experience of sport beyond the merely entertaining or exciting. In certain games, the third viewing may also transcend an appreciation of the merely formal qualities of the game, and so offer substantial insights into what it is to be human.     

Constructs to describe individual knowledge / Constructos para describir el conocimiento individual

Abstract

The basic unit of any cognitive model that attempts to describe individual knowledge and its manifestations must be chosen carefully, as the resulting position on learning, teaching and, in general, of the psychological research subject depends largely on this choice. The objective is to assess and contrast two constructs of enormous significance in cognitive psychology that have been used as cognitive units under different theoretical contexts: the concept in its classical sense, and the scheme in its organismic version. Arguments are presented to show that the latter is more consistent with constructivist assumptions and is more respectful of psychological data such as the Gestalt and prototype effects or the existence of procedural and implicit knowledge.     

Recent Consideration of World Government in the IR Literature: A Critical Appraisal

Because recent contributions on world government in the international relations (IR) literature have focused on relatively nebulous issues, they are of limited usefulness for illuminating whether or not an actual world government would advance the human prospect. This question cannot be sensibly addressed unless in the light of a specific institutional proposal. Along the authority-effectiveness continuum separating the relatively ineffectual existent United Nations on the one hand, and the traditional world federalist ideal of the omnipotent world state on the other, there are intermediate possibilities not subject to the respective disadvantages of the extreme endpoints of this continuum.     

Location,Location, Location

SUMMARY

This chapter describes and analyzes the contributions of contemporary feminist therapy theorists Ellyn Kaschak, Laura Brown, Mary Ballou, Pam Remer and Judith Worell, and Bonnie Burstow. Themes common to all of the authors are presented, including: (1) the deconstruction of patriarchy in the service of understanding the lived experience of women, (2) the position that there is no single reality, no one “right” feminist theory or epistemological position about women, and (3) the understanding that the relationship of women's multiple realities, experiences, and roles is central to feminist theory building. The approaches of these theorists to the critical analysis of mainstream therapy, to feminist theory building, and therapy applications are described and compared.     

In the letter of mere reason: Rethinking the universal secular intellectual with Immanuel Kant,Jacques Derrida and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

This article reconsiders a question, ‘Is Critique Secular?’, which ostensibly polarised Saba Mahmood and Stathis Gourgouris in the 2008 exchange forum of Public Culture. After positing that Mahmood and Gourgouris are mutually invested in challenging and overcoming the intransigence of epistemic secularism, the article canvasses Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's deconstruction of the Kantian ‘universal secular intellectual’. The article suggests that Spivak's reading of Kant's Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone constitutes a vital exercise in democratic criticism that sets into relief an important convergence between Mahmood and Gourgouris as interlocutors. Delineating imbrications among Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Judgment and Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, the article synthesises Jacques Derrida's work on Kantian aesthetics and Spivak's recalibration of the Kantian intellectual as a means to unsettle the recalcitrance of epistemic secularism in academic debate and public culture.     

A Curriculum Evaluation Strategy to Guide District-Level Basal Text Adoption Decision-Making for Special Education

This article describes an approach to curriculum adoption that is confirmatory in nature, and is based upon Cooley and Leinhardt's (1975) model of classroom learning and Stake's (1967) data matrix. This approach includes identification of principles of classroom learning, assessment of district goals, analysis of curriculm materials "on the shelf," direct observation of learning processes during classroom use of materials, and measurement of student performance with curriculum-based and non-curriculum-based measures. This approach was applied to a school district's curriculum adoption decision-making needs in the area of special education, with the pilot use of basal materials in four classrooms over a 1-year period, and the assignment of two nonequivalent control group classrooms. Analysis of the resulting multi-faceted database was used to address a number of separate but interrelated evaluation questions. The results from the separate analyses are mutually supportive, converging toward a single adoption decision.     

On Generalization： Pragmatists＇ Contributions to Constructivism

Constructivism has been an important program in contemporary philosophy, but cannot itself cannot provide sufficient context for grasping its key points. To fully understand its power and potential we must borrow tools from other programs： specifically, Charles Peirce and John Dewey＇s pragmatism. By exploring these two pragmatists＇ articulations of ＂generalization,＂ which I hold is the most crucial question in constructivism, their prospective contributions to constructivism can be brought to light. If, as I argue, constructivism can incorporate the lessons of pragmatism, then it can still be considered a highly workable interpretation of reality and of human endeavors.     

In Defense of Radical Social Constructivism

This article is a response to Alex North's ( 2016 ) critique of radical social constructivism (RSC). North claimed that RSC was a movement in counseling that would be monumentally problematic in its future application to counseling theory. In this article, the author defends RSC and posits that RSC is closely aligned with the values of counseling. RSC encourages counselors to look at the social understanding of clients' experiences as paramount to the behaviors they exhibit.     

KORSGAARD'S REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM

Abstract: In her recent book Self‐Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Christine Korsgaard does a wonderful job developing her Kantian account of normativity and the rational necessity of morality. Korsgaard's account of normativity, however, has received its fair share of attention. In this discussion, the focus is on the resulting moral theory and, in particular, on Korsgaard's reason for rejecting consequentialist moral theories. The article suggests that we assume that Korsgaard's vindication of Kantian rationalism is successful and ask whether, nonetheless, her account is consistent with consequentialism. It suggests further that we grant that moral reasons are not based on substantive principles, and that they must instead emerge from the purely formal principles of practical reason. Can consequentialist principles nonetheless emerge from the formal constraints of practical reason? Why can't a consequentialist embrace Korsgaard's account of self‐constitution and normativity?     

Kant on the motive of (imperfect) duty

This paper argues that Kantians face a little discussed problem in accounting for how actions that fulfill imperfect duties can be morally motivated. It is widely agreed that actions that are performed from the motive of duty are performed through a recognition of the objective necessity of the action. It is also generally held that the objective necessity of an action consists in its rational non-optionality. Many actions that fulfill imperfect duties, however, are rationally optional. Given these constraints, it is impossible that such rationally optional actions (including, for instance, many acts of benevolence) could be performed from the motive of duty. After presenting the problem as one that Kantians should find genuinely pressing, this paper offers a solution by advancing an alternative to the conception of rational necessity widely shared by Kantians. On the alternative view presented here, an action is rationally necessary if and only if the justifying reasons that speak in favor of performing the action do not depend on any empirical and therefore contingent motivational source on the part of an agent. Such actions may well be rationally optional. Moral motivation is therefore possible even in the case of rationally optional actions. Abbreviations: The following abbreviations are used for Kant’s works. All translations are from Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Citations are given by the abbreviation, the volume, and the page number from Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter deGruyter & Co., 1900–). G. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals).

KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason).

MS Die Metaphysik der Sitten (The Metaphysics of Morals).