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461.
Fischer’s Way: The Next Level 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Saul Smilansky 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):147-155
I present an analogy between analytic philosophy and a particular sort of computer game, and analyze some aspects of John
Martin Fischer's My Way in the light of this analogy. I set out the different levels of the free will question, and explore how well Fischer does
on them. On the compatibility level, he succeeds, in my view, in confronting the "metaphysical challenge" and the "manipulation
challenge", but does less well with the "moral arbitrariness challenge". The compatibilist perspective captures only part
of the moral and personal truth on the compatibility issue, and is shown to be inherently shallow. On the next levels we see
that Fischer confronts particular dangers: the very virtues that make his minimalist position so resilient on the second (compatibility)
level, render it too impoverished when it comes to the third, which asks about the very importance of taking moral responsibility
seriously. Connecting to other positions (such as P.F. Strawson's version of naturalism) may be an imperative, but would also
be risky. Likewise, on the fourth level, where we confront the difficulty of deciding how to deal with the previous conclusions,
it is doubtful how well Fischer can do, given his previous philosophical commitments.
相似文献
Saul SmilanskyEmail: |
462.
The success and failure of Christianity in China was tied to the missionaries’ ability to accommodate to Chinese culture and the powers that ruled over this vast nation. A number of reasons have been put forward regarding the failure of Christian missions in China. Inability to adapt to native norms, ignorance of Chinese language, association with Western imperialism, rivalries among various religious orders, congregations and missionary societies, and the reluctance to establish a Chinese ecclesiastical hierarchy all contributed to hindering the propagation of the gospel. This paper argues that the main reason for their failure was the refusal of European clergy to hand over the leadership of the church to the Chinese, in spite of Rome’s edicts to establish an indigenous ecclesiastical hierarchy. With local clergy in charge, the issue of language and cultural adaptation would have been resolved. Unfortunately, the native clergy were looked down upon by their Western counterparts, who were mostly motivated by national and institutional interests rather than pastoral concern for the local people. The appointment of the first Chinese bishop, Gregorio Lopéz (Luo Wenzao), was more a political move than a pastoral need. 相似文献
463.
Tollefsen Christopher 《Christian Bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality》2007,13(2):139-157
This paper critically explores the path of some of the controversiesover public reason and religion through four distinct steps.The first part of this article considers the engagement of JohnFinnis and Robert P. George with John Rawls over the natureof public reason. The second part moves to the question of religionby looking at the engagement of Nicholas Wolterstorff with Rawls,Robert Audi, and others. Here the question turns specificallyto religious reasons, and their permissible use by citizensin public debate and discourse. The third part engages JürgenHabermas's argument that while citizens must be free to makereligious arguments, still, there is an obligation of translation,and a motivational constraint on lawmakers. The final sectionargues that even though Habermas's proposal fails, neverthelesshe recognizes a key difficulty for religious citizens in contemporaryliberal polities. Restoration of a full role for religiouslygrounded justificatory reasons in public debate is one partof an adequate solution to this problem, but a second plankmust be added to the solution: recognition that religious reasonscan enter into public deliberation not just as first-order justificationsof particular policies, but as second-order reasons, to be consideredby any polity that respects its religious citizens and, morebroadly, the good of religion. 相似文献
464.
Claudia Card 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(1):1-29
It has been claimed that most of the world’s preventable suffering and death are caused not by terrorism but by poverty. That
claim, if true, could be hard to substantiate. For most terrorism is not publicly recognized as such, and it is far commoner
than paradigms of the usual suspects suggest. Everyday lives under oppressive regimes, in racist environments, and of women,
children, and elders everywhere who suffer violence in their homes offer instances of terrorisms that seldom capture public
attention. Or so this essay argues, through exploring two models of terrorism and the points of view highlighted by each. 相似文献
465.
