Charles F. Mackenzie,Popery, Guns,and Colonial Conflict

Charles F. Mackenzie was an Anglican archdeacon in the 19th century in the newly formed Diocese of Natal. He was consecrated a missionary bishop for Central Africa in Cape Town in 1861, which was a significant development for the Anglican Church at the time. Mackenzie struggled to read the social landscape, becoming embroiled in colonial conflict. Consequently, congregants, colleagues, and historians have characterized him in markedly different ways, rendering a disputed legacy. This paper brings Mackenzie into conversation with another figure who is not without his own controversy: Martyn Percy. Applying Percy's implicit theological approach provides an important lens with which to view the social complexities, ecclesial conflicts and missional contexts which Mackenzie sought to navigate.     

Constructing other persons: A limit on the effect

Numerous studies have documented the effect that expectancies have on perceivers' perceptions of targets, but in few of these studies have the targets been aware of the perceivers' expectancies. In the present study, some perceivers were led to believe that their future interaction partners had a cold personality while others held no such expectancy. Orthogonal to this manipulation, some targets were told that their partners expected them to be cold while others received no such information. Results indicate that expectancy confirmation occurs only when perceivers with expectancies interact with naive targets. Targets who were told that the perceiver held an expectancy about them were able to overcome this expectancy. The relevance of these findings to the process of expectancy confirmation is discussed, and some predictions are made about the conditions under which expectancy confirmation will and will not occur.     

Determinants of infant visual fixation: evidence for a two-process theory

Three experiments were conducted to investigate the dynamics of the human infant's (4 months old) visual fixation. The general finding that, over a series of trials, infants fixate longer to a complex than to a simple stimulus was replicated. The function relating fixation time to trials was shown to be nonmonotonic when the stimulus was complex (fixation time increased between Trials 1 and 2 and then decreased), but was monotonic when the stimulus was simple (it decreased systematically over trials). Additional experiments indicated that (a) the nonmonotonic function associated with the complex stimulus was eliminated when the interval separating Trials 1 and 2 was increased from 10 to 20 or 30 s (Experiment 2), and (b) the difference in fixation time between the complex and the simple stimulus was eliminated by controlling their effects in a within-subjects design (Experiment 3). These data challenge the prevailing cognitive-schema theories as a complete account of the dynamics of the infant's visual fixation. A two-process theory that accounts for these data was proposed.     

Mirror reading in right and left handers: Are sinistrals really superior?

While left handers, where they do in fact appear to differ from right handers in cognitive function, have generally been found to be slightly inferior on verbal tasks, there are some reports of a sinistral superiority for nonverbal or spatial abilities. Tankle and Heilman (Brain and Language, 1982, 17, 124-132) report a sinistral superiority in (obligatory) reading of left-right mirror-reversed text. However, in an investigation which included various other forms of geometrical transformation of the written word, we find that strong familial sinistrals are either not different from or even slightly inferior to dextrals in reading most transformations, including left-right mirror reversals.     

Doxological Extended Cognition

Many Christian theologians have proposed a universal knowledge of God implanted in all humans. Thomas Aquinas famously stated that all humans have some knowledge of God, confused though it may be. John Calvin developed this proposition in much more detail and concluded that there is a cognitive faculty in humans, the sensus divinitatis, committed to giving the cognizer knowledge of God. Independent of such theological concerns, a current movement in cognitive science proposes a radical change to the traditional boundaries drawn around the human mind. Proponents of mental extension, such as Andy Clark, argue that the mind extends well beyond the body and should be approached in a much broader conceptual analysis. This essay arises from the conviction that the Extended Mind (EM) framework offers new insights into developing a cognitive understanding of the sensus divinitatis. Drawing in equal parts on current arguments for mental extension and the sensus divinitatis, the essay establishes the compatibility between the two arguments and indicates how an integration of the two can yield significant benefits for both mental extension and the sensus divinitatis: the basing of the sensus divinitatis in a specific cognitive theory that offers explanations of its functions, and the introduction of theism to the EM argument as a potentially useful component in a collaborative cognitive science effort.     

Deconstruction and creation: an Augustinian deconstruction of Derrida

In recent continental philosophy of religion there has been significant attention paid to the Abrahamic doctrines of creation ex nihilo and divine omnipotence, especially by deconstructive thinkers such as Derrida, Caputo, and Keller. For these thinkers, the doctrine represents a form of agency that does violence to various forms of alterity. While broadly supportive of their fundamental philosophical and ethico-political views, especially about the primordiality of alterity, I differ from them in that I argue that creation ex nihilo articulates the very structure of the alterity they are concerned with. The essay proceeds through a reading of Derrida’s representation of the doctrine and a “deconstruction” of his view by means of a reading of Augustine and Anselm.     

Was John Stuart Mill a Pluralist?

In his Autobiography,John Stuart Mill,the 19th-century British political philosopher,portrayed his On Liberty as being "a kind of philosophic text-book" dedicated to a single truth,that is,"the importance,to man and society,of a large variety in types of character,and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and conflicting directions." The Mill of On Liberty may seem to be a pluralist who tends to prefer difference per se to goodness of a uniform pattern,many-sidedness to conformity,and eccentricity to mediocrity.This paper seeks to challenge this argument by paying close attention to the text.It argues that the Mill of On Liberty was far from a single-minded pluralist.Two divergent positions are found throughout his reasoning:one is a pluralist idea that an individual's own plan of life is the best,no matter how base or licentious it might be;the other is the belief that there exist a limited number of ideal ways of life which define what the good life is.The two positions are,if not mutually exclusive,at least in important aspects indicative of some profound tension at the center of Mill's thought.     

过渡中的日本卫生体系

主要探讨日本过渡中的医疗卫生体系。近十年间,由于日本经济持续迟滞和通货紧缩,共产资本主义下的社会平等已受到挑战,新自由主义改革已经波及到医疗保健领域,改革已势在必行。通过借鉴池上和坎贝尔的研究成果基础上,回顾了日本医疗卫生体系的特征,试图为日本医疗卫生体系改革提供选择性的方案。     

Did John B. Watson Really “Found” Behaviorism?

Developments culminating in the nineteenth century, along with the predictable collapse of introspective psychology, meant that the rise of behavioral psychology was inevitable. In 1913, John B. Watson was an established scientist with impeccable credentials who acted as a strong and combative promoter of a natural science approach to psychology when just such an advocate was needed. He never claimed to have founded “behavior psychology” and, despite the acclaim and criticism attending his portrayal as the original behaviorist, he was more an exemplar of a movement than a founder. Many influential writers had already characterized psychology, including so-called mental activity, as behavior, offered many applications, and rejected metaphysical dualism. Among others, William Carpenter, Alexander Bain, and (early) Sigmund Freud held views compatible with twentieth-century behaviorism. Thus, though Watson was the first to argue specifically for psychology as a natural science, behaviorism in both theory and practice had clear roots long before 1913. If behaviorism really needs a “founder,” Edward Thorndike might seem more deserving, because of his great influence and promotion of an objective psychology, but he was not a true behaviorist for several important reasons. Watson deserves the fame he has received, since he first made a strong case for a natural science (behaviorist) approach and, importantly, he made people pay attention to it.