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101.
Ralph Weber 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2015,10(4):547
Contemporary proponents of Confucian political philosophy often ignore the fact that any sizeable future Confucian political order will have to accommodate many “non-Confucians.” The guiding question of this paper is therefore the following: how could a Confucian political philosophy, if it can at all, adequately take into account a plurality of comprehensive worldviews? I first turn to John Rawls and his account of these terms and of reasonable pluralism more generally. I then examine some particularly relevant developments and criticism of Rawls’ account. Finally, I offer a discussion of some recent proposals for a Confucian political philosophy, and examine to what extent each recognizes the fact of pluralism, sees it as a challenge, and deals with it in a persuasive manner. The paper concludes with a depiction of two major stumbling blocks that might stand firmly in the way of such a pluralism-accommodating political Confucianism. 相似文献
102.
William Grassie 《Zygon》2008,43(2):297-306
This essay is William Grassie's valedictory remarks at the Metanexus Institute's 2007 Annual Conference. Grassie asks what is wrong with religion, what is wrong with science, and why the constructive engagement of the two holds the key to setting things right. He cites Sir John Templeton and others to make his case and proposes a new curriculum for general science education that uses the history of nature as a mnemonic and context for promoting better science literacy and the incorporation of science into our cultural traditions. 相似文献
103.
Can’t We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">My Way</Emphasis> 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
John Perry 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):157-166
My aim in this study is not to praise Fischer's fine theory of moral responsibility, but to (try to) bury the “semi” in “semicompatibilism”.
I think Fischer gives the Consequence Argument (CA) too much credit, and gives himself too little credit. In his book, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer gave the CA as good a statement as it will ever get, and put his finger on what is wrong with it. Then he declared
stalemate rather than victory. In my view, Fischer’s view amounts to sophisticated compatibilism. It would be nice to be able
to call it by its right name. In The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer develops his own version of Consequence Argument, which turns on two principles, one of which is the fixity of the
past. FP: For any action Y, agent S and time t, if it is true that is S were to do Y at t, some fact about that past relative to t would not have been a fact, then S cannot at t do Y at t. I argue that the equipment needed to reject FP (and thereby defend the most plausible version of compatibilism) is needed
to deal with the problem of fatalism. In addition, I argue that the rejection of FP is compatible with Fischer’s approach
to Frankfurt cases and with his account of transfer principles. 相似文献
104.
John Martin Fischer 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):167-189
I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues
that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that
her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible,
unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that
we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that
even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned
(even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main
objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own
account.
相似文献
John Martin FischerEmail: |
105.
106.
Nicola Hoggard Creegan 《Zygon》2007,42(2):499-518
Recent controversies surrounding the discernment of design in the natural world are an indication of a pervasive disquiet among believers. Can God as creator/sustainer of creation be reconcilable with the belief that God's work is indiscernible behind secondary evolutionary causes? Christian piety requires that the order experienced in the natural world be evidence of God's love and existence. Theistic evolutionary models rarely examine this matter, assuming that God is indiscernible in the processes and order of the world because only secondary causes can be examined. This leaves antievolutionary perspectives to interpret and address the problem of seeing God in the world. I examine these issues in order to gain more credibility for the religious longing to discern God in nature while at the same time affirming the indubitable truth of an evolutionary history. I argue that God's trinitarian nature, hiddenness, and incarnation give us reason to believe that God's presence in the natural world will be discernible, but only within the natural processes, and thereby only in an obscured fashion. I also argue that newer understandings of evolutionary mechanisms are more consistent with theological appropriation than are strictly Darwinian ones. 相似文献
107.
Shaun Young 《Res Publica》2007,13(3):231-253
No less an authority than John Rawls identified Judith Shklar as a ‘political’ liberal. However, though their respective conceptions of political liberalism are similar in a number of important respects, Shklar emphasizes that her vision differs notably from that of Rawls. In particular, she explicitly eschews Rawls’s focus on establishing and sustaining an overlapping consensus, arguing that his belief in the possibility of securing such a consensus is naïve and, indeed, dangerous insofar as it embodies an obvious disregard for the painful lessons of history and thereby not only allows but invites the occurrence of new cruelties and horrors. Obviously, such an approach would seem to diverge dramatically from that promoted by Rawls and many other political liberals. The purpose of this essay is to analyze Shklar’s arguments and determine the validity of her claims regarding the differences between her conception and that of Rawls and, in so doing, assess the extent to which Shklar’s ‘liberalism of fear’ can be said to represent a meaningfully distinctive model of political liberalism. 相似文献
108.
While most people may initially agree that justice is fairness,as an evangelical Protestant I argue that, for many religiouscomprehensive doctrines, the Rawlsean model does not possessthe resources necessary to sustain tolerance in moral decisionmaking. The weakness of Rawls's model centers on the reasonablepriority of convictions that arise from private comprehensivedoctrines. To attain a free and pluralistic society, peopleneed resources sufficient to provide reasons to tolerate actionsthat are otherwise intolerable. In addition to arguing for thedeficiency of the Rawlsean political model, I sketch out a preliminarymodel of ambassadorship that offers religious communities, andin particular Protestant evangelicals, the necessary resourcesto engage the broader society tolerantly while maintaining theirreligious convictions. As a citizen of the church and a memberof another kingdom, Christians serve as ambassadors to thosewho are not of the heavenly kingdom. I take this model to bemore ambitious than that of a sojourner who lives in the landbut is isolated as much as possible from society, while moremodest than that of reconstructionists who seek to implementtheir own sacred law on all others. 相似文献
109.
David A. Reidy 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(2):193-236
In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls does not discuss justice and the global economy at great length or in great detail. What he does say has not
been well-received. The prevailing view seems to be that what Rawls says in The Law of Peoples regarding global economic justice is both inconsistent with and a betrayal of his own liberal egalitarian commitments, an
unexpected and unacceptable defense of the status quo. This view is, I think, mistaken. Rawls’s position on global or international economic justice is richer, more nuanced, and
generally more compelling than his critics have been willing to acknowledge. My aim in this essay is to sympathetically set
out, and then defend against two common families of objection to, Rawls’s position on global or international economic justice.
Objections of the first sort reject Rawls’s position as inadequately attentive to the material and economic interests of individual
persons worldwide. Objections of the second sort reject it as inadequately attentive to the material and economic interests
of well-ordered peoples. Throughout the paper I develop several arguments implicit in The Law of Peoples but not well-developed there as well as offer some additional arguments of my own consistent with the spirit of The Law of Peoples and Rawls’s work more generally. I conclude with some brief remarks expressing two worries I have about Rawls’s position
– one concerning global public goods, the other concerning the formation of a morally adequate and effective political will
within the international context under contemporary conditions.
I wish to thank Alyssa Bernstein, Allen Buchanan, Samuel Freeman, John Hardwig, John Mandle, Rex Martin, Jim Nickel, Walter
Riker, Kok-Chor Tan, and Leif Wenar for helpful comments or instructive conversation regarding earlier drafts of this paper. 相似文献
110.
Neal Judisch 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(4):357-375
John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer a theory of moral responsibility which makes responsibility dependent upon the
way in which moral agents view themselves. According to the theory, agents are responsible for their actions only if they
think of themselves as apt candidates for praise and blame; if they come to believe they are not apt candidates for praise
and blame, they are ipso facto not morally responsible. In what follows, I show that Fischer and Ravizza’s account of responsibility for consequences is
inconsistent with this subjective element of their theory, and that the subjective element may be retained only if they are
willing to implausibly restrict their account of responsibility for consequences. I end by discussing the broad significance
of the failure of the subjective element for their overall approach to moral responsibility. 相似文献