Richard Garner 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):499-513
Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral
judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making
statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are
uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I explore
a dispute among moral error theorists about how to deal with false moral judgments. The advice of the moral abolitionist is
to stop making moral judgments, but the contrary advice of the moral fictionalist is to retain moral language and moral thinking.
After clarifying the choice that arises for the moral error theorist, I argue that moral abolitionism has much to recommend
it. I discuss Mackie’s defense of moral fictionalism as well as a recent version of the same position offered by Daniel Nolan,
Greg Restall, and Caroline West. Then I second some remarks Ian Hinckfuss made in his defense of moral abolitionism and his
criticism of “the moral society.” One of the worst things about moral fictionalism is that it undermines our epistemology
by promoting a culture of deception. To deal with this problem Richard Joyce offers a “non-assertive” version of moral fictionalism
as perhaps the last option for an error theorist who hopes to avoid moral abolitionism. I discuss some of the problems facing
that form of moral fictionalism, offer some further reasons for adopting moral abolitionism in our personal lives, and conclude
with reasons for thinking that abolishing morality may be an essential step in achieving the goals well-meaning moralists
and moral fictionalists have always cherished.
相似文献
Richard GarnerEmail: |
466.
Joas Adiprasetya 《Dialog》2018,57(1):47-52
Christian leadership has long enjoyed the idea of servant‐leadership or doularchy that has been seen as standing against any form of kyriarchy. This article is an attempt to solve the problems left by doularchy and construct a model of philiarchic leadership based on the identity of pastors as friends. Several texts in the Gospel of John will be reinterpreted using the philiarchic lens. The article concludes with three applied ideas that today's Christian leaders should take into consideration. 相似文献
467.
Roberto Frega 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(3):399-421
This article explores the theme of moral rationality by examining two distinct philosophical approaches, those of perfectionism and pragmatism broadly construed. It does this by comparing Cora Diamond's reading of J. M. Coetzee's novel The Lives of Animals with an imaginary reading of the same novel tuned to a moral sensibility closer to Deweyan pragmatism. By comparing a real account with an imaginary one, the article intends to press Diamond's perfectionist understanding of problematic moral experience into confrontation with a pragmatist account of the same phenomenon. This reading becomes the starting point for a broader confrontation between two larger philosophical conceptions: perfectionism and pragmatism. By this comparison, the article means to extend a dialogue begun more than a century ago, showing in particular that integrating both perspectives within a common moral epistemology provides new insights into our understanding of moral experience. The general claim is that their differences notwithstanding, perfectionism and pragmatism share a common moral sensibility, although they part ways on some decisive issues that the article makes explicit. 相似文献
468.
David Horst 《European Journal of Philosophy》2017,25(1):47-67
An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery how an agent's thinking and acting can be guided by the enkratic requirement, which, as I shall further argue, is something that an adequate conception of enkratic rationality must be able to explain. This, I suggest, motivates exploring a different account of enkratic rationality. On this view, enkratic rationality is primarily a constitutive requirement on agency: it is a standard internal to agency, i.e., a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one's agential powers well. 相似文献
469.
John Turri 《Synthese》2009,170(1):147-153
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper
divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This
puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections. 相似文献
470.
Louise Cummings 《Argumentation》2004,18(1):61-94
In this paper, I examine the incessant call to theory that is evident in fallacy inquiry. I relate the motivations for this call to a desire to attain for fallacy inquiry certain attributes of the theoretical process in scientific inquiry. I argue that these same attributes, when pursued in the context of philosophical inquiry in general and fallacy inquiry in particular, lead to the assumption of a metaphysical standpoint. This standpoint, I contend, is generative of unintelligibility in philosophical discussions of rationality. I claim that this same unintelligibility can be shown to characterise fallacy inquiry, an example of the study of argumentative rationality. The context for my claim is an examination of the theoretical pronouncements of two prominent fallacy theorists, John Woods and Douglas Walton, in relation to the argument from ignorance fallacy. My conclusion takes the form of guidelines for the post-theoretical pursuit of fallacy inquiry. 相似文献