Mental number line disruption in a right-neglect patient after a left-hemisphere stroke

A right-neglect patient with focal left-hemisphere damage to the posterior superior parietal lobe was assessed for numerical knowledge and tested on the bisection of numerical intervals and visual lines. The semantic and verbal knowledge of numbers was preserved, whereas the performance in numerical tasks that strongly emphasize the visuo-spatial layout of numbers (e.g. number bisection) was impaired. The behavioral pattern of error in the two bisection tasks mirrored the one previously described in left-neglect patients. In other words, our patient misplaced the subjective midpoint (numerical or visual) to the left as function of the interval size. These data, paired with the patient's lesion site are strictly consistent with the tripartite organization of number-related processes in the parietal lobes as proposed by Dehaene and colleagues. According to these authors, the posterior superior parietal lobe on both hemispheres underpins the attentional orientation on the putative mental number line, the horizontal segment of the intraparietal sulcus is bilaterally related to the semantic of the numerical domain, whereas the left angular gyrus subserves the verbal knowledge of numbers. In summary, our results suggest that the processes involved in the navigation along the mental number line, which are related to the parietal mechanisms for spatial attention, and the processes involved in the semantic and verbal knowledge of numbers, are dissociable.     

Indigenization and the history of psychology

This article argues for the development of a historical perspective to help understand the process of indigenization in psychology. The indigenization of psychology in both the United States and India is shown to be part of larger social, economic, and political processes. A center and periphery model of knowledge production and praxes is deployed to show how practices of scientific imperialism are used to maintain the hegemony of the center. It is argued that historical approaches may be useful to challenge and counter such practices. Finally, the authors call for a polycentric history of psychology that will correspond to the emerging polycentrism exemplified in indigenous psychologies.     

Cognitive epidemiology: With emphasis on untangling cognitive ability and socioeconomic status

This commentary touches on practical, public policy, and social science domains informed by cognitive epidemiology while pulling together common themes running through this important special issue. As is made clear in the contributions assembled here, and others (Deary, Whalley, & Starr, 2009; Gottfredson, 2004; Lubinski & Humphreys, 1992, 1997), social scientists and practitioners cannot afford to neglect cognitive ability when modeling epidemiological and health care phenomena. However, given the dominant concern about the confounding of general cognitive ability (GCA) and socioeconomic status (SES), and the extent to which SES is frequently seen as the primary cause of health disparities (while GCA is neglected as a possible influence in epidemiology and health psychology), some methodological applications for untangling the relative influences of GCA and SES are reviewed. In addition, cognitive epidemiology is placed in a broader context: Just as cognitive epidemiology facilitates an understanding of pathology (“at risk” populations, and ways to attenuate undesirable personal and social conditions), it may also enrich our understanding of optimal functioning (“at promise” populations, and ways to identify and nurture the human and social capital needed to develop innovations for saving lives, economies, and perhaps even our planet). Finally, while GCA is likely the most important dimension in the study of individual differences for modeling healthy behaviors and outcomes, other relatively independent dimensions of psychological diversity do add value (Krueger, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2000). For example, compliance has at least two psychological components: a “can do” competency component (ability) and a “will do” motivational component (conscientiousness). Ultimately, developing and modeling healthy behaviors, interpersonal environments, and medical maladies are best accomplished by teaming multiple dimensions of human individuality.     

Sunk-cost effects on purely behavioral investments

Although the sunk-cost effect is a well-documented psychological phenomenon in monetary investments, existing literature investigating behavioral investments (e.g., time, effort) has not replicated this effect except when such investments relate to monetary values. The current explanation for this discrepancy proposes that purely behavioral sunk-cost effects are unlikely to be observed because they are difficult to book, track, and balance in a mental account. Conversely, we argue that, through an effort-justification mechanism, people account for the amount of behavioral resources invested when selecting an alternative, in which case they may fall prey to purely behavioral sunk-cost effects. The results of two experiments support this prediction. Because many decisions involve behavioral investments, behavioral sunk-cost effects should be pervasive psychological phenomena.     

