From Maclean's Triune Brain Concept to the Conflict Systems Neurobehavioral Model: The Subjective Basis of Moral and Spiritual Consciousness

This paper builds upon a critically clarified statement of the triune brain concept to set out the conflict systems neurobehavioral model. The model defines the reciprocal algorithms (rules of procedure) of behavior from evolved brain structure. The algorithms are driven by subjectively experienced behavioral tension as the self-preservational programming, common to our ancestral vertebrates, frequently tugs and pulls against the affectional program-ming of our mammalian legacy. The yoking ( zygon ) of the dual algorithmic dynamic accounts for the emergence of moral and spiritual consciousness as manifested in the universal norm of reciprocity and in the work of such thinkersas Martin Buber and Paul Tillich.     

Psychometric and Piagetian intelligences: Toward resolution of controversy

Whether “psychometric” and “Piagetian” kinds of intelligence, as measured by instruments designed to measure these constructs, are the same or different is regarded as a question of whether they have the same or different courses of development with age. While factor analysis may not be fully adequate for investigation of this question, use of this technique with variables reflecting chronological age variation must involve elimination of the age effect in order to assess relations among the constructs measured. Humphreys and Parsons (1979) were justified in partialing out age in their reanalysis of a study by Stephens, McLaughlin, Miller, and Glass (1972), to show that the two constructs are highly correlated and possibly identical in the sample studied. Reanalyses of studies by DeVries and Kohlberg (1977) and by DeVries (1974) yield somewhat conflicting results on the identity between psychometric and Piagetian intelligences. The former study does not yield a convincing separation between them, whereas the latter suggests that they can be distinguished, though substantially correlated and both loaded with a general factor. Problems in further investigating the issue are discussed.     

Learning to program in LISP

We have gathered protocols of subjects in their first 30 hours of learning LISP. The processes by which subjects write LISP functions to meet problem specifications has been modeled in a simulation program called GRAPES (Goal Restricted Production System). The GRAPES system embodies the goal-restricted architecture for production systems as specified in the ACT* theory (Anderson, 1983). We compare our simulation to human protocols on a number of problems. GRAPES simulates the top-down, depth-first flow of control exhibited by subjects and produces code very similar to subject code. Special attention is given to modeling student solutions by analogy, how students learn from doing, and how failures of working memory affect the course of problem-solving. Of major concern is the process by which GRAPES compiles operators in solving one problem to facilitate the solution of later problems.     

Shame,Stigma, and Disgust in the Decent Society

Would a just society or government absolutely refrain from shaming or humiliating any of its members? “No,” says this essay. It describes morally acceptable uses of shame, stigma and disgust as tools of social control in a decent (just) society. These uses involve criminal law, tort law, and informal social norms. The standard of moral acceptability proposed for determining the line is a version of perfectionistic prioritarian consequenstialism. From this standpoint, criticism is developed against Martha Nussbaum’s view that to respect the dignity of each person, society absolutely must refrain from certain ways of shaming and humiliating its members and rendering them objects of communal disgust.     

SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A PERSONAL VIEW ON THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE

This article considers the current state of the science–religion debate in the United Kingdom. It discusses the societies, groups, and individual scholars that shape that debate, including the dialogue between theology and physics, biology, and psychology. Attention is also given to theology's engagement with ecological issues. The article also reflects on the loss of influence of denominational Christianity within British society, and the impact both on the character of the debate and the role of the churches. Finally, some promising trajectories of development for the future are outlined.     

STIRPICULTURE: SCIENCE‐GUIDED HUMAN PROPAGATION AND THE ONEIDA COMMUNITY

Between 1869 and 1879, the communal Christian group the Oneida Community undertook a pioneering eugenics experiment called “stirpiculture” in upstate New York. Stirpiculture resulted in the planned conception, birth, and communal rearing of fifty‐eight children, bred from selected members of the Oneida Community. This article concerns how the Oneida Community's unique approach to religion and science provided the framework for the creation, process, and eventual dissolution of the stirpiculture experiment. The work seeks to expand current understanding of the early history of eugenics in the United States by placing its practice more than two decades earlier than is generally considered. Additionally, this article situates the Community's leader John Humphrey Noyes as an early eugenics and social scientific thinker. Finally, the treatment provides a case study for the transitional period in mid to late nineteenth century America whereby scientific modes of epistemology were accommodated within or supplanted by theological worldviews.     

Can’t We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">My Way</Emphasis>

My aim in this study is not to praise Fischer's fine theory of moral responsibility, but to (try to) bury the “semi” in “semicompatibilism”. I think Fischer gives the Consequence Argument (CA) too much credit, and gives himself too little credit. In his book, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer gave the CA as good a statement as it will ever get, and put his finger on what is wrong with it. Then he declared stalemate rather than victory. In my view, Fischer’s view amounts to sophisticated compatibilism. It would be nice to be able to call it by its right name. In The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer develops his own version of Consequence Argument, which turns on two principles, one of which is the fixity of the past. FP: For any action Y, agent S and time t, if it is true that is S were to do Y at t, some fact about that past relative to t would not have been a fact, then S cannot at t do Y at t. I argue that the equipment needed to reject FP (and thereby defend the most plausible version of compatibilism) is needed to deal with the problem of fatalism. In addition, I argue that the rejection of FP is compatible with Fischer’s approach to Frankfurt cases and with his account of transfer principles.     

Six Ways of Salvation: How Does Jesus Save?

Abstract : Using the model method for comparative analysis of theological theories, this article compares and contrasts six models of atonement: (1) Jesus as teacher of true knowledge; (2) Jesus as moral example and influence; (3) Jesus as the victorious champion and liberator; (4) Jesus as our satisfaction; (5) Jesus as the happy exchange; and (6) Jesus as the final scapegoat.     

Avoiding The Unavoidable? Judith Shklar’s Unwilling Search For An Overlapping Consensus

No less an authority than John Rawls identified Judith Shklar as a ‘political’ liberal. However, though their respective conceptions of political liberalism are similar in a number of important respects, Shklar emphasizes that her vision differs notably from that of Rawls. In particular, she explicitly eschews Rawls’s focus on establishing and sustaining an overlapping consensus, arguing that his belief in the possibility of securing such a consensus is naïve and, indeed, dangerous insofar as it embodies an obvious disregard for the painful lessons of history and thereby not only allows but invites the occurrence of new cruelties and horrors. Obviously, such an approach would seem to diverge dramatically from that promoted by Rawls and many other political liberals. The purpose of this essay is to analyze Shklar’s arguments and determine the validity of her claims regarding the differences between her conception and that of Rawls and, in so doing, assess the extent to which Shklar’s ‘liberalism of fear’ can be said to represent a meaningfully distinctive model of political liberalism.