Antecedents to Fechner's law: the astronomers J. Herschel, W. R. Dawes, and N. R. Pogson

The history of the stellar magnitude scale is briefly traced from the second century b.c. until the middle of the nineteenth century. It becomes clear that astronomers formulated "Fechner's Law" by about 1850. While Fechner is credited with the grander view of things, the contention is made that the astronomers John Herschel, W. R. Dawes, and N. R. Pogson have not been given their due by historians of psychology.     

Cross-modal matching and association under sodium amytal

Anatomical and theoretical considerations, as well as experimental findings, have yielded conflicting points of view regarding the abilities of the right hemisphere in man to accomplish cross-modal transfer of information. Auditory—visual cross-modal matching (CMM) and association (CMA) abilities of the left and right hemisphere (LH and RH) were tested, using the Wada intracarotid sodium amytal technique. It was found that the RH performed slightly better on these tasks than the LH. These findings contrast with results of other techniques which indicate that the RH cannot perform CMM and CMA.     

Seniority in the generational transition of laboratory groups: The effects of social familiarity and task experience

The determinants of leadership seniority in laboratory groups were investigated in two experiments. In both experiments a procedure was used in which individual group members were periodically replaced throughout 7 generations. The individuals within the groups folded origami products and traded with other groups so as to earn quarters. In the first experiment the effect of social familiarity on seniority was investigated by comparing a set of standard groups with a set of rotational groups in which the group members moved from group to group between generations and thus always interacted with strangers. There was less seniority in the rotational groups. In the second experiment the effect of experience on seniority was investigated by comparing a set of standard groups with a set of experienced groups in which the new group members were recruited from the standard groups. There was less seniority in the experienced groups. It was found in both experiments, in agreement with previous research, that over generations the subjects earned increasing amounts of money and worked with increasing speed and efficiency.     

Nonconsummatory and consummatory behavioral CRs elicited by lithium- and amphetamine-paired flavors

Various behavioral CRs elicited by saccharin solution previously paired with either lithium or amphetamine were measured in a series of four experiments. With one conditioning trial, lithium (Experiment 1), but not amphetamine (Experiment 2), produced nonconsummatory behavioral evidence of conditioning in the form of chin-rub CRs; both drugs, however, produced strong flavor aversions. With 3 conditioning trials, lithium- and amphetamine-paired flavors elicited a pattern of agitated activity, characterized by increased general activity, rearing duration, and body temperature, when the flavor was forcibly presented through an intraoral cannula (Experiment 3). When the flavor was presented in a single-bottle test (Experiment 4), 3 conditioning trials produced a similar pattern of agitated activity characterized by increased general activity, rearing (duration and frequency), stretching (duration and frequency), and limb flicking. Although both drugs supported the pattern of increased agitation-related CRs, only the lithium-paired flavors elicited chin-rub CRs (Experiments 1, 3, and 4). The difference between the drug conditions was not the result of a greater saccharin aversion in the lithium-conditioned group than in the amphetamine-conditioned group (Experiment 4). The results are related to findings that suggest that flavor aversions are mediated by a shift in the hedonic properties of the drug-paired flavors.     

Conditioned and unconditioned defensive burying in the rat

When rats first encountered a mouse-trap or a flashbulb in a chamber to which they had been habituated, they buried it with bedding material from the floor of the chamber, whereas rats previously habituated to the trap or the flashbulb did not. Conversely, rats did not bury a stationary, wire-wrapped wooden prod or a length of polyethylene tubing, even on first encounter. However, almost every rat struck by the trap, shocked by the prod, exposed to an airblast from the tube, or to a flash of the bulb, buried the respective source of aversive stimulation with the bedding material, even when a comparable control object was present during conditioning and testing. Thus, the phenomenon of defensive burying is not restricted to situations in which neutral objects serve as the source of painful electric shock. Rats seem to enter the experimental environment with an already established tendency to bury some objects (unconditioned defensive burying) but not others, and they readily learn to selectively bury an object that has been the source of any one of a variety of aversive stimuli (conditioned defensive burying).     

Cognitive style and recognition memory in young adults

Differences between impulsive and reflective subjects may be related to the amount of information processed in a given task. This possibility was tested in a visual-verbal probe recognition task. Twenty-three impulsive and 23 reflective adults subjects were divided into experimental and control groups. Experimental subjects were briefly exposed to a complex stimulus, whereas control subjects were given a comparable exposure to a different stimulus. Subjects were asked to choose between equal number of positives (stimulus-relevant) and negative probe items. A comparison of areas under memory operating characteristic curves for experimental subjects indicated that the recognition threshold for positive probes for impulsive subjects was significantly lower than the threshold for reflective subjects. The difference between subjective likelihood criteria was not significant. Also, accuracy of experimental subjects was significantly greater than that of control subjects. Differences in information availability were thought to be indicative of differences in selective attention processes.     

Confidence-judgment accuracy as a predictor of test performance

As part of the regular classroom testing procedure, undergraduate students in an introductory psychology course were asked to provide confidence judgments along with their answers to multiple-choice test items. The two objectives of the study were to determine the extent of students' confidence-judgment accuracy and the degree of relationship of this memory-monitoring ability to overall test performance. The results showed that even the students having the poorest test performance showed some confidence-judgment accuracy, and, more importantly, there was a strong positive relationship between confidence-judgment accuracy and test performance, r(43) = .49. Thus, students who know more also are better able to distinguish between known and unknown information.     

Influence and development: Two basic paradigms of education

The article discusses two basic paradigms of western educational theory, namely the concept of influence and the concept of development. Two historical contextes are analyzed, John Locke's theory of human learning and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory of natural development. Both theories are rejected in favour of a position beyond influence and development. This position of a theory of education (Erziehung) is marked with the term moral communication.An earlier and slightly different version of this article was presented to the International Symposion The Crisis of Schools (Corsendonck/Belgium, March 1992). It was translated from the german original by Annette Roeder. The final draft is my own.     

NATURALISM AND THE CATEGORIES “SCIENCE” AND “RELIGION”: A RESPONSE TO JOSH REEVES

This article is a response to Josh Reeve's “A Defense of Science and Religion.” I begin with the disclaimer that this was not solely my project but a joint enterprise. A common commitment of participants was to make the disciplines of history and theology central to the discussion and explore what new possibilities follows for the field of science and religion. I then address Reeves's two central concerns: first that I am too dismissive of the categories “science” and “religion.” In fact I have not advocated dispensing with these categories, but have insisted than we employ them critically and with a sense of their history. The second concern is that my position on naturalism seems to place me perilously close to advocates of ID or scientific creationism. I deny this, but point out that more work needs to be done, beyond simply invoking methodological naturalism, to clarify the differences between naturalistic and theological approaches to the world.