When multi‐problem poor individuals' values meet practitioners' values!

Every intervention process can be thought of as a journey of partnership between people, as well as an intellectual journey of ideas and an emotional journey of relationships. This exploratory study aims at reaching a better understanding of three questions: (i) What values do individual heads of multi‐problem poor households and practitioners show regarding their relationship? (ii) How might those values inform the interaction between them, in positive and/or negative ways? (iii) What might the value system which organizes the interaction between the participants be? This study was carried out using a critical incidents technique and was based on a sample comprising two sub‐groups: 100 heads of multi‐problem poor families and 97 professionals. Findings reveal the following individual values: heads of multi‐problem poor families value instrumental support, relationships and effectiveness; while professionals' appreciate relationships, obedience to their own instructions and (in)effectiveness. These value systems seem to frame the interaction in games of responsibility avoidance that lead to the individuals' disempowerment, disguised in an aura of ‘adequate impotence’. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's understanding of mental states as causes of emotions

Theory of mind studies of emotion usually focus on children's ability to predict other people's feelings. This study examined children's spontaneous references to mental states in explaining others' emotions. Children (4‐, 6‐ and 10‐year‐olds, n = 122) were told stories and asked to explain both typical and atypical emotional reactions of characters. Because atypical emotional reactions are unexpected, we hypothesized that children would be more likely to refer to mental states, such as desires and beliefs, in explaining them than when explaining typical emotions. From the development of lay theories of emotion, derived the prediction that older children would refer more often to mental states than younger children. The developmental shift from a desire‐psychology to a belief‐psychology led to the expectation that references to desires would increase at an earlier age than references to beliefs. Our findings confirmed these expectations only partly, because the nature of the emotion (happiness, anger, sadness or fear) interacted with these factors. Whereas anger, happiness and sadness mainly evoked desire references, fear evoked more belief references, even in 4‐year‐olds. The fact that other factors besides age can also play an influential role in children's mental state reasoning is discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The hybrid split ad technique and onsite rewards

With a ‘split ad’, information is presented as two distinct parts, such as when two short commercials for a given brand are separated by other television content. Two studies are presented in this paper which demonstrate the advantages of an emerging form of the split ad strategy, which is termed the ‘hybrid split ad’ technique. Using this approach, a message typically begins in a traditional medium and then concludes at a website. In Experiment 1, the hybrid split ad technique is shown to enhance attitudes towards an advertised product by increasing the perceived importance of favourable attributes provided at the website. Experiment 2 replicates this finding and also addresses an issue of managerial importance, namely, how to motivate consumers to pursue the second (web‐based) portion of the ad. Offering consumers an incentive at the website is useful in this regard, provided that the incentive is small enough not to undermine the positive effects of the hybrid split ad.     

The analyst: His professional novel1

The psychoanalyst needs to be in touch with a community of colleagues; he needs to feel part of a group with which he can share cognitive tension and therapeutic knowledge. Yet group ties are an aspect we analysts seldom discuss. The author defi nes the analyst's ‘professional novel’ as the emotional vicissitudes with the group that have marked the professional itinerary of every analyst; his relationship with institutions and with theories, and the emotional nuance of these relationships. The analyst's professional novel is the narrative elaboration of his professional autobiography. It is capable of transforming the individual's need to belong and the paths of identifi cation and deidentifi cation. Experience of the oedipal confi guration allows the analyst to begin psychic work aimed at gaining spaces of separateness in his relationship with the group. This passage is marked by the work on mourning that separation involves, but also of mourning implicit in the awareness of the representative limits of our theories. Right from the start of analysis, the patient observes the emotional nuance of the analyst's connection to his group and theories; the patient notices how much this connection is governed by rigid needs to belong, and how much freedom of thought and exploration it allows the analyst. The author uses clinical examples to illustrate these hypotheses.     

The four antinomies of the death instinct1

Matte Blanco examines four paradoxical positions that arise out of Freud's writings on the death instinct. He notes that death is not a content known to the unconscious. Furthermore, the absence of time and space in the unconscious means that the conditions necessary for any process such as instinct are similarly absent. Matte Blanco demonstrates the way in which the antinomies that he explores can be explained in terms of the logics that obtain in the unconscious, and he suggests that the concept of the death instinct is one of the most profound expressions of the relationship between the modes that underlie conscious and unconscious logic.     

