Conditioned and unconditioned defensive burying in the rat

When rats first encountered a mouse-trap or a flashbulb in a chamber to which they had been habituated, they buried it with bedding material from the floor of the chamber, whereas rats previously habituated to the trap or the flashbulb did not. Conversely, rats did not bury a stationary, wire-wrapped wooden prod or a length of polyethylene tubing, even on first encounter. However, almost every rat struck by the trap, shocked by the prod, exposed to an airblast from the tube, or to a flash of the bulb, buried the respective source of aversive stimulation with the bedding material, even when a comparable control object was present during conditioning and testing. Thus, the phenomenon of defensive burying is not restricted to situations in which neutral objects serve as the source of painful electric shock. Rats seem to enter the experimental environment with an already established tendency to bury some objects (unconditioned defensive burying) but not others, and they readily learn to selectively bury an object that has been the source of any one of a variety of aversive stimuli (conditioned defensive burying).     

Cognitive style and recognition memory in young adults

Differences between impulsive and reflective subjects may be related to the amount of information processed in a given task. This possibility was tested in a visual-verbal probe recognition task. Twenty-three impulsive and 23 reflective adults subjects were divided into experimental and control groups. Experimental subjects were briefly exposed to a complex stimulus, whereas control subjects were given a comparable exposure to a different stimulus. Subjects were asked to choose between equal number of positives (stimulus-relevant) and negative probe items. A comparison of areas under memory operating characteristic curves for experimental subjects indicated that the recognition threshold for positive probes for impulsive subjects was significantly lower than the threshold for reflective subjects. The difference between subjective likelihood criteria was not significant. Also, accuracy of experimental subjects was significantly greater than that of control subjects. Differences in information availability were thought to be indicative of differences in selective attention processes.     

Confidence-judgment accuracy as a predictor of test performance

As part of the regular classroom testing procedure, undergraduate students in an introductory psychology course were asked to provide confidence judgments along with their answers to multiple-choice test items. The two objectives of the study were to determine the extent of students' confidence-judgment accuracy and the degree of relationship of this memory-monitoring ability to overall test performance. The results showed that even the students having the poorest test performance showed some confidence-judgment accuracy, and, more importantly, there was a strong positive relationship between confidence-judgment accuracy and test performance, r(43) = .49. Thus, students who know more also are better able to distinguish between known and unknown information.     

Influence and development: Two basic paradigms of education

The article discusses two basic paradigms of western educational theory, namely the concept of influence and the concept of development. Two historical contextes are analyzed, John Locke's theory of human learning and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory of natural development. Both theories are rejected in favour of a position beyond influence and development. This position of a theory of education (Erziehung) is marked with the term moral communication.An earlier and slightly different version of this article was presented to the International Symposion The Crisis of Schools (Corsendonck/Belgium, March 1992). It was translated from the german original by Annette Roeder. The final draft is my own.     

NATURALISM AND THE CATEGORIES “SCIENCE” AND “RELIGION”: A RESPONSE TO JOSH REEVES

This article is a response to Josh Reeve's “A Defense of Science and Religion.” I begin with the disclaimer that this was not solely my project but a joint enterprise. A common commitment of participants was to make the disciplines of history and theology central to the discussion and explore what new possibilities follows for the field of science and religion. I then address Reeves's two central concerns: first that I am too dismissive of the categories “science” and “religion.” In fact I have not advocated dispensing with these categories, but have insisted than we employ them critically and with a sense of their history. The second concern is that my position on naturalism seems to place me perilously close to advocates of ID or scientific creationism. I deny this, but point out that more work needs to be done, beyond simply invoking methodological naturalism, to clarify the differences between naturalistic and theological approaches to the world.     

Rejecting the Urge to Theorise in Fallacy Inquiry

In this paper, I examine the incessant call to theory that is evident in fallacy inquiry. I relate the motivations for this call to a desire to attain for fallacy inquiry certain attributes of the theoretical process in scientific inquiry. I argue that these same attributes, when pursued in the context of philosophical inquiry in general and fallacy inquiry in particular, lead to the assumption of a metaphysical standpoint. This standpoint, I contend, is generative of unintelligibility in philosophical discussions of rationality. I claim that this same unintelligibility can be shown to characterise fallacy inquiry, an example of the study of argumentative rationality. The context for my claim is an examination of the theoretical pronouncements of two prominent fallacy theorists, John Woods and Douglas Walton, in relation to the argument from ignorance fallacy. My conclusion takes the form of guidelines for the post-theoretical pursuit of fallacy inquiry.     

The Heart of the Reformation Faith

Abstract: This historical and theological study of Reformation theologians, principally Martin Luther and John Calvin, examines three dimensions of faith: (1) faith as belief; (2) faith as trust; and (3) faith as the indwelling presence of Christ. To the question, “how does faith justify?,” the answer is found in the third, the indwelling of Christ, wherein the justness of Christ is present in the sinful person.     

THE POWER OF RELIGIOUS NATURALISM IN KARL PETERS'S DANCING WITH THE SACRED

Abstract. This essay is an appreciative engagement with Karl Peters's Dancing with the Sacred (2002). Peters achieves a naturalistic theology of great power. Two themes are covered here. The first is how Peters gives ontological footing for a naturalistic conception of God conceived as the process of creativity in nature. Peters achieves this by conceiving creativity in terms of Darwinian random variation and natural selection combined with the notion of nonequilibrium thermodynamics. He gives ontological reference for a conception of God similar to Henry Nelson Wieman's idea of creative transformation. The second theme is how Peters succeeds in translating this nonpersonal conception of God into a powerful view of naturalistic religion that can shape a religious form of life. The key is that Peters's God can be understood as present in experience. Peters provides naturalistic interpretations of grace and the cruciform structure of creativity; the latter addresses the problem of evil in a nuanced fashion. I conclude with three critical comments about Peters's environmental ethics, his use of the notion of mystery, and his failure to have a robust conception of human fault or sin.     

RETHINKING THE SECULAR: SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY, AND RELIGION TODAY

Abstract. Contemporary tensions between science and religion cannot simply be seen as a manifestation of an eternal tension between reason and revelation. Instead, the modern secular, including science and technology, needs to be seen as a distinctive historical phenomenon, produced and still radically conditioned by the religious history of the West. Clashes between religion and science thus ought to be seen fundamentally as part of a dialogue that is internal to Western religious history. While largely agreeing with Caiazza's account of the “magical” understanding of technology, I suggest that this needs to be seen as part of a more fundamental drift in religion and culture away from canonical meanings to more “indexical,” pragmatic ones—but also that technology is still inflected by soteriological meanings that were coded into modern technology at its very inception in the early modern period. I conclude by arguing that a recognition of science and technology's grounding in Western religious history can make possible a more fundamental encounter with religion.