Jung Among the Physicists: A Review Essay of Dual-Aspect Monism and the Deep Structure of Meaning

This essay reviews the recent book by Harald Atmanspacher and Dean Rickles, Dual-Aspect Monism and the Deep Structure of Meaning. The essay aims to contextualize and clarify the book’s core argument about the theoretical and empirical fruitfulness of decompositional dual-aspect monism as an intervention into the mind-body problem that ascribes a pivotal role to meaning. The variants of dual-aspect monism discussed were developed primarily by physicists, but the essay also highlights the crucial contributions to the argument by the one non-physicist involved, Carl Gustav Jung, as well as noting the significance of dual-aspect monism and of the reviewed book for analytical psychology.     

The Life and Works of a Bottom-Up Thinker

A brief account is given of the author's life as a physicist and then a priest. The twin foundations of the author's theological endeavors have been a respect for traditional Christian thinking, though not exempting it from revision where this is needed, and a style of argument termed bottom-up thinking, which seeks to proceed from experience to understanding. The diversity of the world faith traditions is perceived as a major source of perplexity. A revised and modest natural theology and the issue of divine action have been at the top of a science and theology agenda. A defense is sketched in realist terms of the metaphysical strategy of using an ontological interpretation of the unpredictabilities of chaos theory to support a notion of top-down causality through active information. The success of Christian theology as a resource of total explanation depends on a credible account of eschatological hope. Reference is made to practical experience of ethics in the public square.     

Higher Pantheism

Romantic sensibility and political necessity led Humphry Davy, Britain's most prominent scientist in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, to pantheism: nature worship, involving for him a fervent belief in the immortality of the soul. Rapt with a vision of sublimity, from mountain tops or balloons, men of science in succeeding generations also found in pantheism a reason for their vocation and a way of making sense of their world. It should be seen as an alternative both to active participation in church life (like Faraday's) and to a gritty agnosticism (like Huxley's), indicating again how subtle and complex relationships were between science and religion in the nineteenth century.     

Mission,Reconciliation, and the Politics of Place

Through the retelling of some familiar biblical stories – Jonah, Acts 1, Acts 10 – and gospel narratives of inclusion, this paper looks at the transformation of politics and identities made possible by the sending of the Holy Spirit and the mission of reconciliation to which Christians are called. Through an examination of the themes of power, prejudice, partnership, and identity, the paper aims to offer a concrete approach to rethinking the spaces and places where a reconciling mission can be enacted. Central to an understanding of reconciliation are the disruption and transgressing of boundaries in which Jesus engaged. In addition to this, Jesus creates these unique spaces for reconciliation around his very person, and the Spirit leads the church into these same contexts. Finally, selections of John 17 are examined through a biographical lens in order to offer a new understanding of the politics of identity and the surprising contexts where God’s Spirit reconciles all things in Christ.     

What We Owe to the Global Poor

This essay defends an account of the duties to the global poor that is informed by the empirical question of what makes countries rich or poor, and that tends to be broadly in agreement with John Rawlss account in The Law of Peoples. I begin by introducing the debate about the sources of growth and explore its implications for duties towards the poor. Next I explore whether (and deny that) there are any further-reaching duties towards the poor. Finally, I ask about the moral foundations for the duties to the poor of the sort that earlier parts argue there are.     

Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations

This article has three main parts, Section 2 considers the nature and extent to which individuals who are well-off have a moral obligation to aid the worlds needy. Drawing on a pluralistic approach to morality, which includes consequentialist, virtue-based, and deontological elements, it is contended that most who are well-off should do much more than they do to aid the needy, and that they are open to serious moral criticism if they simply ignore the needy. Part one also focuses on the United States, and illustrates both how incredibly wealthy the U.S. is and some of the spending habits of its citizens; however, its considerations apply to the well-off generally. Section 3 considers whether justice provides reasons for helping the needy. Noting that justice in an extremely complex notion, it discusses numerous considerations relevant to justices scope and implications, including an extended Rawlsian conception of justice, an absolute conception, a comparative conception, the distinction between natural and social justice, and various elements of common-sense morality. Section 2 also distinguishes between agent-relative justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we act justly, and agent-neutral justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we have reasons of justicefor acting. Correspondingly, it argues that even if one can ignore the needy without acting unjustly, as philosophers like Robert Nozick and Jan Narveson contend, there may be powerful reasons of justicefor addressing their plight. Section 4 briefly address the responsibilities of international organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). Drawing on Section 2, it is suggested that in addition to standard reasons to act justlytowards needy members of the worlds community, there will be reasons of justicefor such organizations to aid the needy in both present, and future, generations. The article concludes by contending that the well-off in countries like the U.S. have reason to view international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO as their agents, and to seek to insure that they alleviate misfortunes amongst the worlds needy.     

MORAL DELIBERATION AND OPERATIVE RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO MARY MAGADA‐WARD AND CYNTHIA GAYMAN

Abstract: The aim of this article is to show how intimately connected Beth J. Singer's theory of operative rights is with her understanding of the deliberative process. I thus argue against Cynthia Gayman's effort to set in contrast Singer's theory of rights and Dewey's characteristic emphasis on reflective morality. Since I take the value of Singer's approach to be most evident in its relevance to the abortion debate as an ongoing deliberation, I question whether Mary Magada‐Ward sufficiently appreciates the dialogical and deliberative emphases of Singer's stance. My goal, however, is not so much to argue against either Gayman or Magada‐Ward as it is to argue for taking Singer's position even more seriously than either author does. In particular, I want to highlight the finely nuanced character of Singer's philosophical intervention in the debate regarding abortion, especially stressing certain features that Gayman and Magada‐Ward overlook.     

Principles for The Law of Peoples

In The Law of Peoples John Rawls gives a list of eight principles for the law of peoples. I argue that the force of the principles depends in large part upon their being lexically ordered, and I attempt such an ordering. However, the lexically ordered list makes it clear that the duty of non-intervention obtains only after the duty to honor human rights is satisfied. Also, I point to certain “practical” difficulties with intervention on behalf of human rights. Rawls writes that additional principles are needed, and I make two suggestions. I conclude that the problems arising from intervention and the need for additional principles show that the “second Original Position” is like the first Original Position: both involve, Rawls notwithstanding, the selection and ordering of principles of justice.     

AN ENGAGED BUDDHIST RESPONSE TO JOHN RAWLS'S THE LAW OF PEOPLES

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls proposes a set of principles for international relations, his “Law of Peoples.” He calls this Law a “realistic utopia,” and invites consideration of this Law from the perspectives of non‐Western cultures. This paper considers Rawls's Law from the perspective of Engaged Buddhism, the contemporary form of socially and politically activist Buddhism. We find that Engaged Buddhists would be largely in sympathy with Rawls's proposals. There are differences, however: Rawls builds his view from the idea of independent nation–states, while the Buddhists see the world more in terms of a single humankind, the members being highly interdependent with one another, and also with the physical world. The Buddhists would also push harder than Rawls for global structures building multilateralism, restrict more severely justifications for war and behavior in war, stress economic justice more heavily, and insist on all the human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.