The biological foundations of cognitive science

Cognitive Science originated in reactions against behaviorism that were motivated in significant part by the example of the computer. The computer raised the exciting possibility that mind could be understood almost entirely independently of brain: if the operations of the mind are akin to the execution of a program, then almost all the relevant aspects of mind would be captured by that program, independently of whatever was running it, be it transistors or neurons. This presumed independence of cognitive science from biology has waned considerably in recent decades, but in this paper, I argue that there is at least one crucial aspect of biology that has yet to be appreciated for its relevance to mental and other normative processes—the thermodynamics of living systems. In particular, I argue that the emergence of normativity in general—and normative function and representation in particular—depends on special systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium; these form the interface between the factual world of atoms and molecules and the normative world of mind. The nature of that emergence, in turn, imposes strong constraints on how the central nervous system functions, and, therefore, on how cognition is realized.     

Simulation à la Goldman: pretend and collapse

Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman 2006). We argue that this path leads to the resurgence of the threat of collapse (Davies 1994), diluting the principled distinction between simulation and theory use. Exploration of a related method of real-mental states operating in a pretend mode leads to a factually untenable model. Our main goal here is to raise this problem as a challenge for Goldman’s reconfigured simulation theory. Only at the end we will briefly sketch a possible alternative way of quarantine that preserves the replicative element of simulation and avoids collapse. Figure 1 provides a guide to our argument. Fig. 1 Structure of argument

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“Der Weisheits letzter Schluss”? Wisdom’s Last Conclusion?

Unexpected empirical findings lead Schwarz (2009) to question current methodological approaches within psychology. He claims that distribution anomalies, which cannot be explained by independent variables, actually prove an error in classical test theory, which then leads him to criticize current scientific conventionalism. In this commentary, it is shown that the current university system not only uses, but often reproduces conventionalism. It is, of course, necessary to teach certain techniques and tools to future psychologists, but using these critically seem to be essential in preventing scientific approaches turn into ideologies that are or must not be questioned—even if this is sometimes less threatening to one’s identity as a scientist/psychologist. This is true for all sciences, but understanding the bio-psycho-social interdependencies of human nature (ambiguities), as Schwarz describes it, seems to be a particular challenge that is in many ways different from other disciplines. Instead of striving to be like them, it is suggested we establish an ambiguity-accepting and critical environment in psychology in which theories and approaches are not considered final but temporary to foster change and progress.

Self as the feminine principle

In analytical psychology, ego is associated with consciousness and the masculine principle. Although die feminine principle generally characterizes the unconscious, it was not assigned a psychic structure equivalent to the ego. This paper proposes a model of the psyche where self and ego are the major modes of psychic experience. The self as the 'being' mode represents the feminine principle and functions according to primary process; the ego represents 'doing', the masculine principle and secondary process. Feminine and masculine principles are considered to be of equal significance in both men and women and are not limited to gender.
Jung's concept of the self is related to the Hindu metaphysical concepts of Atman and Brahman, whose source was the older Aryan nature-oriented, pagan religion. The prominence of self in analytical psychology and its predominantly 'feminine' symbolism can be understood as Jung's reaction to the psychoanalytic emphasis on ego and to Freud's 'patriarchal' orientation. In Kabbalah, a similar development took place when the feminine principle of the Shekinah emerged in a central, redemptive role, as a mythic compensation to the overtly patriarchal Judaic religion.
In the proposed model of the psyche neither ego nor self represents the psychic totality. The interplay of both psychic modes/principles constitutes the psyche and the individuation process.     

Two Books for Teachers

Murphy, Nancey and Ellis, George F. R. On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics
Haught, John F. Science and Religion: From Conflict to Conversation     

卡车驾驶员速度估计研究

用速度知觉测试仪,对251名男性卡车驾驶员在四种实验条件下的速度估计准确性进行了测量。结果发现：安全组卡车驾驶员的速度估计准确性优于事故组卡车驾驶员,两者在低速条件下差异不显著,高速条件下差异显著;事故组卡车驾驶员的高估次数高于安全组卡车驾驶员,低速条件下两者不显著.高速条件下差异显著;事故多发组与安全组卡车驾驶员的速度估计准确性在高速及低速长距离条件下差异显著;速度及距离对速度估计准确性有显著影响,且两者之间存在显著的交互作用;年龄对速度估计准确性无显著影响。