The basic traumatic situation in the analytical relationship1

The author attempts to develop a concept of psychic trauma which would comply with the nucleus of this Freudian notion, that is, an excess of excitations that cannot be processed by the mental apparatus, but which would also consider the functions and the crucial role of objects in the constitution of the psychism and in traumatic conditions, as well as taking into account the methodological positioning according to which the analytical relationship is the sole possible locus of observation, inference and intervention by the psychoanalyst. He considers as a basic or minimal traumatic psychoanalytical situation that in which a magnitude or quality of emotions exceeds the capacity for containment of the psychoanalytical pair, to the point of generating a period or area of dementalisation in the psyche of one or both of the participants, of requiring analytical work on the matter and promoting a signifi cant positive or negative change in the relationship. Availing himself of Bion's theory about the alpha function and the metapsychological conceptions of Freud and Green concerning psychic representations, he presents two theoretical formulations relating to this traumatic situation, utilising them according to the ‘altered focus’ model proposed by Bion. He presents three clinical examples to illustrate the concept and the relevant theoretical formulations.     

Affect and the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis1

In connection with controversial IJP articles by Stern et al. and Fonagy on the interpretation of the repressed and the recovery of past memories, the author maintains that the affect that is inherent in positive transference is at the heart of therapeutic action. Points of view put forward in the controversy (based on neurobiological knowledge) are related to Freudian metapsychology, as well as to their precursors whose scope was necessarily limited by a lack of access to more recent scientific discoveries. The author demonstrates metapsychological elements of therapeutic action inherent in the intersubjective relationship, especially identification, manifested in introjection and empathy. He describes cognitive development as spontaneously blossoming from the affective nucleus, and he explains the neuroscientic bases of this step forward. The classic (interpretative) psychoanalytic method makes up the cognitive superstructure necessary for the organisation of the mind that has sprung from the affective substructure. As a primary factor in psychic change, interpretation is limited in effectiveness to pathologies arising from the verbal phase, related to explicit memories, with no effect in the pre‐verbal phase where implicit memories are to be found. Interpretation the method used to the exclusion of all others for a century is only partial; when used in isolation it does not meet the demands of modern broad‐spectrum psychoanalysis, as the clinical material presented illustrates.     

Why perversion?: False love and the perverse pact1

In this paper, the author works with the awareness that perversion is a socially, historically and theologically loaded term, at the same time as it may be the latest frontier in psychoanalysis, both clinically, and in relation to contemporary art and culture which emphasize the perverse. Positioning itself against tendencies to deny the existence of a category of perversion or, inversely, to abuse it for the power that accrues from the act of diagnosing, she also points to other liabilities in the history of the treatment of this term, such as the narrowing down of perversion to the exclusively sexual domain, or, alternatively, the overextension of it to polymorphously erotic practices that enhance sexual excitement. The paradoxes of perversion and the difficulties of distinguishing the perverse from the non‐perverse are addressed. The case is also made that, in order to understand perversion, one must unlink it from the narrow notion of sexual practice and see what is involved on a deeper level an approach initiated when psychoanalysis turned to perversion as a defense against psychotic anxieties, and began considering the necessary place of perversion in the transference countertransference. Two features common to both sexual and non‐sexual perverse relations are the seductive and bribing aspects of perversion, and its means‐ends reversal. Perversion is a haven for the disguising of hatred and suspicion as excitement and (false) love. Displaced child and beating father, entitled child and seductive mother, are both prototypes of psychoanalytic refiection on parents who excite, deceive and corrupt their children and establish perverse pacts with them. The notion of the perverse pact is foregrounded in Alice's analysis, where first the resurrection and then the dismantling of such a pact were effected through various analytic means.     

Variations on the concept of traumatism: Traumatism,traumatic, trauma1

In this paper, the author outlines Freud's fundamental hypotheses concerning the concept of traumatism, then goes on to differentiate three notions (French being a particularly apposite language for such a venture): ‘traumatism’, ‘traumatic’ (in a substantive sense) and ‘trauma’. These three terms correspond to the three turning points in Freud's theory with respect to the concept of traumatism (1895‐97, 1920, 1938). The author evokes also the developments that are due to Ferenczi, particularly in his later writings (1928‐33), where he defi ned and discussed the question of ‘trauma’ in contemporary clinical practice; the author goes on to explore the different variations on this theme as regards mental functioning. He then defi nes, from a metapsychological point of view, the differences between ‘traumatisms’ that have been ‘worked over by secondary processes’, organised and governed by the pleasure‐unpleasure principle (‘traumatism’) and ‘early’ or ‘primary traumatisms’, which interfere with the process of binding the instinctual drives (‘trauma’); states of mind infl uenced by a traumatic imprint (‘traumatic’) are looked upon as belonging to both categories of the above mentioned traumatisms. The author illustrates his hypotheses with a clinical example.     

REDUCTIONISM AND HOLISM,CHANCE AND SELECTION,MECHANISM AND MIND

Abstract. Despite its rich and deepening panoply of empirical support, evolutionary theory continues to generate widespread concern. Some of this concern can be attributed to misunderstandings of the original concept, some to unfamiliarity with its current trajectories, and some to strongly held fears that it strips the human of cherished attributes. In this essay I seek to deconstruct such misunderstandings, lift up current concepts of what evolution entails, and address some of the existential issues it generates.